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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in macroeconomics and finance. The first and
second chapters analyze the impact of the financial shocks and anti-corruption campaign
on Chinese firms through the bank lending channel. The third chapter provides a new
method to predict the cash flow from operations (CFO) via semi-parametric estimation
and machine learning.
The first chapter explores the impact of the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis
on Chinese firms through the bank lending channel and firm borrowing channel. Using
new data linking Chinese firms to their bank(s) and four different measurements of expo-
sure to the international markets (international borrowing, importance of lending to for-
eign listed companies, share of trade settlement, and exchange/income), I find that banks
with higher exposure to the international markets cut lending more during the recent fi-
nancial crisis. In addition, state-owned bank loans are more pro-cyclical compared with
private bank loans. Moreover, banks with higher exposure to the international markets
cut lending more when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth. With regard to
firm borrowing channel, I find that firms with higher weighted aggregate exposure to the
international markets through banks have lower net debt, cash, employment, and capital
investment during the financial crisis. Firms with higher weighted aggregate exposure to
the global markets have higher net debt and lower cash, employment, and capital invest-
ment when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth. This paper also provides a
theoretical model to explain the mechanism in a partially opened economy like China.
The second chapter discusses the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on Chinese
firms through the bank lending channel. Using confidential data linking Chinese firms to
their bank(s) and prefecture-level corruption index, I find that banks located in more cor-
rupted prefectures offer significantly less credits before the anti-corruption investigation,
and this effect changes the direction after the investigation. Moreover, banks located in
more corrupted prefectures tend to use higher interest rates, longer maturity, and more
collateral before the campaign, all of these effects change the direction after the campaign.
This paper suggests that the banks located in more corrupted prefectures have stronger
monopoly power (or higher markup, and lower efficiency). This monopoly effect could
be proved by that the bank concentration ratio is higher, and the bad loans of the banks are
higher in the more corrupted areas, and all of these effects disappear after the campaign.
The third chapter considers the methods of prediction of Cash flow from operations
(CFO). Forecasting CFO is an essential topic in financial econometrics and empirical ac-
counting. It impacts a variety of economic decisions, including valuation methodolo-
gies employing discounted cash flows, distress prediction, risk assessment, the accuracy
of credit-rating predictions, and the provision of value-relevant information to security
markets. Existing literature on statistically-based cash-flow prediction has pursued cross-
sectional versus time-series estimation procedures in a mutually exclusive fashion. Cu-
mulated empirical evidence indicates that the beta value varies across firms of different
sizes, and the cross-sectional regression can not capture an idiosyncratic beta. However,
although a time series based predictive model has the advantage of allowing for firm-
specific variability in beta, it requires a long enough time series data. In this paper, we
extend the literature on statistically-based, cash-flow prediction models by introducing
an estimation procedure that, in essence, combine the favorable attributes of both cross-
sectional estimation via the use of "local" cross-sectional data for firms of similar size and
time-series estimation via the capturing of firm-specific variability in the beta parameters
for the independent variables. The local learning approach assumes no a priori knowl-
edge on the constancy of the beta coefficient. It allows the information about coefficients
to be represented by only a subset of observations. This feature is particularly relevant in
the CFO model, where the beta values are only related to cross-sectional data information
that is "local" to its size. We provide empirical evidence that the prediction of cash flows
from operations is enhanced by jointly adopting features specific to both cross-sectional
and time-series modeling simultaneously.
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Chapter One
International Exposure and the
Transmission of Financial Shocks:
Evidence from China
1.1 Introduction
What is the impact of the two crises on the credit supply of Chinese banks? This paper an-
alyzes the effects of the financial crisis in the US and the sovereign debt crisis in European
countries on the credit supply of Chinese banks.
Why do we focus on Chinese bank lending channel? Table 1.1 compares the financial
development of China and the United States in 2016, column 1 shows that the absolute
value of the bank credit in China is even more significant than the bank credit in the
United States (15.45 vs. 12.44). When we consider the amount of bank credit as a fraction
of the GDP, the difference between China and the United States is significantly amplified
(137.95% vs. 67.00%). Moreover, the amount of bank credit is the largest among all finan-
cial instruments (stock, fixed income, insurance, and investment funds). Therefore I focus
on Chinese bank credit in this paper.
Why do we choose the financial crisis in 2008 as the supply side shock? Figure 1.1
1
shows the bank assets and ROA of Chinese banks, we could find an obvious turning point
in the year 2008, from 2000 to 2008, the ROA of Chinese banks increased dramatically,
however, after 2008 the ROA became flat and even decreased later. Thus, something
happened in Chinese bank system in the year 2008.
Why do we use the financial crisis as a natural experiment? The recent economic
recession happened outside China, but it should significantly affect the Chinese banks
that have a high level of openness. In other words, the liquidity problem was experienced
by Chinese banks with a higher degree of openness, so that the liquidity and funding
shock varied substantially across banks.
Do the financial crisis in the US and sovereign debt crisis in European countries have
any impact on Chinese banks? Some people suggest no effects. There are two points
to support this hypothesis. First, both the financial and sovereign debt crisis occurred
outside China. Secondly, China is almost the most regulated financial market in the main
economy. However, this paper suggests financial crisis have an impact on Chinese bank
lending channel. We could find three supply-side bank lending channels. First, we have a
passive and direct bond market channel. When the international bond markets contracts
decrease following the financial crisis, the bank credits of high exposure banks decreases.
Secondly, we have an active and indirect stock market channel. The stock price of foreign
listed firms declined significantly in the stock market after the recent financial crisis, the
bank credits of high exposure banks declined accordingly. Finally, we have an active and
indirect goods market channel. When firm exports decrease in the goods market after the
financial crisis, the asset side of bank balance sheets worsens in quantity and quality.
Chodorow-Reich (2013) shows the impact of the financial crisis on the bank lending
channel of the United States. Similarly, as the financial crisis originated outside China,
we could use the dispersion in the exposure to the recent financial crisis as a source of
exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers in Chinese financial market.
This paper also uses the Khwaja and Mian (2008) technique to examine the bank lending
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channel and firm borrowing channel simultaneously, in particular, I use the firm-year
fixed effects to control the impact endogenous coming from the demand side. Moreover,
I also use bank-level control variables to address the issue of bank heterogeneity.
This paper constructs a novel data set which combines information on 281 major Chi-
nese banks and 3302 listed Chinese firms from 2001 to 2016. We also use some variables
to measure the degree of the openness of the banks: International borrowing, which as-
sess a bank’s openness by dividing the bank’s international commercial borrowing and
bond by its total assets; Foreign Listed, which is the loans given to B-share, H-share and
overseas-listed firms as a fraction of the total loan; Trade Settlement, which is the bank-
level trade settlements over the total loans; as well as Exchange/Income, which is the
bank’s exchange gains as a fraction of its total income.
Acharya et al. (2018) discusses three potential transmission channels of the sovereign
debt crisis in Europe. Although I do not focus on the sovereign debt crisis, I will focus
on the channels identified in the paper of Acharya et al. (2018). Compared to a typical
banking crisis in which the lending supply shock is solely caused by banks’ impaired
financial health, the impact of the financial crisis and sovereign debt crises on bank lend-
ing in China is much more complicated. In particular, there are three channels through
which the financial crisis potentially affected banks’ lending decisions: two active chan-
nels, which worked through a reduction in the bank credit given to foreign listed and in-
ternational trade firms because of banks’ risk-limiting behavior, and one passive channel,
which acted via the substantial decline in the bank’s existing international borrowings.
Moreover, we could use international borrowing to represent the bonds market, foreign
listed is a good proxy for the stocks market, and trade settlement is a suitable measure-
ment for goods market. I also compared these three potential channels in three different
markets, and find that bonds and stocks markets are more responsive when facing with
the recent financial crisis.
In summary, my paper provides several novel findings. I find that banks with higher
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exposure to the international markets cut lending more following the recent financial cri-
sis. Moreover, banks with higher exposure to the global markets cut credit more when
there is a negative shock in the OECD GDP growth rate.
Moreover, this paper considers both the market effect and the government regulation
effect. China was experiencing a domestic slow down when it got hammered by the
global financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008. The Chinese policy response since
that time has been extraordinarily vigorous. At the beginning of 2009, China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) put strict finan-
cial regulations on the banks with high exposure to the international financial market to
avoid the liquidity risk. However, these kinds of banks are highly encouraged before the
financial crisis in 2008. This paper groups all the banks into state-owned banks and pri-
vate banks; thus, state-owned banks were affected more because of the regulation effect.
To Sum up, the data suggest that regulatory pressure was substantial. This finding could
be seen by observing that the reduction in loans is more significant for state-owned banks
on which the Chinese government has more control.
In addition, I find that the financial shock from the international markets also impacts
Chinese firm borrowing channel. In particular, firms with higher weighted aggregate
exposure to the global markets through the banks have lower net debt, cash, employ-
ment and capital investment during the financial crisis, and firms with higher weighted
aggregate exposure to the international markets have higher net debt and lower cash, em-
ployment and capital investment when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth
rate.
This paper also develops a model bank in the partially opened economy where banks
differ in their exposure to the international market. This general equilibrium model sheds
light on the mechanism behind the transmission channels that impact the bank lending
channel. The proposed model predicts that when world interest rate increases, banks
with higher exposure to the international market would reduce more bank loans through
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the balance sheet hit the channel. Besides, when firm return decreases, banks with higher
international exposure will reduce more bank credits through the risk-limiting behavior
channel. The predictions of the model are consistent with crucial empirical results in this
paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 further discusses our contribution
to the existing literature. Section 1.3 presents the background of the Chinese bank sys-
tem. Section 1.4 illustrates the three potential channels to impact the Chinese bank lend-
ing channel. Section 1.5 presents the bank loan effects of the financial crisis. Section 1.6
shows the firm-level financial and real effects of the financial shocks. Section 1.7 studies
an incentive conceptual framework of financial inter-mediation to illustrate the lending
patterns observed during the recent financial crises. Section 1.8 presents the robustness
checks. Section 1.9 concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
Chodorow-Reich (2013) discuss the link between credit supply shocks and employment
during the recent financial crisis. He constructs a new data set which combines infor-
mation on banking relationships and employment at 2000 non-financial firms during the
2008-2009 crisis. Chodorow-Reich (2013) first verifies empirically the importance of bank-
ing relationships, which imply a cost to borrowers who switch lenders. To address po-
tential endogeneity issues, he uses the dispersion in lender health following the Lehman
crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers. Simi-
larly, I use the distribution in lender exposure to the international markets following the
financial crisis as the source of exogenous variation to exploit the fact that the financial
crisis originated outside the Chinese financial market. Finally, he shows that firms that
had pre-crisis relationships with less healthy lenders had a lower likelihood of obtaining
a loan following the Lehman bankruptcy, paid a higher interest rate if they did borrow,
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and reduced employment by more compared to pre-crisis clients of healthier lenders.
Since Chodorow-Reich (2013) only consider the cross-sectional regression, he only
paid attention to a point instead of a period, including the periods before and after the
financial crisis. In this case, he only considers the firm fixed effects. In my paper, I use
panel data regression, which means I could estimate the time trend of the impact, and
also I could use year fixed effects, or more general, year-firm fixed effects.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) analyze how supply-side bank liquidity shocks get transmit-
ted to the rest of the economy. They examine the impact of liquidity shocks by exploiting
cross-bank liquidity variation induced by unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan. When
Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, the IMF suspended the exchange rate liquidity
support. Banks experienced the deposit run with larger dollar deposit accounts. The liq-
uidity shock varied substantially across banks.Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimate the bank
lending channel and firm borrowing channel simultaneously, and show that for the same
firm borrowing from two different banks, its loan from the bank experiencing a 1 percent
larger decline in liquidity drops by an additional 0.6 percent. This paper also uses the
fixed effect technique in Khwaja and Mian (2008) to estimate the bank lending channel
and firm borrowing channel simultaneously.
Whereas several contributions have analyzed the effects of the financial crisis on bank
lending, there is more limited evidence about the resulting impact on sovereign debt
crises. Balduzzi et al. (2017) summarize the literature regarding micro evidence on the ef-
fects of financial shocks related to the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis. They use
Italian firm-bank data (more representative than the data from the Italian Credit Registry)
and find that financial market valuations of banks affect firm’s investment and employ-
ment decisions through their impact on the level and volatility of banks’ cost of funding.
The identification strategy in their paper relies on the heterogeneous time variation in
banks’ cost of funding generated by the 2007-2009 financial crisis and by the 2010-2012
sovereign debt crisis, both generated outside the Italian non-financial corporate sector.
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Moreover, Acharya et al. (2018) explore the impact of the credit crunch that followed
the European debt crisis on the corporate policies of European firms. They show that
banks’ exposures to impaired sovereign debt and the risk-limiting behavior of under-
capitalized banks contributed significantly to the severity of the crisis.
Overall, the specific business cycle model is a hybrid of Gertler and Karadi (2011) that
allows for financial inter-mediation and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) that allows for liq-
uidity risk. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) develop a canonical framework to think about
credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the financial cri-
sis. They use the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in
financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how var-
ious credit market interventions by the central bank might work to mitigate the crisis. In
this paper, we allow for the interaction of central bank, private bank as well as the state-
owned bank. Song et al. (2011) construct a model consistent with China’s economic tran-
sition: entrepreneurial firms use more productive technologies, but due to financial im-
perfections, they must finance investments through internal savings. State-owned firms
have low productivity but survive because of better access to credit markets. In this pa-
per, we use homogeneous firms and heterogeneous banks. We assume that state-owned
banks focus on risk, thus they have low return and low risk, while private banks focus
on profit, therefore they have a high return and high risk. Based on Holmstrom and Ti-
role (1997), this paper tries to develop an incentive model of financial intermediation to
illustrate the lending patterns observed during the recent financial crisis.
This paper also contributes to the academic literature on the Chinese banking system.
There is a growing literature that analysis the Chinese financial market. The Chinese
banking system has played an important role in the growth of China’s economy. (Allen
et al., 2005) In the past decade, several papers have been published, analyzing different
aspects of the Chinese banking system. García-Herrero et al. (2006), Fu and Heffernan
(2009), Lin and Zhang (2009), and Dong et al. (2016) focus on the reform and/or perfor-
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mance of the Chinese banking system. In the 1990s, the banking system in China was
dominated by four large state-owned banks. However, these four state-owned big banks
faced serious problems, such as high non-performing loans and inefficient operation and
management. Thus, the Chinese authorities initiated a series of reforms on the banking
system in 2003. The four state-owned banks became joint-stock commercial banks, and
they have been listed successively on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2006. Reforms
were also implemented in other small and medium-sized commercial banks and rural
credit cooperatives since 2003. After the reform, the Chinese banking system became
more and more comprehensive and diversified, playing a dominant role in the Chinese
financial system.
Berger et al. (2009), Ariff and Luc (2008), and Asmild and Matthews (2012) investigate
the efficiency of Chinese banks. Bailey et al. (2011) and Fenech et al. (2014) investigate
the quality of bank loans and some other characteristic of the Chinese banking system.
Fenech et al. (2014) find that the Chinese banking system and its loan quality is directly
linked to real estate values and government-supported infrastructure projects. Clearly,
in China, the two-way causality of both bank growth and its soundness partly depends
on these projects’ propensity in generating sufficient cash flows to repay the bank loans.
Chen et al. (2014), Wang et al. (2015) and Huang et al. (2015) investigate systemic risk in
the Chinese banking system.
There is a growing literature that analyzes the Chinese bank lending channel. Qian
et al. (2015) use the event that many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated
authority to individual loan officers in 2002 and 2003 as a plausibly exogenous shock,
and find that the bank’s internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest
rates and ex-post outcomes after the reform. Gao et al. (2019) analyze the borrowing and
defaults of local governments in China. They find that policy bank loans to local gov-
ernments have significantly lower default rates than commercial bank loans with similar
characteristics. The exogenous shock they use is the announcement of the 4-trillion stim-
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ulus package in 2009. Li et al. (2018) provide a novel empirical finding that the recent
anti-corruption investigations in China are associated with bank loan reallocation from
less productive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive non-SOEs, indicating
that the competition effect dominates the contagion effect for non-SOEs. The exogenous
shock they use is that the government required the immediate information disclosures
of the corruption-related officials to the public, intending to improve the transparency of
governance since late 2012.
1.3 Background
According to the Chinese Financial Stability Report (2009-2014), the banking system ac-
counted for more than 90% of the total asset of financial institutions since 2008. Ac-
cording to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC), the composition of Chinese banks are 3 development banks, 5 large-scale
commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 145 city commercial banks, 468 ru-
ral commercial banks, 122 rural cooperative banks, 1803 agricultural credit cooperatives,
1134 new rural financial institution, 1 postal savings bank, 92 foreign banks’ branches or
non-bank financial institutions.
China has achieved remarkable progress in reforming its banking system. There are
117 Chinese banks in the 2015 Top 1000 of banks; three of them (the Bank of China, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China) are rated
as global systemically important banks. Chinese banks made $292 billion in aggregate
pretax profit in 2013, or 32% of total earnings of the world’s top 1,000 banks, according to
The Banker magazine.
However, there are also lots of severe problems in the Chinese banking system. First
off, although the Chinese banking system has become more diversified, it is still domi-
nated by a few big banks. For example, five large-scale commercial banks accounted for
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43% of total assets of the Chinese banking system at the end of 2013 and 12 joint-stock
commercial banks for 18%.
Moreover, China’s banking sector, together with other sectors of strategic importance,
has been under intensive monitoring by the government, mainly through its central bank
(People’s Bank of China, PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
Qian et al. (2015) states that PBOC limits the movements of interest rates on both deposits
and loans by setting base rates along with upper and lower bounds. These rates and
bounds vary over business cycles and with loan maturities.
1.4 Transmission Channels
Compared to the financial crisis in which the lending supply shock is solely caused by
banks’ impaired financial health in the United States, the impact of the financial crisis
on bank lending is much more complex in China. In particular, there are three chan-
nels through which the financial crisis potentially affected banks’ lending decisions: one
passive channel, which worked through the substantial decrease on the international bor-
rowing, and two active channels, which acted via the reduction of loans to foreign listed
and trade firms because of bank’s risk-limiting behavior.
To evaluate the passive channel, I need to determine how strongly a bank was affected
by the credit crunch in the international markets. As in Acharya et al. (2018), I construct
a variable to measure the exposure to global markets of bank i in year t as follows:
International Borrowingi,t =
International bondi,t + International commercial borrowingi,t
Asseti,t
(1.1)
In particular, Chinese banks borrow money from three different kinds of institutions;
they are foreign commercial banks, other foreign financial institutions, and the World
Bank. A primary concern about this measurement is that if most of the international
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borrowing came from the World Bank, it wouldn’t be affected significantly during the
financial crisis period. However, there are only two Chinese banks could get money from
the World Bank (China Investment Bank and Agricultural Bank of China), and the bor-
rowing amount is minimal. Moreover, the bank-level average international borrowing
declined significantly at the beginning of the year 2009, which hits the bank’s balance
sheet directly.
The risk-limiting motive arises since, as the default risk of both the foreign listed firms
and the trade firms increased, the banks had an incentive to decrease the credit given to
these firms. There are four compositions of stocks in China: A-share stock, which faces
to only Chinese citizens; B-share stock, which faces to foreigners (non-Chinese citizens);
H-share, which are listed in Hong Kong, as well as overseas-listed stocks, which are listed
in U.S., Japan, Singapore... Since the financial policy and government regulation is utterly
different in Hong Kong compared with the mainland, this paper regards the firm listed
in Hong Kong as foreign listed firms. Therefore, I could construct another variable to
measure the exposure to international markets of bank i in year t as follows:
Foreign Listedi,t =
∑j Loan to B , H-share & overseas listed Chinese f irmsijt
Total loani,t
(1.2)
From my data, the impacts of the financial crisis on foreign listed firms are significant.
First of all, the sales of foreign listed firms decline significantly relative to A-share listed
firms. Secondly, the capital expenditure (investment) of foreign listed firms drop dramat-
ically relative to A-share listed firms. Thirdly, the unemployment rate of foreign listed
firms increases significantly relative to A-share listed firms.
Figure 1.2 shows the change in China’s GDP, international trade, and foreign exchange
reserve from 1976 to 2016. International trade here includes both export and import. We
could find a significant drop in trades in the year 2008. Moreover, we could also regard
the year 2008 as a turning point. China joined the WTO at the year 2001, and from 2001
to 2008, the international trade of China increased dramatically, however, after the year
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2008, the trades trend became flat, and it even decreases later in the year 2013. Therefore,





Note that we use trade settlement divided by total loans to control for the size of the
bank. In this paper, we focus on the bank loan, so we use total loans instead of assets to
define the different sizes of banks. A bank may have lots of assets but only a small amount
of loans, it is determined as a small bank in the research background of this paper.
1.5 Bank Loan Effects of the Financial Crisis
Before assessing the importance of the three channels (international borrowing, foreign
listed, trade settlement) separately, we first analyze whether, in general, the financial cri-
sis in global markets affected the financial market in China through a change in the banks’
lending behavior. All three channels could potentially lead to a reduction in the bank loan
supply after the financial crisis, either by reducing a bank’s debt capacity (international
borrowing) or by risk-limiting behavior (foreign listed and trade settlement). Hence, we
expect that banks that are more dependent on the global markets significantly affected
by the financial crisis. Moreover, state-owned banks affected by government regulation
acted differently in terms of financial decisions compared to private firms after the finan-
cial crisis. In Section 1.7, we then analyze which of the three channels were of first-order
importance for the adverse financial effects incurred by Chinese banks.
1.5.1 Data
This paper uses a novel data set that contains bank-firm relationships in China, along
with detailed firm and bank-specific information. Our sample period is from 2001 to 2016,
such that we have an asymmetric time window surrounding the beginning of the financial
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crisis in the United States. Chinese data in this paper comes three primary data sets: Wind
Datafeed Service (referred to as WDS), GTA The China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (referred to as GTA CSMAR) Database as well as Almanac of China’s Finance
and Banking (2001-2016).
Information about bank-firm relationships is from the bank loan data in GTA CSMAR
Database. GTA CSMAR access data on the China stock markets and the financial state-
ments of China’s listed companies. GTA CSMAR is a unique, comprehensive database of
China stock returns, covering all companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. I collect information on bank loans to all of the listed firms
from China.
I augment the data on bank-firm relationships with bank-level and firm-level data
taken from WDS. WDS provides historical reference data, real-time market data, and his-
torical intraday market data, covering stocks, bonds, futures, foreign exchanges, funds,
indices, warrants, and macro market data as well as descriptions, real-time market data,
financial data, dividend data, corporate actions, and historical intraday data.
In addition, I combine the data set with bank-level information (trade settlement) from
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2001-2016). Almanac of China’s Finance and
Banking is a high informative yearbook that is supervised by the People’s Bank of China,
sponsored by China society for finance and banking. Established in 1986, the yearbook
has been consecutively published for 29 volumes at the publication frequency of one vol-
ume a year.
To get data about the OECD GDP growth rate, I obtain data about the GDP of 35
OECD member countries from information disclosed on the OECD data websites. The
definitions of all variables are summarized in Table 1.2.
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1.5.2 Summary Statistics
In the following, I present summary statistics and explore whether our identifying as-
sumptions are plausible. Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the loan level variables
in our primary data set. Since our data covers the universe of all business loans of listed
firms, there is considerable variation in loan sizes. For example, the average loan size is
about 358.828 million yuan, and the standard deviation is 2418.99 million yuan. Given the
considerable size variation, I choose to use the log loan volume instead of the loan vol-
ume. Table 1.3 also shows that the average of the log loan volume of state-owned banks
is similar to that of private banks (18.842 vs. 18.548), and the average of the change of the
log loan volume of state-owned banks are very similar to that of private banks (11.4% vs.
12.3%).
Table 1.4 presents summary statistics for the bank-level variables in our data set, the
bad loan is a variable used to measure the health of a specific bank i in year t, and it is
constructed as:
Bad Loani,t−1 =
Subprime loani,t−1 + Doubt loani,t−1 + Loss loani,t−1
Asseti,t−1
(1.4)
The average bad loan rate is higher for the state-owned banks compared with private
banks. The reason behind this is that the Chinese government has more control power
on state-owned banks. To save some non-profitability or insolvent state-owned firms, the
Chinese government would require the state-owned banks to give credit to this kind of
firms. The loan managers in state-owned banks don’t have any chose but lend money
to these firms even though they know that these firms have extremely high default risk.
Moreover, I also find that state-owned banks could borrow more money from the central
bank, it is obvious that state-owned banks may have more connection or relationships
with the Chinese government and the central bank (PBOC).
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1.5.3 Empirical Methodology
Following the Chow test for structural breaks, I employ the three-period model, which
includes pre-crisis, crisis, and postcrisis periods. I define the indicator variable Crisist
equals to one only in the period of the financial crisis (2008-2009) and sovereign debt
crisis (2010-2012), and Postt equals to one for fiscal years after 2012. The year 2001 is a
particular year for China; this is the year China joined WTO. Moreover, we could regard
this year as the first year China opens its door after closing it for thousands of years.
For the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following specifica-
tion for bank i and firm j in year t:
Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Exposurei,t−1 × State-ownedi + β3Exposurei,t−1 × Crisist
+β4Exposurei,t−1 × Crisist × State-ownedi + β5Exposurei,t−1 × Postt (1.5)
+β6Exposurei,t−1 × Postt × State-ownedi + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Exposurei,t−1 × grOECDYt + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt (1.6)
where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size,
Crisist is an indicator variable equals to one for fiscal years 2008-2012, Postt is an indi-
cator variable equals to one for fiscal years after 2012, State-ownedi is also an indicator
variable equals to one if the bank is a state-owned bank, and it equals to zero if the bank
is a privately-owned bank, Xi,t−1 is the bank-level control variables, λjt is the year-firm
fixed effects. I use three foreign exposure measurements: international borrowing, foreign
listed and trade settlement. International Borrowingi,t−1 could be represented as (Interna-
tional bondi,t−1+International commercial borrowingi,t−1)/Asseti,t−1. Foreign Listedi,t−1
is (Loan gives to B and H-share and overseas listed Chinese firmsi,t−1/Total loani,t−1),
Trade Settlementi,t−1 is Trade settlementsi,t−1/ Total loani,t−1.
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The term (Exposurei,t−1× State-ownedi) is used to control for the different effects of
state-owned and private banks on the dimension of the international exposure measure-
ment. If banks with higher exposure to the international markets cut lending more fol-
lowing the recent financial crisis, higher exposure banks would reduce their loan amount
after the financial crisis, that is, I expect β3 in Eq. (1.5) to be negative. Moreover, if the
Chinese government tried to close the door to avoid the substantial loss from the outside
world following the financial crisis, the state-owned banks should be affected more com-
pared with the privately-owned banks. Therefore, I expect β4 in Eq. (1.5) to be negative.
Crisist and Postt are only two dummies. If we want to know something more about
the specific changes of the bank credit, we need a variable to measure the international
market shocks. It is just like if we want to pull the water into the swimming pool, we
need to consider both the velocity of the water and the intersecting surface of the water
pipe. If we consider the different measurements of the exposure to international markets
as the intersecting surface of the water pipe, the international market shocks should be a
good indicator for the velocity of the water. In this paper, I use the OECD GDP growth
rate to measure the international market shock for China, China is not one of the 35 OECD
member countries, for sure I have to assume that OECD GDP growth rate could represent
the financial shocks in the international world from 2001 to 2016.
For the growth rate effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following
specification for bank i and firm j in year t:
∆Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Exposurei,t−1 × State-ownedi + β3Exposurei,t−1 × Crisist
+β4Exposurei,t−1 × Crisist × State-ownedi + β5Exposurei,t−1 × Postt (1.7)
+β6Exposurei,t−1 × Postt × State-ownedi + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
∆Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Exposurei,t−1 × grOECDYt + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt (1.8)
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, ∆Lijt is the growth rate
of loan size, grOECDYt is the OECD GDP growth rate, Xi,t−1 is the bank-level control vari-
ables, λjt is the year-firm fixed effects. I also use the three foreign exposure measure-
ments here: international borrowing, foreign listed and trade settlement. International
Borrowingi,t−1 could be represented as (International bondi,t−1+International commercial
borrowingi,t−1)/Asseti,t−1. Foreign Listedi,t−1 is (Loan gives to B and H-share and over-
seas listed Chinese firmsi,t−1)/Total loani,t−1), Trade Settlementi,t−1 is Trade settlementsi,t−1/
Total loani,t−1.
If banks with higher exposure to the international markets cut lending more when
there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth rate, which means the higher the OECD
GDP growth rate, the higher the impact of the exposure to the international markets, that
is, I expect β2 in Eq. (1.8) to be positive.
1.5.4 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy of this paper needs to address four problems: omitted variable,
reverse causality, measurement error, and sample selection.
I use the Khwaja and Mian (2008) technique to simultaneously estimate the bank lend-
ing and firm borrowing channels stems from identification concerns. Identification con-
cerns arise because events that trigger changes in liquidity supply, such as monetary pol-
icy innovations or financial shocks are often accompanied by changes in investment re-
turns and consequently, credit demand. Changes in firm borrowing, therefore, reflect
both changes in credit supply as well as credit demand. This paper uses year-firm fixed
effects to control credit shocks from the demand side.
One concern is the endogeneity problem of the exposure measurement, if pre-crisis
banks that have higher exposure to international markets could costlessly switch to lower
exposure banks, with no reason to expect differential outcomes at the pre-crisis level of
exposure for different banks. Similar to Chodorow-Reich (2013), I conduct a preliminary
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test, using demeaned exposure measurement value as dependent variable and A f tert
(a dummy variable equal to one after 2008) as independent variable, and find that the
coefficient before A f tert is insignificant, which suggests that there is no systematically
changes relative to liquidity supply shock in 2008.
Another concern about the omitted variable problem is the heterogeneity in bank re-
sponse to financial shocks. Could the lending channel coefficient be driven by inherent
differences in how banks respond to the shocks induced by the credit crunch in the in-
ternational markets? It is possible if there is such response heterogeneity, and it is sys-
tematically correlated with a bank’s liquidity shock. For example, perhaps the lending
channel estimate is picking up differences in how state-owned and private banks react to
financial crisis since we know that the Chinese government has more control power on
state-owned banks.
At the beginning of 2009, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) put strict financial regulations on the banks with high
exposure to the international financial market to avoid the liquidity risk. However, these
kinds of banks are highly encouraged before the financial crisis in 2008. Since state-owned
banks should be affected more by this government regulation change, this paper uses an
interaction term with state-owned to address the differences.
We also test for such concerns by including various bank characteristics that proxy for
such differential lending sensitivity as controls, such as the bank size, the bank’s return
on assets, the bad loan rate, the amount lend from central bank, tangibility, cash flow,
and dummies state-owned, policy, rural and listed banks. These bank-level controls are
likely to capture a banks’ sensitivity to financial shocks. In particular, I use lagged value
to avoid concern about the endogeneity problem. The results below indicate that the
lending channel coefficient remains robust to all these bank-level controls.
Although firm fixed effects address the main identification concerns expressed in the
literature, there may remain some additional questions. While the fixed effects strategy
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does not require or make any assumptions about the correlation between liquidity sup-
ply and demand shocks, the concern about the reverse causality problem is that if the
liquidity supply shocks are anticipated, banks may adjust their lending or firms adjust
their borrowing prior to the shock. This would lead to either an under or overestimate of
the bank lending channel depending on the direction of the pre-shock loan adjustments.
However, in this paper, the natural experiment financial crisis is unanticipated; the finan-
cial crisis is happened out of China in the international markets. Therefore, it is difficult
for Chinese banks and firms to anticipate this kind of liquidity supply shock. In partic-
ular, the identifying assumption for all the level effect regressions in this paper is that
year-before financial positions are not positively correlated with unobserved within-bank
changes in loans lending following the onset of the crisis.
To reduce the measurement Error, I winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% level to
lessen the influence of outliers. For the sample selection problem, my data set provides
more comprehensive coverage of small, micro, and rural banks than other data sets. I
include all of the banks, both listed and non-listed banks. A primary concern about the
sample selection problem in my paper is that my data set only provides the information of
the listed firms, there are also many small and micro firms (non-listed) in China. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) suggest that since size may proxy for financial constraints, a higher
sensitivity of small firms would provide evidence in favor of the “financial accelerator",
the view that financial frictions can amplify downturns. Mehrotra et al. (2017) use new
and confidential data on income statements and balance sheets of US manufacturing firms
to bear on this idea. Thus, my analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on Chinese bank
lending channel could be regarded as the “lower bound" impact, since we only consider
the listed firms, if listed firms are affected by the financial crisis, small and micro firms
should be affected more.
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1.5.5 Detection for Structural Breaks
The goal of this analysis is to detect the structural breakpoints for the Chinese bank lend-
ing channel.
I conduct the structural Wald test for each period, respectively. Figure 1.3 plots the
Wald test statistics of the change-point diagnostics. First, I use international borrowing
to measure international exposure, the Wald test statistic is above the 95% critical value
for the year 2009 and 2013-2016, implying two structural breakpoints, the year of 2009
and 2013.1 Secondly, I choose foreign listed to measure external exposure, the Wald test
statistic is above the 95% critical value for the year 2008-2009 and 2013-2016, implying
two structural breakpoints, the year of 2008 and 2013. Thirdly, I change the exposure
measurement to trade settlement, the Wald test statistic is above the 95% critical value for
the year 2008 and 2013-2016, implying two structural breakpoints, the year of 2008 and
2013.
1.5.6 Baseline Results
This section is about the empirical results of the analysis. I first provide results for the
level effect and then turn to the growth rate effect.
Level Effect
Table 1.8 presents estimates from panel regressions explaining bank-firm-level yearly
bank loans from 2001 to 2016. The conditional information set includes Size, State-owned,
Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, List, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank, Bad Loan, Bad Loan
× Crisis, and Bad Loan × Post. Explicitly speaking, Size is ln(assets), State-owned is an
indicator variable equals to one if the bank is a state-owned bank. Policy is an indicator
1In the years of 2014-2016, hypothesis H0 is also rejected. But I drop them because consecutive break
points imply the same structural break.
20
variable that equals one if the bank is a policy bank. Policy bank is something very special
in China. The difference between the policy bank and the commercial banks is that the
goal of the policy banks is not profit maximization. Their goal is to try to put the govern-
ment policy into the financial market. In addition, there are lots of differences between
the central bank and the policy bank. However, the most crucial difference in this paper
is the central bank could not lend money directly to firms, it could only lend money to
policy or commercial banks, but policy banks could give loans to firms directly. Rural is
also an indicator variable equals one if the bank is located in a rural area. Tangibility is
represented by (fixed assets/assets). Roa is the return on assets. List is a dummy vari-
able equals to one if the bank is a listed bank. Cash Flow is the operating income before
depreciation over the assets. Lend Central Bank is the credit lent from the central bank
over the assets. As noted before, Bad loan is a measurement of the bank’s health, I use
Bad Loan× Crisis, and Bad Loan× Post to capture the different impacts of Bad Loan pre-
and post-crisis.
Table 1.8 present the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.5) that provides an unbiased
estimate of the bank lending channel coefficient. All regressions include fixed effects. Ro-
bust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level. The
results indicate a large bank lending channel: column 1 of table 1.8 shows that one per-
centage point increase of international commercial lending and bond as a fraction of assets
could lead to a decrease of private bank loans by 4.725 percentage points more during fi-
nancial crisis than before, and 10.385 percentage points more decrease in state-owned
loans during financial crisis than before. Moreover, one percentage point increase of in-
ternational borrowing would lead to the rise of private bank loans by 0.893 percentage
points more after financial crisis than before, and 7.071 percentage points more increase
in state-owned loans after financial crisis than before.
Column 3 of table 1.8 shows that one percentage point increase of loans lend to B-
share, H-share and overseas-listed Chinese firms as a fraction of total loans could lead
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to a decrease of private bank loans by 5.149 percentage points more during financial cri-
sis than before, and 9.831 percentage points more decrease in state-owned loans during
financial crisis than before. Column 3 also shows that one percentage point increase of
international borrowing would lead to the rise of private bank loans by 0.724 percentage
points more after financial crisis than before, and 5.505 percentage points more increase
in state-owned loans after financial crisis than before.
Column 5 of table 1.8 shows that one percentage point increase of the bank’s trade
settlements as a fraction of its total loans could lead to a decrease of private bank loans
by 1.773 percentage points more during financial crisis than before, and 2.054 percentage
points more decrease in state-owned loans during financial crisis than before. Further-
more, one percentage point increase of international borrowing would lead to the rise of
private bank loans by 0.824 percentage points more after financial crisis than before, and
0.988 percentage points more increase in state-owned loans after financial crisis than be-
fore. All in all, Banks with higher international exposure tend to cut more lending during
the financial crisis, state-owned bank loans are more pro-cyclical.
To show the robustness of our results, we rerun the above regressions using less re-
strictive specifications. Column 2, 4, 6 presents results for specifications, including the
only firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Importantly, results remain very similar
both in terms of economic and statistical significance using either specification. Hence,
also the economic magnitude of the impact described is very stable across different spec-
ifications.
Since Crisis and Post are two indicator variables, they only address the difference
before, during, and after the financial crisis, and there is a very long-time period in my
sample (16 years). Thus we need to plot the year-specific effects of these three potential
channels.
I employ the following specification for bank i and firm j in year t for the year-specific
effects for both state-owned and private banks.
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Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 ×Year Dummyt + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt (1.9)
where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size, Year
Dummy equals to one for each specific year, otherwise it equals to zero, Xi,t−1 is the bank-
level control variables, λjt is the year-firm fixed effects.
Figure 1.5 plot the year-specific effects of the three exposure measurements state above
on the level of the log loan volume during 2001-2016. The red line represents the year-
specific effect of the state-owned banks, and the blue line represents the year-specific
effect of the private banks, robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. All of
the three figures show that the parallel trends of the year-specific log loan volume are
divergent following the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, and they finally converged
together when the year moves on.
The baseline result in this paper is consistent with the effect in Russia, Fungáčová
et al. (2013) also find that bank ownership affected credit supply during the financial crisis
and that the crisis led to an overall decrease in the credit supply, however, the direction
is opposite. Fungáčová et al. (2013) suggest relative to Russian private banks, Russian
state-controlled banks reduced their credit less, but in my paper compared with Chinese
private banks, Chinese state-owned banks reduced their credit more.
Growth Rate Effect
Table 1.12 and 1.13 present the growth rate effect estimates from panel regressions ex-
plaining bank-firm-level yearly bank loans from 2001 to 2016. OECD growth rate could
be represented as ∑ni=1 dlnGDPi× GDP sharei, i represents for the 35 OECD member
countries. The conditional information set includes Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank, Tan-
gibility, Roa, List, Bad Loan, and Bad Loan × OECD growth rate. Specifically speaking,
Cash Flow is cash/assets, Lend Central Bank is log(the money borrowed from the central
bank), Tangibility is tangible assets/assets, Roa is the return on assets. List is an indicator
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variable equal to one if the bank is a listed bank. As noted before, Bad loan is a mea-
surement of the bank’s balance sheet health, and I use Bad Loan × OECD growth rate to
capture the different impacts of Bad Loan given different levels of the OECD growth rate.
Table 1.12 and 1.13 present the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.8) that provides
an unbiased estimate of the bank lending channel coefficient. All regressions include
fixed effects. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at
the bank-level. The results indicate a large bank lending channel: column 1 of table 1.12
shows that one percentage point increase of international commercial lending and bond
as a fraction of assets could lead to a decline of the growth rate of bank loans by 0.379
percentage points when the OECD GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline is substantially
offset and even reversed when OECD GDP growth rate increases.
Column 3 of table 1.12 shows that one percentage point increase of loans lend to B-
share, H-share and overseas-listed Chinese firms as a fraction of total loans could lead
to a decline of the growth rate of bank loans by 0.455 percentage points when the OECD
GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline is substantially offset and even reversed when
OECD GDP growth rate increases.
Column 5 of table 1.12 shows that one percentage point increase of loans lend to trade
settlements as a fraction of total loans could lead to a decline of the growth rate of bank
loans by 0.609 percentage points when the OECD GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline
is substantially offset and even reversed when OECD GDP growth rate increases.
Figure 1.6 presents the average marginal bank credit effects of three different inter-
national exposure measurements. Panel A of figure 1.6 shows that the average marginal
effects of international borrowing is positive when OECD GDP growth rate is higher than
1.192%, the average marginal effects is negative when the growth rate is less than 1.192%,
the average marginal effects equals to zero when growth rate equals to 1.192%. The 95%
confidence interval when the average marginal effects of international borrowing equals
to 0 is [-0.2%,3.8%].
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Panel B of figure 1.6 shows that the average marginal effects of foreign listed is posi-
tive when OECD GDP growth rate is higher than 1.750%, the average marginal effects is
negative when the growth rate is less than 1.750%, the average marginal effects equals to
zero when growth rate equals to 1.750%. The 95% confidence interval when the average
marginal effects of foreign listed equals to 0 is [1.5%,2.3%].
Panel C of figure 1.6 shows that the average marginal effects of trade settlement is
positive when OECD GDP growth rate is higher than 2.086%, the average marginal effects
is negative when the growth rate is less than 2.086%, the average marginal effects equals
to zero when growth rate equals to 2.086%. The 95% confidence interval when the average
marginal effects of foreign listed equals to 0 is [1.2%,5.8%].
1.5.7 Using All Measures of Exposure Together
Since we have three different international exposure measurements: international bor-
rowing, foreign listed, and trade settlement, while international borrowing could be re-
garded as a proxy in the bond market, foreign listed is a proxy in the stock market, and
trade settlement is also a good measure in the goods market. Therefore, an interesting
question could be asked, which effect dominates? The impact in the bond market, stock
market, or goods market?
To answer this question, I employ the following specification for bank i and firm j in
year t:
Lijt = β1 International Borrowingi,t−1 + β2 International Borrowingi,t−1 × Crisist
+β3 International Borrowingi,t−1 × Postt + β4Foreign Listedi,t−1 (1.10)
+β5Foreign Listedi,t−1 × Crisist + β6Foreign Listedi,t−1 × Postt
+β7Trade Settlementi,t−1 + β8Trade Settlementi,t−1 × Crisist
+β9Trade Settlementi,t−1 × Postt + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size, Crisist
is an indicator variable equals to one for fiscal years 2008-2012, Postt is an indicator vari-
able equals to one for fiscal years after 2012, Xi,t−1 is the bank-level control variables,
λjt is the year-firm fixed effects. I use three foreign exposure measurements: international
borrowing, foreign listed and trade settlement. International Borrowingi,t−1 could be rep-
resented as (International bondi,t−1+International commercial borrowingi,t−1)/Asseti,t−1.
Foreign Listedi,t−1 is (Loan gives to B and H-share and overseas listed Chinese firmsi,t−1/Total
loani,t−1), Trade Settlementi,t−1 is Trade settlementsi,t−1/ Total loani,t−1.
Table 1.10 presents the estimates from panel regressions in equation (1.10), we could
find that the international borrowing in the bond market and the foreign listed in the
stock market are more severely affected by the financial crisis compared with the trade
settlement in the goods market.
For the growth rate effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following
specification for bank i and firm j in year t:
∆Lijt = β1 International Borrowingi,t−1 + β2 International Borrowingi,t−1 × grOECDYt
+β3Foreign Listedi,t−1 + β4Foreign Listedi,t−1 × grOECDYt (1.11)
+β5Trade Settlementi,t−1 + β6Trade Settlementi,t−1 × grOECDYt
+γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, ∆Lijt is the growth rate of
loan size, grOECDYt is the OECD GDP growth rate, Xi,t−1 is the bank-level control vari-
ables, λjt is the year-firm fixed effects. I also use the three foreign exposure measure-
ments here: international borrowing, foreign listed and trade settlement. International
Borrowingi,t−1 could be represented as (International bondi,t−1+International commercial
borrowingi,t−1)/Asseti,t−1. Foreign Listedi,t−1 is (Loan gives to B and H-share and over-
seas listed Chinese firmsi,t−1)/Total loani,t−1), Trade Settlementi,t−1 is Trade settlementsi,t−1/
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Total loani,t−1, A f tert is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years after 2008.
Table 1.14 shows the estimates from panel regressions in equation (1.11), we find the
results in growth rate effect are quite similar to the results in level effect, the interna-
tional borrowing in bond market and the foreign listed in stock market are more severely
affected by the financial crisis compared with the trade settlement in goods market.
1.6 Firm-Level Effects of the Financial Crisis: Loans and
Real Outcomes
We have seen that negative shocks to a bank’s liquidity supply translate into a drop in its
client firms’ loans for both state-owned and private firms. However, such bank lending
channels may not have any aggregate effect if firms can compensate for bank-specific loan
losses by borrowing more from banks with greater liquidity. In this section, we discuss
the firm-level effects of the financial crisis as well as the sovereign debt crisis.
1.6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.6 presents summary statistics for the firm-level variables in our data set. The
average net debt over total assets is 3.8%; the average cash over total assets is 16.6%. There
are around 4074 staffs in all the Chinese listed firms on average. The mean value for sales
over assets, capital investments over assets, and operating income before depreciation
over assets is 60.4%, 4%, and 3.2% respectively.
1.6.2 Empirical Methodology
I also utilize both the fixed effect and the GMM estimates of the firm borrowing channel to
argue that I can provide conservative estimates of the impact of the liquidity and funding
shock on firm-level outcomes such as a firm’s net debt, cash (financial effects) as well as
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sales, capital investment, and employment (real effects).
Let Yjt be a firm-level attribute of interest in period t (such as a firm’s net debt, log
cash, log sales, log capital investment, and log employment). The reduced form firm
borrowing channel can be determined by estimating the following equation:
Yjt = βF1 Exposurej,t−1 + β
F
2 Exposurej,t−1 × Crisist + β
F







+ γXj,t−1 + λj + µt + ηjt
Yjt = βF1 Exposurej,t−1 + β
F











+ γXj,t−1 + λj + µt + ηjt
where Exposurej,t−1 is the weighted aggregate exposure to international markets faced
by firm j’s banks in period t− 1, which is measured by international borrowing, foreign
listed and trade settlement. Crisist equals to one only in the period of financial crisis
(2008-2009) and sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012), and Postt equals to one for fiscal years
after 2012, grOECDYt is the OECD GDP growth rate, Cash Flowj,t−1 is calculated by (Operat-
ing income before depreciationj,t−1/Assetsj,t−1). Xj,t−1 is the firm-level control variables.
Firm-level controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. Specifically speaking,
Size is ln(assets), State-owned is an indicator variable equals to one if the firm is a state-
owned firm. Tangibility is represented by (fixed assets/assets). Roa is the return on assets.
λj is the firm fixed effects, µt is the year fixed effects. If the firm borrowing channel
completely insulates a firm from the bank lending channels, then the liquidity shocks
should have no net impact on the firm’s aggregate outcomes, i.e., βF2 and β
F
3 in (1.12) as
well as βF2 in (1.13) should be zero.
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1.6.3 Baseline Results
Table 1.15, 1.16 and 1.17 present the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.12) that provides
an unbiased estimate of the firm borrowing channel coefficient. All regressions include
fixed effects. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at
the firm-level. The results indicate a large firm borrowing channel: column 1 of table 1.15
shows that one percentage point increase of bank’s international borrowing aggregated at
the firm’s level could lead to a decrease of the firm’s net debt by 1.172 percentage points
more during the financial crisis than before, Moreover, one percentage point increase of
the weighted aggregate international borrowing would lead to a decline of the firm’s net
debt by 1.333 percentage points more after the financial crisis than before. Column 2, 3, 4
of table 1.15 shows that one percentage point increase of bank’s international borrowing
aggregated at firm’s level could lead to a decrease of firm’s cash, employment and capital
investment by 2.738, 0.0772 and 3.717 percentage points respectively more during finan-
cial crisis than before, Moreover, one percentage point increase of the weighted aggregate
international borrowing would lead to an increase of firm’s cash, employment and capi-
tal investment by 9.046, 9.911 and 19.78 percentage points more after financial crisis than
before.
Column 1 of table 1.16 shows that one percentage point increase of the bank foreign
listed aggregated at the firm’s level could lead to a decrease of the firm’s net debt by 0.372
percentage points more during the financial crisis than before. Moreover, one percentage
point increase of the weighted aggregate foreign listed would lead to a decrease of the
firm’s net debt by 1.169 percentage points more after the financial crisis than before. Col-
umn 2, 3, 4 of table 1.16 shows that one percentage point increase of the bank foreign listed
aggregated at firm’s level could lead to a decrease of firm’s cash, employment and capital
investment by 0.398, 0.153 and 1.144 percentage points respectively more during finan-
cial crisis than before, Moreover, one percentage point increase of the weighted aggregate
foreign listed would lead to a rise of the firm’s cash, employment and capital investment
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by 7.318, 8.472 and 12.06 percentage points more after financial crisis than before.
Column 1 of table 1.17 shows that one percentage point increase of bank’s trade settle-
ment aggregated at the firm’s level could lead to a decrease of the firm’s net debt by 0.139
percentage points more during the financial crisis than before, Moreover, one percentage
point increase of the weighted aggregate trade settlement would lead to a decrease in
the firm’s net debt by 0.171 percentage points more after the financial crisis than before.
Column 2, 3, 4 of table 1.17 shows that one percentage point increase of bank’s trade set-
tlement aggregated at firm’s level could lead to a decrease of firm’s cash, employment
and capital investment by 0.366, 0.486 and 1.558 percentage points respectively more dur-
ing financial crisis than before, Moreover, one percentage point increase of the weighted
aggregate trade settlement would lead to a rise of firm’s cash, employment and capital
investment by 0.877, 0.850 and 2.286 percentage points more after financial crisis than
before.
Table 1.18, 1.19 and 1.20 present the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.13) that pro-
vides an unbiased estimate of the firm borrowing channel coefficient. All regressions
include fixed effects. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clus-
tered at the firm-level. The results indicate a large firm borrowing channel: column 1 of
table 1.18 shows that one percentage point increase of bank’s international borrowing ag-
gregated at firm’s level could lead to a decline of the firm’s net debt by 5.362 percentage
points when the OECD GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline is accelerated when OECD
GDP growth rate increases. Column 2, 3 and 4 of table 1.18 shows that firms with higher
weighted aggregate international borrowing will have lower cash stock, employment,
and capital investment when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth rate.
Column 1 of table 1.19 shows that firms with higher bank foreign listed aggregated
at the firm’s level will have higher net debt when there is a negative shock in OECD
GDP growth rate. Column 2, 3 and 4 of table 1.19 shows that firms with higher weighted
aggregate foreign listed will have lower cash stock, employment, and capital investment
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when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth rate.
Column 1 of table 1.20 shows that firms with higher bank’s trade settlement aggre-
gated at the firm’s level will have higher net debt when there is a negative shock in OECD
GDP growth rate. Column 2, 3 and 4 of table 1.20 shows that firms with higher weighted
aggregate foreign listed will have lower cash stock, employment, and capital investment
when there is a negative shock in OECD GDP growth rate.
1.7 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a general equilibrium model of bank lending in the partially open
financial market that sheds light on the mechanism behind the transmission channels that
impact the bank lending channel. The proposed model predicts that when world interest
rate increases, banks with higher exposure to the international market will reduce more
bank credits through the balance sheet hit the channel. In addition, when firm return
decreases, banks with higher international exposure will reduce more bank loans through
the risk-limiting behavior channel.
This model is based on the framework of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). The model
has three types of agents: firms, banks, and depositors. All parties are risk-neutral and
protected by limited liability so that no one could end up with a negative cash position.
Firms are run by entrepreneurs, who in the absence of proper incentives or outside
monitoring may deliberately reduce the probability of success to enjoy a private benefit.
This model formalizes this moral hazard problem by assuming that the entrepreneur can
privately choose between two versions of the project as described in Figure 1.7. There are
two periods, in the first period, financial contracts are signed, and investments are made.
In the second period, investment returns are realized, and claims are settled. In period
2, the investment generates a verifiable, financial return equaling either 0 (failure) or R
(success).
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The function of banks is to monitor firms and thereby alleviate the moral hazard
problem. In the case of bank lending, covenants are particularly typical and extensive.
Covenants intend to reduce the firm’s opportunity cost of being diligent. With that in
mind, we assume that a bank could monitor a firm to prevent them from the bad project
by cost γ. Thus, bank incentive compatibility condition could be written as
λHRm − γ ≥ λLRm (1.14)
1.7.1 Setup
There is a continuum of capitalists of measure K, who can become bankers or depositors,
each capitalist is endowed with one unit of capital, and there is a continuum of potential
entrepreneurs who can run firms. Moreover, in developing countries like China, being a
banker needs tremendous verification procedures and license given by the central gov-
ernment. Thus we assume that the number of bankers is proportional to total capitalists
and fixed at δ.
Bankers have two tasks in the economy: first, they channel capital from depositors to
firms. Second, they monitor the firms they lend to at a cost to increase the probability
that production is successful. As the suppliers of capital, bankers collect the gross return
to capital R in the second period. There are two types of depositors: domestic depositors
with the endogenous domestic deposit rate r — foreign depositors with the exogenous
foreign deposit rate rw. Depositors invest their endowments in banks and obtain the
endogenously determined return r. Before each banker makes his investment decision,
he learns about his efficiency as a banker. Each banker draws a foreign exposure s from
a continuous distribution g(s) with support s ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the financing cost could
be written as
c(s) = srw + (1− s)r = r + s(rw − r) with rw < r. (1.15)
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The lower the financing cost draw the higher the capitalist’s efficiency as a banker. The
timeline is presented in figure 1.8.
Incentive compatibility requires that the banker’s expected return under monitoring
is higher than the return without monitoring, which results in the following condition:
λHRz− λHc(s)(z− v(s))− γz ≥ λLRz− λLc(s)(z− v(s)) (1.16)
where capital input per firm z is fixed. Each capitalist (endowed with one unit of capital)
decides whether to become a banker or a depositor. γz is the total monitoring cost, and v
is the banker’s capital invested in the firm. Thus, in equilibrium (minimizing v, equation
(1.16)) holds with equality, banker’s own capital in each bank loan is






The number of firms that one banker endowed with one unit of capital can monitor is
n(s) = 1/v(s) (1.18)













Banker’s expected return per firm is




Total bank loans of the bank with exposure s could be represented as
I(s) = n(s) =
c(s)
c(s)− β (1.21)
where we assume c(s) > β = R− γ/∆λ > 0 for all s.
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1.7.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition in this model is the market for financial inter-mediation clears.
All active bankers together must intermediate the existing capital in the economy. The
economy is endowed with domestic capital of measure K and foreign capital of measure
K∗. A banker of type s can supply a measure of n(s) firms with capital. Thus the market
clears (financial intermediation) condition is







c(s)− β g(s)ds (1.22)
where N is the number of banks. In the regulated financial markets, the total amount of
the capital inflow is strictly controlled by the central government. Specifically speaking,
in China, it is limited as a proportional to domestic capital; in this model, I assume K∗ =
ρK. Furthermore, this model assumes that the number of bankers is proportional to total
capitalists and fixed at δ, thus




c(s)− β g(s)ds (1.23)
Which could be simplified as






c(s)− β g(s)ds (1.24)
For simplicity, my model assumes g(s) follows uniform distribution s ∼ U[0, 1], thus
g(s) = 1, equation (1.24) could be rewritten as
1 + ρ− δ
δ
= β
ln(rw − β)− ln(r− β)
rw − r (1.25)

















Proof. See appendix A.1. 















Proposition 2 Assume rw is large enough i.e. rw > β(1+ρ)1+ρ−δ and close to r, then 0 <
dr
dR < 1.
Proof. See appendix A.2. 





(c− β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸





General equilibrium e f f ect
(1.28)
∂I
∂rw < 0 under the sufficient condition 0 <
dr
drw < 1.
Asymmetric effect across banks
∂I2
∂rw∂s
= −β (1− dr/dr
w)(c− β) + 2(r− rw)(s + (1− s)dr/drw)
(c− β)3 (1.29)
∂I2
∂rw∂s < 0 under the sufficient condition 0 <
dr
drw < 1.
Proof. See appendix A.3. 






(c− β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸





General equilibrium e f f ect
(1.30)
∂I
∂R > 0 under the sufficient condition 0 <
dr
dR < 1.




βdr/dR(c− β) + (r− rw)(c + β− 2β(1− s)dr/dR)
(c− β)3 (1.31)
∂I2
∂R∂s > 0 under the sufficient condition 0 <
dr
dR < 1.
Proof. See appendix A.4. 
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To conclude, this proposed model predicts that there are two channels through which
the financial shocks potentially affected banks’ lending decisions. Through the balance
sheet hit the channel, the higher world interest rate is associated with lower bank loans,
banks with higher exposure to the international market would cut lending more when the
world interest rate increases. Furthermore, through the risk-limiting behavior channel,
the lower firm return is associated with lower bank credits, banks with higher interna-
tional exposure would cut lending more when the firm return decreases.
1.8 Robustness Analysis
This paper implements several checks to verify the robustness of my results.
1.8.1 Changing from Previous Year to Initial Year
In this part, I use the initial year instead of the previous year to measure the value of
exposure to avoid the endogeneity problem of international exposure. Table 1.25 shows
that the results are robust.
1.8.2 The Health of the Bank
Chodorow-Reich (2013) focus on the impact of the financial crisis associated with the bank
balance sheet’s health. In this subsection, I replicate the specification in Chodorow-Reich
(2013) using Chinese data. For the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ
the following specification for bank i and firm j in year t:
Lijt = β1Bad Loani,t−1 + β2Bad Loani,t−1 × State-ownedi + β3Bad Loani,t−1 × Crisist
+β4Bad Loani,t−1 × Crisist × State-ownedi + β5Bad Loani,t−1 × Postt (1.32)
+β6Bad Loani,t−1 × Postt × State-ownedi + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, and t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size,
Bad Loani,t−1 is (Subprime loani,t−1+Doubt loani,t−1+Loss loani,t−1)/Asseti,t−1, A f tert is
an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years after 2008, State-owned is an indicator
variable equal to one if the bank is a state-owned bank. Xi,t−1 represents the bank-level
control variables, λjt is the year-firm fixed effects.
Table 1.27 presents the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.32) that provides an un-
biased estimate of the bank lending channel coefficient. The results indicate a large bank
lending channel: column 1 shows that one percentage point increase of bad loans as a
fraction of assets could lead to a decrease of private bank loans by 14.85 percentage points
more during the financial crisis than before, and 22.327 percentage points more decrease
in state-owned loans during financial crisis than before. Moreover, one percentage point
increase of international borrowing would lead to an increase of private bank loans by
10.31 percentage points more after financial crisis than before, and 30.43 percentage points
more increase in state-owned loans after financial crisis than before.
Moreover, for the growth rate effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the
following specification for bank i and firm j in year t:
∆Lijt = β1Bad Loani,t−1 + β2Bad Loani,t−1 × grOECDYt (1.33)
+γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
where i represents bank, j represents firm, and t represents year, ∆Lijt is the growth rate of
loan size, Bad Loani,t−1 is (Subprime loani,t−1+Doubt loani,t−1+Loss loani,t−1)/Asseti,t−1,
grOECDYt is the OECD GDP growth rate, Xi,t−1 represents the bank-level control variables,
λjt is the year-firm fixed effects.
Table 1.29 presents the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.33) that provides an un-
biased estimate of the bank lending channel coefficient. The results indicate a large bank
lending channel: column 1 of table 1.29 shows that one percentage point increase of bad
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loan as a fraction of assets could lead to a decline of the growth rate of bank loans by 5.785
percentage points when the OECD GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline is substantially
offset and even reversed when OECD GDP growth rate increases.
Figure 1.6 shows that the average marginal effects of bad loan is positive when OECD
GDP growth rate is higher than 2.940%, the average marginal effects is negative when the
growth rate is less than 2.940%, the average marginal effects equals to zero when growth
rate equals to 2.940%. The 95% confidence interval when the average marginal effects of
the bad loan equals to 0 is [1.1%,6.0%].
1.8.3 Alternative Identification Strategy for Exposure Measurement
As a further robustness check, I provide one alternative definition for our critical explana-
tory variable, which is the exchange gains as a fraction of total income, and this alternative





China maintains a closed capital account, meaning companies, banks, and individu-
als could not move money in or out of the country except under strict rules. The People’s
Bank of China (PBOC) and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) regulate
the flow of foreign exchange in and out of the country and set exchange rates through a
managed float system. The scheme was aimed at stopping the flight of foreign currency
overseas and also preventing the inflow of foreign capital from affecting the Chinese econ-
omy.
Then, for the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following spec-
ification for bank i and firm j in year t:
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Lijt = β1(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 + β2(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × State-ownedi
+β3(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × Crisist (1.35)
+β4(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × Crisist × State-ownedi
+β5(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × Postt
+β6(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × Postt × State-ownedi + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt
where i represents bank, j represents firm, and t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size,
(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 is Exchange gainsi,t−1/Total incomei,t−1, A f tert is an indicator
variable equal to one for fiscal years after 2008, State-owned is an indicator variable equal
to one if the bank is a state-owned bank. Xi,t−1 represents the bank-level control variables,
λjt is the year-firm fixed effects.
Table 1.26 presents the results of the bank lending channel regression in equation
(1.35). Column 1 shows that one percentage point increase of exchange income as a frac-
tion of total income could lead to a decrease of private bank loans by 2.009 percentage
points more during the financial crisis than before, and 8.297 percentage points more de-
crease in state-owned loans during the financial crisis than before. Column 1 also shows
that one percentage point increase of international borrowing would lead to an increase
of private bank loans by 1.641 percentage points more after financial crisis than before,
and 7.250 percentage points more increase in state-owned loans after financial crisis than
before.
Moreover, for the growth rate effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the
following specification for bank i and firm j in year t:
∆Lijt = β1(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 + β2(Exchange/Income)i,t−1 × grOECDYt
+γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt (1.36)
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, and t represents year. ∆Lijt is the growth rate
of loan size, (Exchange/Income)i,t−1 is Exchange gainsi,t−1/Total incomei,t−1, grOECDYt is
the OECD GDP growth rate, Xi,t−1 represents the bank-level control variables, λjt is the
year-firm fixed effects.
Table 1.28 presents the results of the bank lending channel regression in equation
(1.36). Column 1 of table 1.28 shows that one percentage point increase of exchange gains
as a fraction of total income could lead to a decline of the growth rate of bank loans by
1.110 percentage points when the OECD GDP growth rate is 0, and this decline is sub-
stantially offset and even reversed when OECD GDP growth rate increases.
Figure 1.6 shows that the average marginal effects of exchange/income is positive
when OECD GDP growth rate is greater than 1.961%, the average marginal effects is
negative when the growth rate is less than 1.961%, the average marginal effects equals to
zero when growth rate equals to 1.961%. The 95% confidence interval when the average
marginal effects of exchange/income equals to 0 is [0.5%,5.5%].
1.8.4 Alternative Identification Strategy for Two Periods Model
Following the Duchin et al. (2010), I define the indicator variable A f tert equals to one for
fiscal years after 2008 to equally divide the main sample period into the pre-crisis period
(2001-2008) and the post-crisis period (2009-2016). The year 2001 is a particular year for
China; this is the year China joined WTO. Moreover, we could regard this year as the first
year China opens its door after closing it for thousands of years.
For the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following specifica-
tion for bank i and firm j in year t:
Lijt = β1Exposurei,t−1 + β2Exposurei,t−1 × State-ownedi + β3Exposurei,t−1 × A f tert
+β4Exposurei,t−1 × A f tert × State-ownedi + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijt (1.37)
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, Lijt is the log loan size, A f tert
is an indicator variable equals to one for fiscal years after 2008, State_ownedi is also an in-
dicator variable equals to one if the bank is a state-owned bank, and it equals to zero if
the bank is a privately-owned bank, Xi,t−1 is the bank-level control variables, λjt is the
year-firm fixed effects. I use three foreign exposure measurements: international borrow-
ing, foreign listed and trade settlement. International Borrowingi,t−1 could be represented
as (International bondi,t−1+International commercial borrowingi,t−1)/Asseti,t−1. Foreign
Listedi,t−1 is (Loan gives to B and H-share and overseas listed Chinese firmsi,t−1/Total
loani,t−1), Trade Settlementi,t−1 is Trade settlementsi,t−1/ Total loani,t−1.
The term (Exposurei,t−1× State-ownedi) is used to control for the different effects of
state-owned and private banks on the dimension of the international exposure measure-
ment. If banks with higher exposure to the international markets cut lending more fol-
lowing the recent financial crisis, higher exposure banks would reduce their loan amount
after the financial crisis, that is, I expect β3 in Eq. (1.37) to be negative. Moreover, if the
Chinese government tried to close the door to avoid the substantial loss from the outside
world following the financial crisis, the state-owned banks should be affected more com-
pared with the privately-owned banks. Therefore, I expect β4 in Eq. (1.37) to be negative.
Table 1.30 presents estimates from panel regressions explaining bank-firm-level yearly
bank loans from 2001 to 2016. The conditional information set includes Size, State-owned,
Policy, Rural, List, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank, Bad Loan, Bad Loan
× Crisis, and Bad Loan × Post.
Table 1.30 presents the fixed effect estimation in equation (1.37) that provides an unbi-
ased estimate of the bank lending channel coefficient. All regressions include fixed effects.
Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
The results indicate a large bank lending channel: column 1 of table 1.30 shows that one
percentage point increase of international commercial lending and bond as a fraction of
assets could lead to a decrease of private bank loans by 0.839 percentage points more after
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the onset of the financial crisis, and 3.111 percentage points more decrease in state-owned
loans after the onset of the financial crisis.
Column 3 of table 1.30 shows that one percentage point increase of loans lend to B-
share, H-share and overseas-listed Chinese firms as a fraction of total loans could lead to
a decrease of private bank loans by 4.012 percentage points more after the onset of the
financial crisis, and 4.519 percentage points more decrease in state-owned loans after the
beginning of the financial crisis.
Column 5 of table 1.30 shows that one percentage point increase of the bank’s trade
settlements as a fraction of its total loans could lead to a decrease of private bank loans by
0.121 percentage points more after the onset of the financial crisis, and 1.723 percentage
points more decrease in state-owned loans after the beginning of the financial crisis.
To show the robustness of our results, we rerun the above regressions using less re-
strictive specifications. Column 2, 4, and 6 present results for specifications, including the
only firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Importantly, results remain very similar both
in terms of economic and statistical significance using either specification. Hence, also the
economic magnitude of the impact described is very stable across different specifications.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I showed that the credit crunch following the financial crisis in the inter-
national markets did impact Chinese bank lending channel. In particular, I found that
banks with higher exposure to the global markets cut lending more following the recent
financial crisis, and state-owned bank loans are more pro-cyclical compared with private
bank loans. I also found that banks with higher exposure to the international markets cut
lending more when there was a negative shock in the OECD GDP growth rate.
Moreover, I compared the effect from the international borrowing in bonds market, the
foreign listed in the stocks market, as well as the trade settlement in the goods market,
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and found that the effects of the financial crisis on bonds and stocks market were more
significant than the effect on goods market.
Furthermore, I found that the financial shock from the international markets also im-
pacts Chinese firm borrowing channel. Explicitly speaking, firms with higher weighted
aggregate exposure to the global markets through the banks had the lower net debt, cash,
employment and capital investment during the financial crisis, and firms with higher
weighted aggregate exposure to the international markets had higher net debt and lower
cash, employment and capital investment when there was a negative shock in OECD
GDP growth rate.
In my analysis, I took advantage of a novel data set, covering a large number of small,
privately owned and rural banks, with information on firm-bank relationships. This pa-
per is the first paper to analyze the impact of the financial crisis and the sovereign debt
crisis on both the Chinese bank lending channel and the firm borrowing channel. To fur-
ther disclose the bank loan effects of the financial shocks, one may redo my analysis by
industries to see which industry is affected most by the exogenous financial shocks.
My findings foster the understanding of the unfolding of the impact of the financial
crisis on the Chinese bank lending channel and firm borrowing channel. My results also
indicate that both markets oriented and government-oriented effects are critical in the
financial market in China.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1 Financial Development: China and US (USD Trillion) (2016)
Sector Bank Credit Stock Fixed Income Insurance Investment Funds
Size (China) 15.45 7.32 10.43 2.19 1.32
Size (US) 12.44 27.35 39.36 8.46 19.20
% GDP (China) 137.95% 64.30% 93.12% 19.55% 11.76%
% GDP (US) 67.00% 147.40% 211.95% 45.56% 103.39%
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Table 1.2 Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Bank-level
Dependent Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
L Natural logarithm of bank loans
∆L ln(bank loant+1−bank loant)
Key Explanatory Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
A f tert Dummy equal to one if the year is after 2008
Crisist Dummy equal to one if the year is 2008-2012
grOECDYt OECD GDP growth rate
Bad Loani,t (Subprime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss loani,t)/Asseti,t
International Borrowingi,t (International bondi,t+International commercial borrowingi,t)/Asseti,t
Foreign Listedi,t (Loan to B-, H-share & overseas listed Chinese firmsi,t)/Total loani,t
Trade Settlementi,t Trade settlementsi,t/ Total loani,t
(Exchange/Income)i,t Exchange gainsi,t/Total incomei,t
Control Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
State-ownedi Dummy equals to one if the bank is a state-owned bank
Policyi Dummy equals to one if the bank is a policy bank
Rurali Dummy equals to one if the bank is a rural bank




Cash Flowi,t Operating Income Before Depreciationi,t/((Assetsi,t−1+Assetsi,t)/2)
Lend Central Banki,t Debt lent from central banki,t/Assetsi,t
Firm-level
Dependent Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
Net Debt (Current+Non-Current Liabilities−Cash)/(Total Assets)
∆Cash (Casht+1−Casht)/(Total Assett)
Employment Growth ln(Employmentt)−ln(Employmentt−1)
CAPX (Fixed Assetst+1−Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Assetst, set to 0 if negative




Control Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
Sales Growth ln(Salest)−ln(Salest−1)
Cash Flowi,t Operating Income Before Depreciationi,t/Assetsi,t−1
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics (Firm-bank Pairwise)
State-owned Banks Private Banks All Banks
mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count
loan 502.619 3,717.35 9,840 264.614 780.71 15,018 358.828 2,418.99 24,858
lnloan 18.842 1.38 9,840 18.548 1.22 15,018 18.664 1.29 24,858
dlnloan 0.114 0.91 4,822 0.123 0.77 6,655 0.119 0.83 11,477
Observations 9840 15018 24858
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of firm-bank pairwise dependent variables split into
state-owned and private banks. State-owned is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank is a state-
owned bank. The sample consists of all firms that are listed in the A-share, B-share, H-share, and
oversea stocks market.
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics (Bank-level I)
State-owned Banks Private Banks All Banks
mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count
Bad Loan 0.029 0.05 101 0.007 0.01 731 0.010 0.02 832
Exchange/Income 0.028 0.08 122 0.008 0.03 1,010 0.010 0.04 1,132
International Borrowing 0.009 0.03 99 0.002 0.01 749 0.002 0.01 848
Trade Settlement 0.086 0.34 100 0.000 0.01 820 0.010 0.12 920
Foreign Listed 0.060 0.15 110 0.052 0.21 617 0.053 0.20 727
Size 28.993 1.24 107 25.728 1.34 772 26.126 1.70 879
Profit 23.676 2.20 107 20.925 1.46 772 21.260 1.81 879
Cash Flow 0.095 0.06 107 0.150 0.04 772 0.143 0.05 879
Roa 0.012 0.01 93 0.011 0.00 568 0.011 0.01 661
List 0.402 0.49 122 0.126 0.33 994 0.156 0.36 1,116
Deposit 28.367 1.83 103 25.333 1.32 817 25.673 1.69 920
EBITDA 25.124 1.71 107 22.118 1.34 773 22.483 1.70 880
Tangibility 0.009 0.01 107 0.007 0.01 772 0.007 0.01 879
Lend Central Bank 0.022 0.06 122 0.002 0.01 1,010 0.004 0.02 1,132
Policy 0.344 0.48 122 0.000 0.00 1,010 0.037 0.19 1,132
Rural 0.000 0.00 122 0.139 0.35 1,010 0.124 0.33 1,132
Observations 122 1010 1132
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of bank-level explanatory variables split into state-
owned and private banks. The sample consists of all banks that are located in China.
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Table 1.5 Summary Statistics (Bank-level II)
2001-2008 2009-2012 2013-2016
mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count
Bad Loan 0.037 0.04 113 0.010 0.02 832 0.005 0.00 466
Exchange/Income 0.004 0.02 227 0.003 0.04 1,132 0.004 0.04 552
International Borrowing 0.010 0.03 111 0.002 0.01 848 0.001 0.00 489
Foreign Listed 0.050 0.16 105 0.053 0.20 727 0.056 0.23 431
Trade Settlement 0.043 0.30 134 0.010 0.12 920 0.003 0.02 512
Size 26.914 1.54 120 26.126 1.70 879 26.018 1.64 495
Profit 21.398 1.85 119 21.260 1.81 879 21.288 1.76 496
Cash 24.514 1.59 120 24.087 1.61 879 24.026 1.54 495
Roa 0.008 0.00 67 0.011 0.01 661 0.011 0.01 390
List 0.232 0.42 211 0.156 0.36 1,116 0.116 0.32 552
Deposit 26.547 1.74 134 25.673 1.69 920 25.530 1.57 517
Cash Flow 0.023 0.01 120 0.027 0.01 879 0.029 0.01 495
Tangibility 0.010 0.01 120 0.007 0.01 879 0.007 0.01 495
Lend Central Bank 0.006 0.04 227 0.004 0.02 1,132 0.005 0.01 552
State-owned 0.256 0.44 227 0.108 0.31 1,132 0.058 0.23 552
Policy 0.079 0.27 227 0.037 0.19 1,132 0.022 0.15 552
Rural 0.026 0.16 227 0.124 0.33 1,132 0.168 0.37 552
Observations 227 1132 552
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of bank-level explanatory variables split into dif-
ferent time periods: 2001-2008, 2009-2012, and 2013-2016. The sample consists of all banks that are
located in China.
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Table 1.6 Summary Statistics (Firm-level)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Net Debt 0.038 0.206 7213
Cash 0.166 0.114 6245
Employment 4073.728 9104.401 7288
Sales 0.604 0.521 7295
Capital Investment 0.04 0.361 7285
Cash Flow 0.032 0.054 7221
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of
firm-level explanatory variables. The sample con-
sists of all listed Chinese firms.
Table 1.7 Preliminary Test
(1) (2) (3)
Demean (International Borrowing) Demean (Foreign Listed) Demean (Trade Settlement)
Crisis 0.000993 -0.000576 0.00485
(0.0174) (0.0220) (0.0139)
Post -0.000519 -0.00376 0.00375
(0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0150)
Observations 18396 23202 22150
R2 0.101 0.071 0.164
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Clusters at Bank Level 132 177 170
Notes. This table presents the results of a preliminary test regression. The unit of observation is
a bank-year. The dependent variable is the exposure measurement. All variables are defined in
Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.8 Bank Lending Channel (Three Periods Level Effect)




















Bad Loan -1.289∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗ -1.532 -1.720∗ -1.504∗∗∗ -1.291∗∗
(0.471) (0.377) (0.957) (0.910) (0.506) (0.518)
Bad Loan x Post -2.051 3.273 -3.644 2.008 12.31∗∗ 11.37∗∗
(12.20) (11.18) (6.567) (6.183) (5.934) (5.524)
Bad Loan x Crisis 3.514 -0.0869 -1.148 -4.178 -16.92∗ -20.64∗∗
(7.711) (6.406) (5.275) (5.253) (8.916) (8.652)
Exposure -1.827∗ -3.619∗∗∗ 0.501 -0.639 0.745 1.361∗∗
(1.021) (1.185) (1.714) (1.635) (0.752) (0.648)
Expo. x State-owned 2.563∗∗∗ 4.400∗∗∗ 5.828∗∗∗ 7.793∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 1.752∗∗∗
(0.954) (1.160) (1.885) (1.802) (0.344) (0.325)
Exposure x Crisis -4.725∗∗∗ -1.942 -5.149∗∗∗ -6.046∗∗∗ -1.773∗∗ -1.820∗∗∗
(1.541) (1.379) (1.221) (1.168) (0.857) (0.612)
Expo. x Crisis x State-owned -5.660∗ -8.028∗∗∗ -4.682∗∗ -6.159∗∗∗ -0.281 -0.381
(3.347) (2.978) (1.999) (1.908) (0.802) (0.489)
Expo. x Post 0.893 1.695 0.724 0.355 0.824 0.0179
(1.104) (1.300) (1.729) (1.647) (1.101) (0.864)
Expo. x Post x State-owned 6.178∗∗∗ 2.909∗∗ 4.781∗∗ 6.816∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(1.266) (1.458) (1.888) (1.805) (0.0587) (0.0537)
Observations 13934 13934 18895 18895 17222 17222
R2 0.686 0.593 0.669 0.575 0.670 0.575
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 132 132 177 177 170 170
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. Bank
Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All vari-
ables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the
coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.9 Bank Lending Channel (Three Periods Growth Rate Effect)




















Bad Loan 1.095 0.900 0.136 0.869 0.589 1.098
(1.420) (1.477) (1.811) (1.083) (1.379) (1.321)
Exposure -0.584 -0.748 -1.141 -0.853 -3.422 -3.764∗∗
(0.616) (0.752) (3.145) (1.573) (2.205) (1.777)
Exposure x Crisis -0.970 -0.645 -1.192 -0.839 -0.421 -0.0993
(0.692) (0.778) (3.201) (1.540) (0.458) (0.430)
Expo. x Crisis x State-owned -4.379∗ -3.024 -1.017 -0.664 -4.802∗∗ -4.720∗∗
(2.565) (1.977) (0.773) (1.054) (2.407) (1.956)
Expo. x Post 0.581 1.468 1.150 0.872 0.0506 0.0265
(0.972) (1.092) (3.149) (1.582) (0.0433) (0.0294)
Expo. x Post x State-owned 3.030∗∗∗ 2.592∗∗ 0.221∗ 0.314∗∗ 3.996∗ 4.439∗∗
(1.077) (1.023) (0.112) (0.132) (2.210) (1.753)
Observations 6903 6903 9212 9212 5818 5818
R2 0.426 0.198 0.390 0.184 0.417 0.180
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 109 109 135 135 103 103
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the growth rate of the loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, State-owned, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central
Bank. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or *
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.10 Bank Lending Channel (Using All Measures of Exposure Together) (Three Pe-
riods Level Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan
Bad Loan -1.419∗∗ -1.827∗∗ -1.131∗ -1.708∗∗
(0.639) (0.759) (0.677) (0.774)
International Borrowing 1.245∗∗∗ -0.474 0.966 -0.661
(0.467) (0.723) (0.700) (0.832)
Foreign Listed 3.026∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 3.449∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(1.067) (0.0471) (1.226) (0.0515)
Trade Settlement -2.065 0.545 -1.390 0.486
(1.485) (0.745) (1.676) (0.653)
International Borrowing x Crisis -6.266∗∗∗ -4.906∗∗∗
(1.142) (1.286)
Foreign Listed x Crisis -3.515∗∗∗ -3.931∗∗∗
(1.112) (1.324)
Trade Settlement x Crisis -0.694 -0.291
(1.590) (1.674)
International Borrowing x Post 1.629∗ 2.307∗∗∗
(0.884) (0.811)
Foreign Listed x Post 2.882∗∗∗ 3.285∗∗∗
(1.064) (1.228)
Trade Settlement x Post 3.380∗∗ 2.418
(1.402) (1.561)
Observations 11987 11987 11987 11987
R2 0.686 0.684 0.590 0.588
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 128 128 128 128
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regres-
sion. The unit of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the
level of log loan volume. Bank Controls includes Size, State-owned, Policy, Ru-
ral, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are defined in
Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the co-
efficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.11 Bank Lending Channel (OECD GDP Growth Rate)




















Bad Loan -1.352 -1.410 -2.049∗∗ -1.151 -2.095∗ -2.335
(1.351) (1.854) (0.960) (1.222) (1.080) (1.861)
Bad Loan x OECD 0.0523 0.392 0.129 0.344 0.120 0.432
(0.376) (0.605) (0.267) (0.581) (0.343) (0.571)
Exposure -2.194∗∗∗ -2.515∗∗∗ -0.252 -0.0503 -0.877 -1.243∗∗
(0.509) (0.514) (0.200) (0.172) (0.650) (0.622)
Exposure x OECD growth rate 0.0139 0.0115 0.0775 0.0376 1.204∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.175) (0.0900) (0.0771) (0.324) (0.316)
Exposure x OECD x State-owned 1.659∗∗∗ 1.883∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.359) (0.171) (0.201) (0.190) (0.188)
Observations 15503 15503 20528 20528 19144 19144
R2 0.623 0.593 0.606 0.574 0.607 0.573
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 132 132 177 177 170 170
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. Bank Controls
includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are defined
in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.12 Bank Lending Channel (Growth Rate Effect)




















Bad Loan -4.877∗∗ -4.720 -5.479∗∗ -3.509 -6.962∗∗ -3.553
(2.155) (3.317) (2.372) (3.213) (2.866) (3.521)
Bad Loan x OECD growth rate 1.851∗∗ 2.615∗∗ 1.413∗∗ 1.766 2.544∗∗ 1.874
(0.772) (1.070) (0.687) (1.122) (1.033) (1.239)
Exposure -0.379 -0.714∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -0.609 -0.535
(0.290) (0.426) (0.138) (0.154) (0.375) (0.454)
Exposure x OECD growth rate 0.318∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.292∗∗ 0.377∗∗
(0.0854) (0.137) (0.0812) (0.0925) (0.133) (0.167)
Observations 7627 7627 9968 9968 8909 8909
R2 0.195 0.180 0.182 0.167 0.169 0.151
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 118 118 141 141 133 133
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume. Bank
Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables
are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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OECD GDP growth rate 0.0271∗∗ 0.0242∗ 0.0494∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0169)
Bad Loan -1.147 -1.348 -0.335
(1.052) (2.591) (1.642)
Bad Loan x OECD growth rate 0.503 0.403 0.560
(1.018) (0.872) (1.041)
Exposure -0.255 -0.357∗∗ -0.840∗∗
(0.254) (0.153) (0.403)
Exposure x OECD growth rate 0.187∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.474∗∗
(0.106) (0.0920) (0.194)
Observations 7627 9968 8909
R2 0.171 0.156 0.141
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 118 141 133
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of obser-
vation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume. Bank Controls
includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are defined
in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.14 Bank Lending Channel (Using All Measures of Exposure Together) (Growth
Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan
Bad Loan -1.054 -1.039 -3.749 -2.059
(2.192) (2.351) (3.099) (3.408)
Bad Loan x OECD growth rate 1.416∗ 1.352 2.071∗∗ 1.328
(0.795) (0.865) (0.854) (0.993)
International Borrowing -2.858∗∗∗ -0.753 -3.361∗∗∗ -1.276
(1.042) (0.640) (1.232) (0.909)
Foreign Listed -0.810∗∗ -0.0798 -0.778∗∗∗ -0.0690
(0.310) (0.0711) (0.281) (0.0700)
Trade Settlement -2.788∗∗∗ -2.705∗∗∗ -3.263∗∗∗ -3.062∗∗∗
(0.886) (0.927) (0.587) (0.669)
International Borrowing x OECD growth rate 1.572∗∗∗ 1.535∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.380)
Foreign Listed x OECD growth rate 0.473∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.173)
Trade Settlement x OECD growth rate 0.115 0.239
(0.180) (0.231)
Observations 6543 6543 6543 6543
R2 0.178 0.177 0.161 0.160
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 113 113 113 113
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All
variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that
the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.15 Firm Borrowing Channel (Three Periods Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
International Borrowing 0.535 -0.201 -2.875 -13.51∗
(0.325) (2.609) (1.517) (5.665)
International Borrowing x Crisis -1.172∗ -2.738 -0.0772 -3.717
(0.493) (3.813) (2.283) (8.466)
International Borrowing x Post -1.333∗∗∗ 9.046∗∗∗ 9.911∗∗∗ 19.78∗∗∗
(0.397) (3.261) (1.845) (7.005)
Sales 0.00739∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0421
(0.00375) (0.0282) (0.0175) (0.0772)
Cash Flow -0.670∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.958
(0.0440) (0.317) (0.203) (0.913)
Observations 6841 7060 7053 4197
R2 0.751 0.766 0.860 0.640
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1967 1992 1991 1657
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. The unit
of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employ-
ment, and capital investment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa.
All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indi-
cates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the firm-level.
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Table 1.16 Firm Borrowing Channel (Three Periods Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Foreign Listed 0.198∗∗∗ -2.054∗∗∗ -1.661∗∗∗ -1.992
(0.0730) (0.441) (0.335) (1.290)
Foreign Listed x Crisis -0.372∗ -0.398 -0.153 -1.144
(0.158) (1.144) (0.718) (2.750)
Foreign Listed x Post -1.169∗∗∗ 7.318∗∗∗ 8.472∗∗∗ 12.06∗∗∗
(0.221) (1.378) (1.005) (3.932)
Sales 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0153
(0.00378) (0.0251) (0.0173) (0.0794)
Cash Flow -0.709∗∗∗ 2.422∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.918
(0.0456) (0.290) (0.207) (0.974)
Observations 5842 6249 6310 3772
R2 0.765 0.837 0.875 0.650
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1321 1902 1911 1573
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regres-
sion. The unit of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt,
cash/asset, log employment, and capital investment/asset. Firm Controls includes
Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regres-
sions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is signif-
icant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the firm-level.
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Table 1.17 Firm Borrowing Channel (Three Periods Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Trade Settlement 0.129∗∗∗ -0.244 -0.494∗∗∗ -0.462
(0.0299) (0.194) (0.138) (0.546)
Trade Settlement x Crisis -0.139∗ -0.366 -0.486∗ -1.558
(0.0551) (0.371) (0.247) (0.957)
Trade Settlement x Post -0.171∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 2.286∗∗∗
(0.0354) (0.244) (0.172) (0.648)
Sales 0.00849∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.00991
(0.00372) (0.0248) (0.0159) (0.0771)
Cash Flow -0.714∗∗∗ 2.588∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.437
(0.0444) (0.284) (0.189) (0.942)
Observations 6214 6660 6720 3993
R2 0.762 0.832 0.888 0.653
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1349 1943 1952 1611
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regres-
sion. The unit of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt,
cash/asset, log employment, and capital investment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size,
State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions in-
clude fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the firm-level.
59
Table 1.18 Firm Borrowing Channel (OECD GDP Growth Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
International Borrowing -5.362∗∗ 0.708 0.115 -8.104
(2.400) (1.465) (0.965) (4.944)
International Borrowing x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.171 0.320∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 2.083∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.138) (0.0953) (0.526)
Sales 0.0577 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0101
(0.0379) (0.0246) (0.0168) (0.0799)
Cash Flow -6.625∗∗∗ 2.419∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.0355
(0.448) (0.277) (0.196) (0.994)
Observations 6841 7060 7053 4197
R2 0.756 0.823 0.871 0.652
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1967 1992 1991 1657
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. The
unit of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log em-
ployment, and capital investment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility,
Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indi-
cates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the firm-level.
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Table 1.19 Firm Borrowing Channel (OECD GDP Growth Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Foreign Listed 0.0822 -1.748∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗ -1.605
(0.0691) (0.421) (0.300) (1.358)
Foreign Listed x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.0578∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 1.484∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.118) (0.0801) (0.448)
Sales 0.00692∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0322
(0.00390) (0.0252) (0.0171) (0.0853)
Cash Flow -0.688∗∗∗ 2.429∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.0135
(0.0477) (0.291) (0.206) (1.087)
Observations 5842 6249 6310 3772
R2 0.777 0.840 0.885 0.666
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1321 1902 1911 1573
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. The unit of ob-
servation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employment, and capital
investment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in
Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is signifi-
cant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are
clustered at the firm-level.
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Table 1.20 Firm Borrowing Channel (OECD GDP Growth Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Trade Settlement 0.0283 0.166 -0.0516 0.285
(0.0188) (0.117) (0.0816) (0.353)
Trade Settlement x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.0544∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.114) (0.0745) (0.422)
Sales 0.00456 0.177∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0423
(0.00383) (0.0249) (0.0165) (0.0835)
Cash Flow -0.696∗∗∗ 2.560∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.273
(0.0462) (0.285) (0.195) (1.060)
Observations 6214 6660 6720 3993
R2 0.772 0.834 0.886 0.663
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Firm Level 1349 1943 1952 1611
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. The unit of observa-
tion is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employment, and capital invest-
ment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in Table
1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at
the firm-level.
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Table 1.21 Firm Borrowing Channel (Generalized Method of Moments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
International Borrowing 4.351∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -2.488∗∗∗ -18.02
(1.317) (0.147) (0.815) (13.79)
International Borrowing x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.781∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 4.234∗
(0.247) (0.0244) (0.145) (2.561)
Sales 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.537∗
(0.0231) (0.00205) (0.0112) (0.298)
Cash Flow -1.324∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗ 2.332
(0.153) (0.0425) (0.273) (1.864)
Constant 0.364∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 7.236∗∗∗ 17.17∗∗∗
(0.0577) (0.0122) (0.107) (0.556)
Observations 6841 7060 7053 4197
Firms 1967 1992 1991 1657
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0369 0.0820 0.117 0.296
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.624 0.785 0.120 0.390
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. I con-
duct the two-step GMM system estimation using lagged 3-4 values as instruments. The unit
of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employ-
ment, and capital investment/asset. Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility,
Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or *
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Windmeijer corrected robust standard errors are given below.
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Table 1.22 Firm Borrowing Channel (Generalized Method of Moments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Foreign Listed -0.282∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 2.684∗∗∗ -0.599
(0.0542) (0.250) (0.416) (2.129)
Foreign Listed x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.0531∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0528) (0.108) (0.407)
Sales 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0141∗ 0.0167 0.914∗∗∗
(0.00779) (0.00786) (0.0287) (0.332)
Cash Flow -0.469∗∗∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 3.895∗∗∗ 0.401
(0.0477) (0.127) (0.469) (2.312)
Constant 0.180∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 7.669∗∗∗ 18.06∗∗∗
(0.00727) (0.0299) (0.0494) (0.160)
Observations 5842 6249 6310 3772
Firms 1321 1902 1911 1573
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Sargan test (p-value) 0.753 0.357 0.543 0.362
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.0303 0.808 0.0983 0.613
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. I conduct the two-
step GMM system estimation using lagged 3-4 values as instruments. The unit of observation is a firm-
year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employment, and capital investment/asset.
Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Windmeijer corrected robust standard errors are given below.
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Table 1.23 Firm Borrowing Channel (Generalized Method of Moments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
Trade Settlement -0.0696∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ -0.435
(0.0193) (0.0465) (0.157) (0.285)
Trade Settlement x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.0519∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0563) (0.108) (0.334)
Sales 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.00927 0.190∗∗∗ 0.356
(0.00530) (0.0103) (0.0217) (0.223)
Cash Flow -0.574∗∗∗ 2.823∗∗∗ 6.348∗∗∗ 2.308∗
(0.0570) (0.277) (0.482) (1.399)
Constant 0.230∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗ 6.918∗∗∗ 18.74∗∗∗
(0.00859) (0.0482) (0.0723) (0.276)
Observations 6214 6660 6720 3993
Firms 1349 1943 1952 1611
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Sargan test (p-value) 0.901 0.0104 0.855 0.796
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.476 0.808 0.423 0.604
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese firm borrowing channel regression. I conduct the two-
step GMM system estimation using lagged 3-4 values as instruments. The unit of observation is a firm-
year. The dependent variable is the net debt, cash/asset, log employment, and capital investment/asset.
Firm Controls includes Size, State-owned, Tangibility, Roa. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%,
5%, or 10% level, respectively. Windmeijer corrected robust standard errors are given below.
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Table 1.24 Bank Lending Channel (Using All Measures of Exposure Together) (Growth
Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Debt Cash Employment Capital Investment
International Borrowing x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.183 0.216∗∗∗ 0.0819 5.141∗∗
(0.136) (0.0656) (0.169) (2.178)
Foreign Listed x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.310∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 1.556
(0.175) (0.0284) (0.221) (2.612)
Trade Settlement x OECD GDP Growth Rate -0.0383 0.00879 0.0220 3.915∗∗∗
(0.0814) (0.0129) (0.0455) (0.874)
Sales 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.315
(0.0176) (0.000936) (0.00417) (0.380)
Cash Flow -0.916∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 1.167
(0.119) (0.0420) (0.212) (1.992)
Constant 0.140∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 7.015∗∗∗ 17.64∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.00730) (0.0455) (0.198)
Observations 5842 6145 6140 3665
Firms 1321 1890 1889 1546
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Sargan test (p-value) 0.219 0.538 0.772 0.364
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.449 0.826 0.125 0.859
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All
variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that
the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.25 Bank Lending Channel (Growth Rate Effect) (Initial Value)




















Bad Loan -4.704∗∗ -3.651 -6.804∗∗∗ -2.322 -5.541∗∗ -1.264
(2.217) (2.674) (2.345) (3.166) (2.154) (3.239)
Bad Loan x OECD 1.905∗∗ 2.310∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗ 1.303 1.388∗ 0.789
(0.749) (0.964) (0.668) (1.099) (0.780) (1.154)
Exposure -0.836 -0.0827 -0.420∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗ -0.113 -0.259∗∗∗
(0.587) (0.471) (0.154) (0.153) (0.0998) (0.0789)
Exposure x OECD growth rate 0.267∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.0890∗∗ 0.0872∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.196) (0.0384) (0.0395) (0.00943) (0.0280)
Observations 7627 7627 9968 9968 9981 9981
R2 0.195 0.180 0.182 0.167 0.182 0.168
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 118 118 141 141 133 133
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume. Bank
Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables
are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.26 Bank Lending Channel (Exchange/Income) (Three Periods Level Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan
Bad Loan -2.276∗∗ -2.046∗∗ -2.106∗∗ -2.633∗∗∗ -2.282∗∗∗ -2.316∗∗∗
(0.912) (0.907) (0.906) (0.864) (0.860) (0.859)
Bad Loan x Crisis -2.817 -1.534 -2.399 2.636 5.541 4.390
(6.584) (6.098) (6.061) (6.198) (5.718) (5.679)
Bad Loan x Post 8.934∗ 7.893 6.130 4.924 3.018 1.683
(4.858) (4.840) (4.781) (4.835) (4.817) (4.764)
Exchange/Income -0.0724 0.0207 -0.239 -0.268 -0.129 -0.448
(0.439) (0.434) (0.395) (0.432) (0.426) (0.388)
Exchange/Income x State-owned -4.006∗ 0.871 -0.294 -7.551∗∗∗ 0.243 -0.402
(2.213) (0.783) (0.338) (2.071) (0.777) (0.330)
Exchange/Income x Crisis -2.009∗∗∗ -1.442∗∗ -2.022∗∗∗ -0.967
(0.752) (0.712) (0.756) (0.711)
Exchange/Income x Crisis x State-owned -6.288∗ -0.167 -11.88∗∗∗ -0.603
(3.520) (1.157) (3.353) (1.122)
Exchange/Income x Post 1.641 3.580
(2.575) (2.476)
Exchange/Income x Post x State-owned 5.609∗∗ 9.128∗∗∗
(2.381) (2.247)
Observations 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212
R2 0.668 0.668 0.668 0.575 0.574 0.574
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All
variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates
that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
68
Table 1.27 Bank Lending Channel (Bad Loan) (Three Periods Level Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan
Bad Loan -9.737∗ -13.26∗∗∗ -14.72∗∗∗ -16.65∗∗∗ -16.59∗∗∗ -18.93∗∗∗
(5.832) (4.821) (3.963) (5.402) (4.586) (3.825)
Bad Loan x State-owned 7.576 10.96∗∗ 12.18∗∗∗ 14.15∗∗∗ 14.07∗∗∗ 16.27∗∗∗
(5.700) (4.764) (3.956) (5.264) (4.521) (3.803)
Bad Loan x Crisis -14.85∗ -4.646 -11.65 -6.254
(7.960) (6.405) (7.666) (6.296)
Bad Loan x Crisis x State-owned -7.477 -10.54∗∗ -7.210 -3.593
(8.750) (4.348) (8.097) (4.015)
Bad Loan x Post 10.31 17.03∗
(10.74) (10.12)
Bad Loan x Post x State-owned 20.12∗∗∗ 13.16∗
(7.401) (7.023)
Observations 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212
R2 0.669 0.669 0.669 0.576 0.575 0.575
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of observa-
tion is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. Bank Controls includes
Size, State-owned, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are de-
fined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate
is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.28 Bank Lending Channel (Exchange/Income) (Growth Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan
Bad Loan -6.647∗∗∗ -5.862∗∗∗ -2.982 -2.099 -1.315
(2.408) (2.112) (2.690) (2.415) (1.086)
Bad Loan x OECD growth rate 2.339∗∗∗ 2.085∗∗∗ 1.612∗ 1.268 0.514
(0.612) (0.658) (0.950) (0.963) (0.981)
Exchange/Income -1.110∗ -0.707∗∗ -0.352 -0.0851 -0.853∗
(0.566) (0.356) (0.466) (0.295) (0.493)
Exchange/Income x OECD growth rate 0.566∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.401∗∗
(0.254) (0.206) (0.188)
OECD GDP growth rate 0.0362∗∗
(0.0147)
Observations 9986 9986 9986 9986 9986
R2 0.185 0.185 0.168 0.168 0.159
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 141 141 141 141 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, State-owned, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, List, Cash Flow, Lend
Central Bank. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **,
or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.29 Bank Lending Channel (Bad Loan) (Growth Rate Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan dlnloan
Bad Loan -5.785∗∗ -2.429 -2.059 0.797 -0.566
(2.317) (2.024) (3.120) (1.868) (2.547)
Bad Loan x OECD growth rate 1.968∗∗∗ 1.250 0.223
(0.662) (1.094) (0.853)
OECD GDP growth rate 0.0365∗∗∗
(0.0123)
Observations 9986 9986 9986 9986 9986
R2 0.185 0.184 0.168 0.167 0.159
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO YES YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 141 141 141 141 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The
unit of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the change in log loan
volume. Bank Controls includes Size, State-owned, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, List,
Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions
include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.30 Bank Lending Channel (Two Periods Level Effect)




















Bad Loan -1.792∗∗∗ -1.922∗∗∗ -1.253∗∗ -1.352 -1.515 -1.398
(0.645) (0.577) (0.537) (0.909) (0.929) (0.883)
Bad Loan x After 6.427 7.155 -8.034 -6.506 -6.399 -7.903∗
(6.286) (6.408) (6.155) (4.257) (4.419) (4.324)
Exposure 0.602∗∗ 0.576∗∗ 4.671∗∗ 4.903∗∗∗ 0.280∗ 0.241∗
(0.303) (0.264) (2.011) (1.028) (0.167) (0.141)
Exposure x State-owned 0.165∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.0647) (0.0578) (0.0524) (0.0259) (0.0419) (0.0414)
Exposure x After -0.839 -0.991 -4.012∗∗ -4.276∗∗∗ -0.121 -0.180
(1.592) (1.375) (1.978) (1.047) (0.576) (0.558)
Exposure x After x State-owned -2.272∗ -1.540 -0.507∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗ -1.602∗∗ -1.520∗∗
(1.313) (1.159) (0.171) (0.201) (0.753) (0.739)
Observations 13934 13934 18895 18895 17222 17222
R2 0.685 0.593 0.669 0.575 0.670 0.575
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clusters at Bank Level 132 132 177 177 170 170
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of ob-
servation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. Bank Controls
includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables are defined
in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is
significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.31 Bank Lending Channel (Exchange/Income) (Two Periods Level Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan
Bad Loan -2.099∗∗ -2.094∗∗ -2.107∗∗∗ -2.297∗∗∗ -2.287∗∗∗ -2.314∗∗∗
(0.906) (0.906) (0.535) (0.859) (0.859) (0.594)
Bad Loan x After 3.022 3.535 -2.191 2.851 3.391 -1.490
(3.886) (3.894) (5.596) (3.804) (3.810) (5.645)
Exchange/Income -0.260 -0.238 -0.474 -0.446 -0.407 -0.595
(0.394) (0.394) (0.612) (0.386) (0.387) (0.536)
Exchange/Income x After -0.472 -0.177 -0.571∗∗∗ -0.553∗ -0.206 -0.582∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.341) (0.167) (0.300) (0.334) (0.137)
Exchange/Income x After x State-owned -1.549∗∗ -0.330 -1.883∗∗ -0.787
(0.789) (1.438) (0.788) (1.376)
Exchange/Income x State-owned 0.125∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0412)
Observations 19212 19212 18895 19212 19212 18895
R2 0.668 0.668 0.668 0.574 0.574 0.575
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume.
Bank Controls includes Size, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank.
All variables are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates
that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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Table 1.32 Bank Lending Channel (Bad Loan) (Two Periods Level Effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan lnloan
Bad Loan -2.450∗∗∗ -2.193∗∗ -7.706 -2.659∗∗∗ -2.339∗∗∗ -16.07∗∗∗
(0.905) (0.910) (5.768) (0.859) (0.865) (5.334)
Bad Loan x After -9.102∗∗ -1.382 -0.126 -8.305∗∗ -0.399 3.062
(4.190) (5.106) (5.269) (4.090) (4.871) (5.048)
Bad Loan x After x State-owned -15.38∗∗∗ -11.67∗ -16.70∗∗∗ -7.995
(5.816) (6.964) (5.590) (6.508)
Bad Loan x State-owned 5.448 13.54∗∗∗
(5.628) (5.188)
Observations 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212 19212
R2 0.669 0.669 0.669 0.575 0.575 0.575
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES NO NO NO
Clusters at Bank Level 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of ob-
servation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. Bank Controls
includes Size, State-owned, Policy, Rural, Tangibility, Roa, Cash Flow, Lend Central Bank. All variables
are defined in Table 1.2. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank-level.
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1.11 Figures
Figure 1.1 Bank Assets (RMB Trillion) and ROA (%)
Source: Jiang Wang (MIT), “China’s Financial System: Developments and Challenges", MIT
Golub Center for Finance and Policy 4th Annual Conference.
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Figure 1.2 China’s GDP, International Trade and FX Reserve (USD Billion)
Source: Jiang Wang (MIT), “China’s Financial System: Developments and Challenges", MIT
Golub Center for Finance and Policy 4th Annual Conference.
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1.12.1 Techniques for Structural Breaks
Denote the sample period as t = 1, ..., n, the break date (date of the change) as T1, the full
break model could be written as
Y1 = X1β1 + e1 (1.38)
Y2 = X2β2 + e2
or
yt = β′1xt1(t ≤ T1) + β′2xt1(t > T1) + et (1.39)
where Y1 = (y1, ..., yT1)
′, Y2 = (yT1+1, ..., yn)
′, yt = Log(loant), X1 = (x1, ..., xT1)
′, X2 =
(xT1+1, ..., xn)
′, xt = (1, exposure measurement, size, policy, rural, roa, bad loan)′t−1, e1 =
(ε1, ..., εT1)







Assume break dates are unknown; the null hypothesis is β1 = β2, I use the standard
linear hypothesis test (Wald test). The Wald test statistic is






)−1(β̂1 − β̂2) (1.41)
where V̂1 and V̂2 are standard asymptotic variance estimators for β̂1 and β̂2 (on the split
samples):
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V̂1 = Q̂−11 Ω̂1Q̂
−1
1 (1.42)



















n− T1 − k
(ê′2ê2)Q̂2
Under H0, if the number of observations pre- and post-break are large, then under
homoskedasticity, and in general
W(T1) −→d χ2k (1.45)
where k represents the number of the independent variables, we have k = 7.
We can reject H0 in favor of H1 if the test exceeds the critical value, thus “find a break"
if the test rejects.
1.12.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Given rw > β(1+ρ)1+ρ−δ and r > r
w, we have r > β(1+ρ)1+ρ−δ .
rw >
β(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ− δ ⇔
1 + ρ− δ
δ
− β




1 + ρ− δ ⇔
1 + ρ− δ
δ
− β
r− β > 0
r > rw ⇔ β
r− β −
β



























1.12.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Given rw > β(1+ρ)1+ρ−δ and r > r
w, we have r > β(1+ρ)1+ρ−δ .
r >
β(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ− δ ⇔
1 + ρ− δ
δ
− β
r− β > 0
r > rw ⇔ 1 + ρ− δ
βδ
(r− rw); β
rw − β −
β
r− β > 0⇒
1 + ρ− δ
βδ
(r− rw)+ ( β
rw − β −
β
r− β ) > 0
rw >
β(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ− δ and r
w ≈ r ⇔ β
rw − β +




































1.12.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Given c(s) > β = R− γ/∆λ > 0, 0 < s < 1, and 0 < drdrw < 1, we have
− βs




















= −β (1− dr/dr
w)(c− β) + 2(r− rw)(s + (1− s)dr/drw)
(c− β)3 < 0
1.12.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Given c(s) > β = R− γ/∆λ > 0, 0 < s < 1, and 0 < drdR < 1, we have
c− β(1− s) dr
dR
















βdr/dR(c− β) + (r− rw)(c + β− 2β(1− s)dr/dR)
(c− β)3 > 0
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Chapter Two
Financial Corruption and Bank Loan
Allocation: Evidence from China
2.1 Introduction
The research question is, what is the local effects of the anti-corruption campaign in 2012
in China on the credit supply of Chinese banks?
The identification strategy is the exogenous shock of the anti-corruption campaign in
China. A far-reaching campaign against corruption began in China following the con-
clusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. The
campaign, carried out under the aegis of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of China (paramount leader), was the most significant organized anti-graft effort
in the history of Communist rule in China. Figure 2.1 illustrates that the anti-corruption
campaign is unanticipated in China.
Why do we choose the anti-corruption campaign in 2012 as the supply side shock?
Figure 2.2 shows the bank assets and ROA of Chinese banks, we could find an obvious
turning point in the year 2012, from 2000 to 2012, the ROA of Chinese banks increased dra-
matically (except for the financial crisis in 2008), however, after 2012 the ROA decreased
significantly. Thus, something happened in Chinese bank system in the year 2012, af-
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ter reading a large amount of the literature, I find that this domestic supply-side shock
should be the anti-corruption campaign.
There is a growing literature studying the effects of the corruption, some literature
study the negative effects of the corruption and the rent-seeking activities (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993, 1994; Mauro, 1995; Fisman, 2001; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Butler et al.,
2009; Bertrand et al., 2018). On the other side, some papers analyze the positive impacts
of the corruption and the political connections. (Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2008; Amore
and Bennedsen, 2013; Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). Some other literature argue that the
relationship between political connections and bank financing decisions is quite complex,
especially across countries (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian,
2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Zeume, 2017).
Recent studies related to the anti-corruption campaign in China mainly focus on the
stock market price reactions (Griffin et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). How-
ever, bank financing still constitutes a dominant source of corporate financing (about 85
percent), while equity financing is only a tiny portion in China (1.3 percent) (Wang et al.,
2019). Table 2.2 compares the financial development of China and the United States in
2016, column 1 shows that the absolute value of the bank credit in China is even more
significant than the bank credit in the United States (15.45 vs. 12.44). When we consider
the amount of bank credit as a fraction of the GDP, the difference between China and the
United States is significantly amplified (137.95% vs. 67.00%). Moreover, the amount of
bank credit is the largest among all financial instruments (stock, fixed income, insurance,
and investment funds). Therefore I focus on Chinese bank credit in this paper.
Li et al. (2018) provides a novel empirical finding that the recent anti-corruption in-
vestigations in China are associated with credit reallocation from less productive, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive, non-SOEs. There are several differences
between Li et al. (2018) and my paper. First of all, I use a completely different confidential
data set to measure corruption in China. This paper employs the confidential data set
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compiled by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist
Party of China. I got the data from the Center for Anti-corruption and Governance at
Tsinghua University. Secondly, Li et al. (2018) emphasize on the loan rebate, which is the
entry fee for the enterprise to obtain credit funds. My paper focus on the bank’s monopoly
power, which is the entry fee for the bank to get the monopoly power as the fund provider
in the specific prefecture. Thirdly, this paper focus on the local effects. I use difference-
in-difference estimation to emphasize the different levels of corruption between different
prefectures in China. Thus, this paper analyzes the behavior of local officials instead of
firm managers in Li et al. (2018). Moreover, I employ the misreporting extent of the spe-
cific prefecture as the robustness check. Finally, I use the bank-firm matched loan-level
data, which means I could use Khwaja and Mian (2008) technique (year-firm fixed effect)
to focus on the variation in loans due to banks primarily.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) analyze how supply-side bank liquidity shocks get transmit-
ted to the rest of the economy. They examine the impact of liquidity shocks by exploiting
cross-bank liquidity variation induced by unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan. When
Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, the IMF suspended the exchange rate liquidity
support. Banks experienced the deposit run with larger dollar deposit accounts. The liq-
uidity shock varied substantially across banks.Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimate the bank
lending channel and firm borrowing channel simultaneously, and show that for the same
firm borrowing from two different banks, its loan from the bank experiencing a 1 percent
larger decline in liquidity drops by an additional 0.6 percent. This paper also uses the
fixed effect technique in Khwaja and Mian (2008) to estimate the bank lending channel
and firm borrowing channel simultaneously. Regarding to the ownership, Cong et al.
(2019) find that the stimulus-driven credit expansion disproportionately favored state-
owned firms and firms with a lower average product of capital, reversing the process of
capital reallocation toward private firms that characterized China’s high growth before
2008.
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Most of the literature in the field of Political Science states that China is a highly cen-
tralized country, and neither provinces nor prefectures have any specific law, regulations
and policies. Thus we could consider the enforcement is determined by the central gov-
ernment and is almost the same across regions. However, the enforcement differs over
time. In this case, I conduct a robustness check by using the index in the initial year as
well as the average of all the pre-shock years of my sample to measure the corruption.
The article unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the background of anti-corruption
campaign and banking system in China. Section 2.3 describes the data and key indexes
used in this study. Section 2.4 discusses our empirical strategy and identification strat-
egy. Section 2.5 reports our main finding regarding bank loan effects of the corruption
as well as the results from a number of robustness checks. Section 2.6 investigates the
mechanisms through which corruption may affect bank loans. Section 2.7 summarizes
and concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
2.2 Background
After China’s economic system reform in 1978, the planned economic system has broken,
introduced market as well as the price system. In the transition process, the change of
the property rights protection law has also created a group of beneficiaries, and banks are
also one of the beneficiaries formed during the reform process. In the process of reform,
state-owned commercial banks replaced government finance as the primary source of
corporate funds (Ting, 1997; Wedeman, 2004). The provider uses the funds and powers
granted by the government to obtain a monopoly position in the credit market. Although
the central bank has reduced monopoly profits through interest rate controls, banks can
circumvent restrictions through various other means. The banks are trying to acquire
economic benefits beyond the law, which will undoubtedly increase the financing costs
of the firms, both private and state-owned.
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The anti-corruption investigation started in the year 2012. Most of the officials inves-
tigated were removed from office and faced accusations of bribery and abuse of power,
although the range of alleged abuses varied widely. As of 2016, the campaign has ’netted’
over 120 high-ranking officials, including about a dozen high-ranking military officers,
several senior executives of state-owned companies, and five national leaders. More than
100,000 people have been indicted for corruption. Executed mainly under the direction
of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and its Secretary from 2012 to 2019
Qishan Wang along with corresponding military and judicial organs, the campaign was
notable in implicating both incumbent and former leaders. The anti-corruption campaign
continues up to now. The second plenary meeting of the 19th Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing from January
11 to 13, 2018. Xi Jinping emphasized that it is necessary to increase the anti-corruption
efforts in the financial sector. The communique of the meeting also showed that it is es-
sential to focus on resource-rich areas and critical positions and strengthen supervision to
decrease power concentration.
In China, the corruption for bank credit could be classified into two forms: one is the
loan rebate. The deducted benefit fee, which is the entry fee for the enterprise to obtain
credit funds. This kind of rental income could be referred as the “entry fee". Most of
the existing literature focus on the first form (Lu, 2000; Fan and Grossman, 2001; Ping
and Lei, 2003; Yong and An-gang, 2003; Xie and Lu, 2005; Kwong, 2015); the other is
the bank’s monopoly power as the fund provider. The abuse of the pricing power of
the fund to seek high markups in interest rates. The additional high-interest rate rental
income from the monopoly power is called “price rent”. This paper focuses on the second
form. Traditionally, the traditional banking industry has gained unseen profits under its
monopoly advantage. Among them, spread income is the primary source of income for
the traditional banking industry in the past. It is reported that the income from interest
in the listed banking industry accounted for more than 80% of the annual income.
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Xie and Lu (2005) investigate the central bank, commercial bank, and policy bank in
29 cities in China. There are around 80.5% (975/1211) bank staffs admit that the rent-
seeking by the right of financial resource allocating is very common to see or common
to see in their work. Besides, approximately 61.5% (652/1061) staffs in firms consider
they need to pay high markup to get the bank credit. Moreover, when they decrease the
sample size to only staffs in private firms, the percentage increases from 61.5% (652/1061)
to around 73.7% (350/475). Qian et al. (2015) states that PBOC limits the movements of
interest rates on both deposits and loans by setting base rates along with upper and lower
bounds. These rates and bounds vary over business cycles and with loan maturities.
Local commercial banks could adjust the interest rate within the boundaries according to
their specific issues.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Below we describe our data, the definition and evolution of key indexes, and summary
statistics.
2.3.1 Data Source
Our analysis uses several data sources, which we can link through unique identifiers for
each individual and every prefecture. Our data set combines four sources of information
existing in China: (i) bank loan data; (ii) corruption data; (iii) luminosity data; and, (iv)
economic data.
(i) Bank Loan Data. This paper uses a novel data set that contains bank-firm relation-
ships in China, along with detailed firm and bank-specific information. Our sample pe-
riod is from 2001 to 2016, such that we have a symmetric time window surrounding the
beginning of the financial crisis in the United States. Chinese data in this paper comes
91
three primary data sets: Wind Datafeed Service (referred to as WDS), GTA The China
Stock Market and Accounting Research (referred to as GTA CSMAR) Database as well as
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2001-2016).
Information about bank-firm relationships is from the bank loan data in GTA CSMAR
Database. GTA CSMAR access data on the China stock markets and the financial state-
ments of China’s listed companies. GTA CSMAR is a unique, comprehensive database of
China stock returns, covering all companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. I collect information on bank loans to all of the listed firms
from China.
I augment the data on bank-firm relationships with bank-level and firm-level data
taken from WDS. WDS provides historical reference data, real-time market data, and his-
torical intraday market data, covering stocks, bonds, futures, foreign exchanges, funds,
indices, warrants, and macro market data as well as descriptions, real-time market data,
financial data, dividend data, corporate actions, and historical intraday data.
In addition, I combine the data set with bank-level information from Almanac of
China’s Finance and Banking (2001-2016). Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking is
a high informative yearbook that is supervised by the People’s Bank of China, sponsored
by China society for finance and banking. Established in 1986, the yearbook has been con-
secutively published for 29 volumes at the publication frequency of one volume a year.
(ii) Corruption Data. Our corruption-related data set combines two sources of corrup-
tion information existing in China: 1. CCDI dataset; 2. Inside dataset at Tsinghua Univer-
sity.
1. CCDI dataset. This is the dataset compiled by the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI). The data is provided by the Center for Anti-corruption and Gover-
nance at Tsinghua University. This is a cross-sectional dataset for the government officials
been investigated and removed from 2012 to 2018 (after the starting of the anti-corruption
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campaign). Every person in the dataset is known to be investigated and removed, solidly
found to be corrupted, and turned to the procuratorate (prosecutors of the Chinese gov-
ernment). In other words, if a government official is investigated but found to be "clean",
s/he would not be in this dataset. I have their basic information: province, prefecture,
county, administrative level, name, position, violation, and penalty. But I don’t have the
information regarding when the government officials are investigated and removed. The
data contains 282 prefectures with 18453 officials been investigated and removed during
the anti-corruption investigation.
2. Inside dataset at Tsinghua University. This is a panel dataset for the officials been
investigated and removed from 1994 to 2018. In this dataset, I have the information re-
garding when the government officials are investigated and removed. Only less than 10%
of the government officials were investigated and removed from 1994 to 2012 (before the
starting of the anti-corruption campaign). But this dataset is not complete compared with
the CCDI dataset, in other words, this dataset is a subset of the CCDI dataset from the
year 2012 to 2018. Professors and graduate students at Tsinghua University collect all the
data in this dataset by hand (news searching). I use this dataset to supplement the CCDI
dataset for the government officials been investigated and removed between 1994 to 2012.
3. CV dataset. I also have the CV panel data for all the government officials regarding
their name, age, educational background, and working experience from 1994 to 2018. I
merged them using the name, position, prefecture, and year. The assumption is that being
corrupt is a persistent characteristic of the individual.
(iii) Luminosity Data. The night-lights data are gathered by Air Force satellites that
have been circling the earth 14 times a day since the 1970s, which measure the light in-
tensity emanating from specific geographic pixels. Henderson et al. (2012) argued that
the night-lights data are a good proxy for economic activity because the consumption of
goods in the evening requires light. The luminosity data have latitudes and longitudes.
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Use QGIS to locate them in a China GIS map. Then the area (prefecture) codes will be
automatically assigned by QGIS. The luminosity data contains total, average, median,
minimum, and maximum levels of light measurement. I also have the information on
how may light observations are aggregated into each prefecture.
(iv) Economic Data. I also combine the data set with economic information from GTA
CSMAR Database. The economic data set contains all the basic prefecture-level economic
characteristics including GDP, government revenue, government spending, employment,
FDI, population, financial asset, consumption, loan, deposit, and other economic vari-
ables.
2.3.2 Measure and Evolution of Corruption
There are plenty of different methods to measure the corruption, given the data we have,
in this study, the Corruption Index is defined as the probability of being investigated and





Wo′,p,t × 1(Corruptedo′,p,t = 1) (2.1)
where o represents government official for prefecture, p represents prefecture, and
t represents year. Corruptedo,p,t equals 1 if official o was investigated and removed, 0
otherwise. Wo,p,t is the weights given to each official regarding the characteristics of the
position (1/m to leaders, 0.5/m to vice officials for Economics, 0.2/m to others), where
∑Oo′=1 Wo′,p,t = 1.
To further understand the variations and evolution of corruption in China over time,
this paper plots several figures to illustrate. Figure 2.4 plots the corruption index from
2001 to 2016. The corruption index increased from 2001 to 2011, then it peaked in the year
around 2012, and finally decreased after 2012. I acknowledge that the trend of corruption
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index itself may suffer from the construction of index bias. However, I only focus on the
variations among different prefectures rather than the average trend.
Figure 2.6 reports the percentiles of the corruption index from 2001 through 2016. I
find that the dispersion of the corruption index increased significantly with the percentiles
of the index. In other words, the variation of corruption index is highest for the 90% of
the corruption index. Moreover, the indexes are peaked around the year 2012 for 60, 70,
80, and 90 percentiles.
Figure 2.7 plots the average variation in our measure of corruption across prefectures
from 2001 to 2016. It shows that the northern areas are more corrupted compared with
southern areas, which is consistent with the existing literature that southern areas are
more developed, market-oriented, transparent, and independent from the central gov-
ernment compared with the northern areas in China.
Since the dispersion among different prefectures over time is what I focus on, I plot
the variation in corruption index across prefectures over time (every four years) in Figure
2.8. First and foremost, from the period 2001-2004 to 2005-2008, the dispersion increased
substantially. Then, in the next four years, the dispersion increased even more. This
uptrend in variations has coincided with the rapid economic growth as well as the rising
trend of the openness in China from 2001 to 2012. Lastly, from 2009-2012 to 2013-2016,
the dispersion reduced significantly because the anti-corruption investigation started in
2012.
2.3.3 Measure of Misreporting
The misreporting index measures the difference between the reported data and the lumi-
nosity data at the prefecture-level, which could be standardized and represented by








where p represents prefecture and t represents year. By construction, a higher misre-
porting index implies the more exaggerated prefecture-level GDP reported by the local
government.
2.3.4 Summary Statistics
To reduce the measurement error, we winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels to
lessen the influence of outliers.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the loan level variables in our primary data
set. Since our data covers the universe of all business loans of listed firms, there is consid-
erable variation in loan sizes. For example, the average loan size is about 358.828 million
yuan, and the standard deviation is 2418.99 million yuan. Given the considerable size
variation, I choose to use the log loan volume instead of the loan volume. Table 2.3 also
shows that the average of the log loan volume of state-owned banks is similar to that of
private banks (18.842 vs. 18.548), and the average of the change of the log loan volume of
state-owned banks are very similar to that of private banks (11.4% vs. 12.3%).
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for the bank-level and prefecture-level variables
in our data set. It shows that the average corruption index is relatively higher for state-
owned banks, which means that state-owned banks are located in more corrupted areas
compared with the regions of private banks located. Moreover, the average misreporting
index is relatively higher for state-owned banks, which implies that state-owned banks




2.4.1 Bank Loan Effects
For the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following specification
for bank i and firm j in the prefecture p and year t:
Yijpt = β1 Indexp,t−1 + β2 Indexp,t−1 × Postt + γXi,t−1 + µi + λjt + εijpt (2.3)
where i represents bank, j represents firm,p represents prefecture, t represents year.
Yijct could be the log of the loan amount, the log of the interest rate, the log of the ma-
turity, and the collateral. Postt is an indicator variable equals to one after 2012, Xi,t is
the bank level control variables, µi is the bank fixed effects, λjt is the year-firm fixed ef-
fects. Indexp,t could be Corruption Indexp,t and Misreporting Indexp,t respectively. All
the bank branches located in the same prefecture share the unique Corruption Indexp,t,
and the prefecture level Corruption Indexp,t is the probability of been investigated and
removed because of corruption. All the bank branches located in the same prefecture
share the unique Misreporting Indexp,t , and the prefecture level Misreporting Indexp,t is
the standardized differences between GDP and the luminosity data. Since we focus on
the banks’ behavior over time, the standard errors are clustered at the bank level and
robust to heteroskedasticity.
2.4.2 Year-specific Effects
To further explore the relationship between the bank loan amount and corruption, I em-
ploy the following specification for bank i and firm j in year t for the year-specific effects.
Lijpt = β1 Indexp,t−1 ×Year Dummyt + γXi,t−1 + λjt + εijpt (2.4)
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where i represents bank, j represents firm, t represents year, Lijpt is the log loan size,
Year Dummy equals to one for each specific year, otherwise it equals to zero, Xi,t−1 is the
bank-level control variables, λjt is the year-firm fixed effects.
2.4.3 Loan Allocation Effects
For the level effect of the bank-firm matched loans, I employ the following specification
for bank i and firm j in the prefecture p and year t:
Lijpt = β1 Indexp,t−1 + β2 Indexp,t−1 × Postt (2.5)
+β3 Indexp,t−1 × Postt × State-owned(Firm)jt + µi + λjt + εijpt
where i represents bank, j represents firm,p represents prefecture, t represents year.
Yijct could be the log of the loan amount, the log of the interest rate, the log of the ma-
turity, and the collateral. Postt is an indicator variable equals to one after 2012, Xi,t is
the bank level control variables, µi is the bank fixed effects, λjt is the year-firm fixed ef-
fects. Indexp,t could be Corruption Indexp,t and Misreporting Indexp,t respectively. All
the bank branches located in the same prefecture share the unique Corruption Indexp,t,
and the prefecture level Corruption Indexp,t is the probability of been investigated and
removed because of corruption. All the bank branches located in the same prefecture
share the unique Misreporting Indexp,t , and the prefecture level Misreporting Indexp,t is
the standardized differences between GDP and the luminosity data. State-owned(Firm)jt
equals one if the firm is a state-owned firm. Since we focus on the banks’ behavior over
time, the standard errors are clustered at the bank level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
2.4.4 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy of this paper could be summarized in four dimensions: omit-
ted variable, reverse causality, measurement error, and sample selection.
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I use the Khwaja and Mian (2008) technique to simultaneously estimate the bank lend-
ing and firm borrowing channels stems from identification concerns. Identification con-
cerns arise because events that trigger changes in liquidity supply, such as monetary pol-
icy innovations or financial shocks are often accompanied by changes in investment re-
turns and consequently, credit demand. Changes in firm borrowing, therefore, reflect
both changes in credit supply as well as credit demand. This paper uses year-firm fixed
effects to control credit shocks from the demand side.
Another concern about the omitted variable problem is the heterogeneity in bank re-
sponse to political shocks. Could the lending channel coefficient be driven by inherent
differences in how banks respond to the shocks induced by the anti-corruption campaign
in China? It is possible if there is such response heterogeneity, and it is systematically cor-
related with a bank’s liquidity shock. For example, perhaps the lending channel estimate
is picking up differences in how state-owned and private banks react to political shocks
since we know that the Chinese government has more control power on state-owned
banks.
We also test for such concerns by including various bank characteristics that proxy for
such differential lending sensitivity as controls, such as the bank size, the bank’s return
on assets, the bad loan rate, the amount lend from central bank, tangibility, cash flow,
and dummies state-owned, policy, rural and listed banks. These bank-level controls are
likely to capture a banks’ sensitivity to political shocks. In particular, I use lagged value
to avoid concern about the endogeneity problem.
Although firm fixed effects address the main identification concerns expressed in the
literature, there may remain some additional questions. While the fixed effects strategy
does not require or make any assumptions about the correlation between liquidity supply
and demand shocks, the concern about the reverse causality problem is that if the liquid-
ity supply shocks are anticipated, banks may adjust their lending or firms adjust their bor-
rowing prior to the shock. This would lead to either an under or overestimate of the bank
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lending channel depending on the direction of the pre-shock loan adjustments. How-
ever, in this paper, the natural experiment anti-corruption campaign is unanticipated, the
anti-corruption is happened out of the financial market. Therefore, it is difficult for Chi-
nese banks and firms to anticipate this kind of liquidity supply shock. In particular, the
identifying assumption for all the level effect regressions in this paper is that year-before
financial positions are not positively correlated with unobserved within-bank changes in
loans lending following the onset of the campaign.
To reduce the measurement Error, I winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% level to
lessen the influence of outliers. For the sample selection problem, my data set provides
more comprehensive coverage of small, micro, and rural banks than other data sets. I
include all of the banks, both listed and non-listed banks. A primary concern about the
sample selection problem in my paper is that my data set only provides the information of
the listed firms, there are also many small and micro firms (non-listed) in China. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) suggest that since size may proxy for financial constraints, a higher
sensitivity of small firms would provide evidence in favor of the “financial accelerator",
the view that financial frictions can amplify downturns. Mehrotra et al. (2017) use new
and confidential data on income statements and balance sheets of US manufacturing firms
to bear on this idea. Thus, my analysis of the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on
Chinese bank lending channel could be regarded as the “lower bound" impact, since we
only consider the listed firms, if listed firms are affected by the anti-corruption campaign,
small and micro firms should be affected more.
2.5 Bank Loan Effects of the Corruption
2.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.5 reports results from the regression model given by equation (2.3). Column (3)
in Table 2.5 shows that one percentage increased of the leaders’ probability of being in-
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vestigated and removed is associated with 0.161% decline in the bank loan amount, and
this reduction effect changes the direction and becomes significantly positive after the
anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (6) in Table 2.5 presents that one additional
increased of the difference between the log of the economic and luminosity data is asso-
ciated with 0.122% decline in the bank loan amount, and this reduction effect changes the
direction and becomes significantly positive after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
The estimated effects of interest rate is reported in Table 2.9. Column (3) in Table
2.9 shows that one percentage increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated
and removed is associated with 0.900% increase in the interest rate, and this increment
becomes significantly negative after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (6) in
Table 2.5 presents that one additional increased of the difference between the log of the
economic and luminosity data is associated with 0.103% increase in the interest rate, and
this increment becomes significantly negative after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
Table 2.12 focus on the maturity of the loan. Column (3) in Table 2.12 shows that one
percentage increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated and removed is as-
sociated with 0.637% increase in the maturity, and this increment significantly changes the
direction after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (6) in Table 2.12 presents
that one additional increased of the difference between the log of the economic and lumi-
nosity data is associated with 0.487% increase in the maturity, and this increment signifi-
cantly changes the direction after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
Table 2.13 discusses the influence on having the collateral or not. Column (3) in Table
2.13 shows that one percentage increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated
and removed is associated with 0.106% increase in the collateral, and this increment could
be offset significantly after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (6) in Table 2.13
presents that one additional increased of the difference between the log of the economic
and luminosity data is associated with 0.120% increase in the collateral, and this incre-
ment could be offset significantly after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
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2.5.2 Year-specific Effects
Figure 2.10 plots the estimations of the year-specific effects from the equation (2.4). We
find that the coefficient before the interaction term corruption index and year dummy, β1,
increased substantially around the year 2012. Therefore, we find that banks located in
a more corrupted prefecture will increase their credit supply significantly in the starting
year of the anti-corruption campaign.
2.5.3 Loan Allocation Effects
In part 2.5.1, we find that the banks located in the more corrupted areas increase lending
more after the anti-corruption investigation. In this part, we discuss where the increase
in the credit supply goes? Does it go to state-owned firms or private firms? Table 2.14
reports results from the regression model given by equation (2.5). The estimated results
in Table 2.14 shows that banks located in more corrupted areas are more likely to increase
lending after the anti-corruption campaign. Moreover, they have a preference to reallo-
cate toward private firms, but not significantly so. In addition, the results in table 2.14
also indicates that banks located in areas with more misreporting of GDP will increase
lending more after the anti-corruption campaign, and they are more likely to reallocate
toward private firms, but not significantly so. my results in Table 2.14 are consistent with
the main findings in Li et al. (2018).
2.5.4 Robustness Analysis
Dealing with the Endogeneity Problem of Indices
We just saw that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls
and fixed effects. We now report results from additional specification checks to further
increase our confidence in the estimates. To further address the concern of the possible
endogeneity problem of the corruption and misreporting index, we use the index in the
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initial year as well as the average of the entire pre-shock years of my sample to mea-
sure the corruption and misreporting. Table 2.6 reports estimates from the regression
model given by equation (1.7) using the corruption or misreporting index of the initial
year instead of lagged one year, the results for the loan amount are nearly identical to our
baseline estimates. Table 2.7 shows results from equation (1.7) using the corruption or
misreporting index of the average of all the pre-shock years, again we find that these are
close to our baseline estimates.
Moreover, Table 2.10 reports the interest rate effects given by equation (1.7) using the
initial year corruption or misreporting index, we find similar results as the baseline. Table
2.11 reports the interest rate effects also given by equation (1.7) using the corruption or
misreporting index of the average of all the pre-shock years. It is reassuring to find no
evidence that our results are driven by the endogeneity bias of the corruption or misre-
porting index.
Dealing with the Tight Fixed Effects
I employ the firm-year interacted fixed effects, λjt. Such tight firm-level fixed effects could
help us focus primarily on the variation in loans due to banks. However, there is the con-
cern that a given Chinese manufacturing firm receives only one credit from only one
prefecture per year. The tight fixed effects hurt my fixed results estimation quite a bit as
substantial variation is eliminated (there are no cross-bank loans; just one loan from one
prefecture in a given year). To alleviate such concerns, first of all, I calculate the percent-
age of the firms in my sample take multiple loans per year from different prefectures. This
number is 61.85%, which is higher than 60%, and the average number of years for those
firms is 3.13. Thus the tight fixed effects in this paper should be warranted. However,
in order to avoid my fixed firm-year interacted effects model could do more harm than
bring improvements to my causal identification.
Therefore, I employ the estimation of the firm borrowing channel to make sure that
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the whole sample has been considered.









Let Yjt be a firm-level attribute of interest in period t (such as a firm’s net debt, log
cash, log sales, log capital investment, and log employment.) The reduced form firm
borrowing channel can be determined by estimating the following equation:
Yjt = βF1 Exposurej,t−1 + β
F







+ γXj,t−1 + λj + µt + ηjt
where j represents firm, p represents prefecture, and t represents year. Yjt is a firm-
level attribute of interest in period t. Postt equals to one after 2012. Xj,t−1 is the firm level
control variables. While λj is the firm fixed effects, µt is the year fixed effects.
2.6 Mechanism
The corruption index could disclose the extent of the market competition or marketiza-
tion. The corrupted banks bribe the government of the local prefecture to obtain market
power. Banks with enough market power could have more ability to set prices and con-
trol quantity. Thus the loan amounts and interest rates could be affected by the extent
of the market competition. Banks in the corrupted areas may have higher markup and
lower credit supply.
Moreover, firms who want to acquire credits with banks with relatively higher market
power need to pay the higher fixed cost (entry cost) and higher variable cost (interest
rate). Thus they are more likely to use collateral and set longer maturity. In addition,
banks in the corrupted areas may have lower efficiency and higher default risk. Thus
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they may suffer from higher bad loans. Therefore, this section explores the mechanisms
behind the effect of bank loans relating to the bank concentration effects and bank health
effects.
2.6.1 Bank Concentration Effects
To justify this mechanism, we examine the effects of corruption and misreporting on both
the market share of the top three banks and the HHI index in the specific prefecture as
follows.
Bank Share
I employ the bank share to measure the bargaining power of the banks in a specific pre-
fecture in China. The Bank share is a variable used to measure the share of bank i in year





Size could be bank assets or loans. Here, we consider not only assets but loans be-
cause different banks in China have certain various operations, some banks may be small
regarding the assets, but they may provide a considerable amount of the credit supply.
Since we focus on bank lending, we need to consider the size of the bank loans.
For the bank-level information, I employ the following specification for bank i in the
prefecture p and year t:
Bank Shareipt = β1 Indexp,t−1 + β2 Indexp,t−1 × Postt + γXi,t−1 + µp + λt + εipt (2.9)
where i represents bank, p represents prefecture, t represents year, Bad Loani,t is (Sub-
prime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss loani,t)/Asseti,t or (Subprime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss
loani,t)/Total Loani,t, Postt is an indicator variable equals to one after 2012, Xi,t is the
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bank level control variables, µp is the prefecture fixed effects, λt is the year fixed effects.
Indexp,t could be Corruption Indexp,t and Misreporting Indexp,t respectively. All the bank
branches located in the same prefecture share the unique Corruption Indexp,t, and the
prefecture level Corruption Indexp,t is the probability of been investigated and removed
because of corruption. All the bank branches located in the same prefecture share the
unique Misreporting Indexp,t , and the prefecture level Misreporting Indexp,t is the stan-
dardized differences between GDP and the luminosity data. Since our main variable of
interest varies at the prefecture level over time, the standard errors are clustered at the
prefecture level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
When calculating the bank share with the bank asset, column (1) in Table 2.15 shows
that one percent increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated and removed
is associated with 0.307% increase in the bank share, and this incremental effect signifi-
cantly changes the direction after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (3) in
Table 2.15 presents that one additional increase of the difference between the log of the
economic and luminosity data is associated with a 0.360% increase in the bank share, and
this incremental effect significantly changes the direction after the anti-corruption cam-
paign in 2012.
In addition, when measuring the bank share with the total loans, column (1) in Table
2.15 shows that one percent increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated
and removed is associated with 0.258% increase in the bank share, and this incremental
effect could be offset significantly after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (3)
in Table 2.15 presents that one additional increase of the difference between the log of the
economic and luminosity data is associated with a 0.358% increase in the bank share, and




Since the analysis of the bank share in part 2.6.1 only consider the change of the share for
the top three banks, we need to discuss the effects to all the banks to be complete. There-
fore, I further use the HHI index to indicate the monopoly power of the banks in a specific
prefecture in China. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the banks at the prefecture-level
could be calculated as
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n)/10000 (2.10)
where sn is the market share percentage of bank n. For the prefecture-level informa-
tion, I employ the following specification for prefecture p and year t:
HHIpt = β1 Indexp,t−1 + β2 Indexp,t−1 × Postt + µp + λt + εpt (2.11)
where p represents prefecture and t represents year. Postt is an indicator variable
equals to one after 2012, Xi,t is the bank level control variables, µp is the prefecture fixed
effects, λt is the year fixed effects. Indexp,t could be Corruption Indexp,t and Misreporting Indexp,t
respectively. All the bank branches located in the same prefecture share the unique
Corruption Indexp,t, and the prefecture level Corruption Indexp,t is the probability of been
investigated and removed because of corruption. All the bank branches located in the
same prefecture share the unique Misreporting Indexp,t , and the prefecture level Misreporting Indexp,t
is the standardized differences between GDP and the luminosity data. SInce our main
variable of interest varies at the prefecture level over time, the standard errors are clus-
tered at the prefecture level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 2.16 presents the bank concentration effects estimated using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. Column (1) calculates the HHI index using the bank assets, and we find
that the HHI index was higher in the more corrupted areas before the anti-corruption in-
vestigation. The HHI index decreased substantially in the more corrupted areas after the
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anti-corruption campaign. Column (2) recalculates the HHI index via the bank loans, and
the results barely move, if anything, the estimates became more substantial. Moreover,
column (3) shows that the HHI index measured by asset was higher in the prefectures
with more misreporting of GDP before the anti-corruption campaign, and the HHI index
reduced significantly in the prefectures with a high level of misreporting after the anti-
corruption investigation. Column (4) remeasured the HHI index using the bank loans,
and the results are quite consistent with column (3); indeed, the results are more signifi-
cant.
To sum up, I find that banks located in more corrupted prefectures or prefectures
with more misreporting of GDP have a more substantial monopoly or bargaining power,
higher markups as well as lower efficiencies. As we have seen in section 2.5, these
monopoly effects lead to the higher interest rate and lower bank loan amount in more
corrupted areas before the anti-corruption investigation. After 2012 the phenomena of
higher price and lower quantity disappears because of the collapse of the monopoly or
bargaining power.
2.6.2 Bank Health Effects
Does corruption affect bank health? We use the bad loan to disclose the effect of corrup-
tion and misreporting on the bank’s balance sheet. The bad credit is a variable used to
measure the health of a specific bank i in year t, and it is constructed as
Bad Loanit =
Subprime loanit + Doubt loanit + Loss loanit
Sizeit
(2.12)
where size could be measured by assets or total loans. Similarly, we consider both
the assets and credits to rule out the condition of a bank with small assets and a massive
amount of credit supply. In this case, even if the bad loans regarding the assets is high, it
may be acceptable when considering the credit amounts.
108
For the bank-level information, I employ the following specification for bank i in the
prefecture p and year t:
Bad Loanipt = β1 Indexp,t−1 + β2 Indexp,t−1 × Postt + γXi,t−1 + µp + λt + εipt (2.13)
where i represents bank, p represents prefecture, t represents year, Bad Loanipt is (Sub-
prime loanipt+Doubt loanipt+Loss loanipt)/Assetipt or (Subprime loanipt+Doubt loanipt+Loss
loanipt)/Total Loanipt, Bank Shareipt is Assetipt/∑Ii=1Assetipt or Loanipt/∑
I
i=1Loanipt, Postt
is an indicator variable equals to one after 2012, Xi,t is the bank level control variables, µp
is the prefecture fixed effects, λt is the year fixed effects. Indexp,t could be Corruption Indexp,t
and Misreporting Indexp,t respectively. All the bank branches located in the same prefec-
ture share the unique Corruption Indexp,t, and the prefecture level Corruption Indexp,t is
the probability of been investigated and removed because of corruption. All the bank
branches located in the same prefecture share the unique Misreporting Indexp,t , and the
prefecture level Misreporting Indexp,t is the standardized differences between GDP and
the luminosity data. Since our main variable of interest varies at the prefecture level over
time, the standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level and robust to heteroskedas-
ticity.
When re-scaling the bad loan with the bank asset, column (1) in Table 2.17 shows that
one percent increase of the leaders’ probability of being investigated and removed is asso-
ciated with 0.486% increase in the bad loan as a fraction of the asset, and this incremental
effect could be offset significantly after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012. Column (3)
in Table 2.17 presents that one additional increased of the difference between the log of
the economic and luminosity data is associated with 0.542% increase in the bad loan as
a fraction of the asset, and this incremental effect could be offset significantly after the
anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
Furthermore, when re-scaling the bad loan with the total credit, column (2) in Table
2.17 shows that one percent increased of the leaders’ probability of being investigated and
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removed is associated with 0.216% increase in the bad loan as a fraction of the total loan,
and this incremental effect could be offset significantly after the anti-corruption campaign
in 2012. Column (4) in Table 2.17 presents that one additional increased of the difference
between the log of the economic and luminosity data is associated with 1.128% increase
in the bad loan as a fraction of the total loan, and this incremental effect could be offset
significantly after the anti-corruption campaign in 2012.
Therefore, we find that the anti-corruption investigation indeed improves the banks’
health reflected in the balance sheet. This finding is consistent with the results in part
2.5.3. Banks located in the more corrupted prefectures choose to reallocate more credits
to the private firms, which have higher profitability and debt paying ability compared
with the state-owned firms.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I showed that banks located in more corrupted prefectures offer significantly
less credits before the anti-corruption investigation, and this effect changes the direction
after the investigation. Moreover, banks located in more corrupted prefectures tend to
use higher interest rates, longer maturity, more collateral, higher bad loans before the
campaign; all of these effects change the direction after the campaign.
The corruption index indicates the extent of the market competition (marketization).
The corrupted banks bribe the local government to obtain market power. First of all,
higher corruption leads to less loan supply and higher interest rates through the channel
of less competition and higher markup. Secondly, higher corruption leads to higher in-
terest rates through the channel of less competition, lower efficiency, and higher variable
cost. Thirdly, higher corruption leads to longer maturity through the channel of less com-
petition, lower efficiency, and higher fixed cost. This monopoly effect could be proved
by that the bank concentration ratio is higher in the more corrupted areas, and this effect
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disappears after the campaign.
In my analysis, I took advantage of the confidential and novel data sets, covering
a large number of small, privately owned, and rural banks, with information on firm-
bank relationships and prefecture-level corruption index. This paper is the first paper
to analyze the impact of the anti-corruption investigation on the Chinese bank lending
channel using a prefecture-level corruption index.
My findings foster the understanding of the unfolding of the impact of the anti-corruption
investigation on the Chinese bank lending channel. My results also indicate that both
markets oriented and government-oriented effects are critical in the financial market in
China. Moreover, my contribution provides evidence on the crucial role of monopoly
power as a determinant of bank loan allocation. Furthermore, the analysis of which














































































































Table 2.1 Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Bank-level
Dependent Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
L Natural logarithm of bank loans
∆L ln(bank loant+1−bank loant)
Bad Loani,t (Asset) (Subprime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss loani,t)/Asseti,t
Bad Loani,t (Total loan) (Subprime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss loani,t)/Total loani,t
Bank Sharei,t (Asset) Asseti,t/Total assetp,t
Bank Sharei,t (Loan) Loani,t/Total loanp,t
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Key Explanatory Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
Postt Dummy equal to one if the year is after 2012.
Bad Loani,t (Subprime loani,t+Doubt loani,t+Loss loani,t)/Asseti,t




)− ln( light(sum)p,tsd(light(sum)p,t) )
Trade Settlementi,t Trade settlementsi,t/ Total loani,t
(Exchange/Income)i,t Exchange gainsi,t/Total incomei,t
Control Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
State-ownedi Dummy equals to one if the bank is a state-owned bank.
Policyi Dummy equals to one if the bank is a policy bank.
Rurali Dummy equals to one if the bank is a rural bank.




Cash Flowi,t Operating Income Before Depreciationi,t/((Assetsi,t−1+Assetsi,t)/2)
Lend Central Banki,t Debt lent from central banki,t/Assetsi,t
Firm-level
Dependent Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
Net Debt (Current+Non-Current Liabilities−Cash)/(Total Assets)
∆Cash (Casht+1−Casht)/(Total Assett)
Employment Growth ln(Employmentt)−ln(Employmentt−1)
CAPX (Fixed Assetst+1−Fixed Assetst+Depreciationt)/Assetst, set to 0 if negative




State-ownedj Dummy equals to one if the firm is a state-owned firm.
Control Variables (winsorized at the 1% level)
Sales Growth ln(Salest)−ln(Salest−1)
Cash Flowi,t Operating Income Before Depreciationi,t/Assetsi,t−1
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Table 2.2 Financial Development: China and US (USD Trillion) (2016)
Sector Bank Credit Stock Fixed Income Insurance Investment Funds
Size (China) 15.45 7.32 10.43 2.19 1.32
Size (US) 12.44 27.35 39.36 8.46 19.20
% GDP (China) 137.95% 64.30% 93.12% 19.55% 11.76%
% GDP (US) 67.00% 147.40% 211.95% 45.56% 103.39%
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics (Firm-bank Pairwise)
State-owned Banks Private Banks All Banks
mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count
loan 502.619 3,717.35 9,840 264.614 780.71 15,018 358.828 2,418.99 24,858
lnloan 18.842 1.38 9,840 18.548 1.22 15,018 18.664 1.29 24,858
dlnloan 0.114 0.91 4,822 0.123 0.77 6,655 0.119 0.83 11,477
Observations 9840 15018 24858
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of firm-bank pairwise dependent variables split into
state-owned and private banks. State-owned is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank is a state-
owned bank. The sample consists of all firms that are listed in the A-share, B-share, H-share, and
oversea stocks market.
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Table 2.4 Summary Statistics (Bank and Prefecture Level)
State-owned Banks Private Banks All Banks
mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count
Corruption Index 0.105 0.03 122 0.084 0.17 912 0.087 0.16 1,034
Misreporting Index 0.048 0.42 106 -0.173 0.60 658 -0.142 0.58 764
Size 28.367 1.83 103 25.401 1.32 756 25.757 1.69 859
State-owned (Bank) 1.000 0.00 122 0.000 0.00 912 0.118 0.32 1,034
Policy 0.344 0.48 122 0.000 0.00 912 0.041 0.20 1,034
Rural 0.000 0.00 122 0.154 0.36 912 0.135 0.34 1,034
Observations 122 912 1034
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of bank-level explanatory variables split into
state-owned and private banks. State-owned is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank is
a state-owned bank. The sample consists of all banks that are located in China.
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Table 2.5 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect)














State-owned 0.160∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.0970∗∗ 0.0160
(0.0530) (0.0600) (0.0442) (0.0788)
Policy 0.512∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.0804) (0.0101) (0.0309)
Rural 0.161∗ 0.0340 0.143 -0.00184
(0.0888) (0.147) (0.116) (0.211)
Size 0.0809∗∗∗ 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0214) (0.0189) (0.0314)
Index -0.210∗ -0.199 -0.161∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.143) (0.0931) (0.0319) (0.0643) (0.0280)
Index x Post 0.317∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.0721∗∗ 0.0615∗ 0.0638∗
(0.124) (0.133) (0.158) (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0358)
Observations 23630 23630 23296 13485 13485 12999
R2 0.576 0.112 0.579 0.576 0.119 0.577
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. All re-
gressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates
are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.6 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Initial Year)














State-owned 0.160∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0390
(0.0208) (0.0268) (0.0285) (0.0344)
Policy 0.509∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0615) (0.0479) (0.0662)
Rural 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0351 0.148∗ 0.0155
(0.0495) (0.0679) (0.0789) (0.105)
Size 0.0797∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗∗
(0.00684) (0.00847) (0.0107) (0.0124)
Index -0.120 -0.103 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(0.0920) (0.117) (0.0427) (0.0479)
Index x Post 0.109∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.0789∗∗ 0.0748∗∗ 0.0603∗
(0.0471) (0.0642) (0.0667) (0.0308) (0.0371) (0.0324)
Observations 23630 23630 23296 13485 13485 12999
R2 0.576 0.112 0.579 0.577 0.120 0.577
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is signifi-
cant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.7 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Average of the pre-shock Years)














State-owned 0.159∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗ 0.0957∗∗ 0.0132
(0.0313) (0.0322) (0.0460) (0.0309)
Policy 0.513∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.0683) (0.0560) (0.133) (0.110)
Rural 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0336 0.150∗∗∗ 0.0115
(0.0312) (0.0594) (0.0477) (0.124)
Size 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.00501) (0.00902) (0.0116) (0.00994)
Index -0.108 -0.114 -0.193∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.0817) (0.0746) (0.0633) (0.0685)
Index x Post 0.102∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.0670∗ 0.0629∗ 0.0603∗
(0.0334) (0.0272) (0.0547) (0.0366) (0.0381) (0.0305)
Observations 23630 23630 23296 13485 13485 12999
R2 0.576 0.112 0.579 0.577 0.119 0.577
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is signifi-
cant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.8 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Coefficient of Variation)














State-owned 0.152∗∗∗ 0.0921 0.0970∗∗ 0.0160
(0.0330) (0.0631) (0.0442) (0.0788)
Policy 0.517∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0820) (0.0101) (0.0309)
Rural 0.161∗∗ 0.0329 0.143 -0.00184
(0.0771) (0.145) (0.116) (0.211)
Size 0.0821∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0217) (0.0189) (0.0314)
Index -0.197∗∗ -0.132 -0.104 -0.135∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0977) (0.166) (0.120) (0.0319) (0.0643) (0.0280)
Index x Post 0.196∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.0721∗∗ 0.0615∗ 0.0638∗
(0.100) (0.110) (0.0962) (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0358)
Observations 23630 23630 23296 13485 13485 12999
R2 0.575 0.112 0.579 0.576 0.119 0.577
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. All re-
gressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates
are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.9 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect)














State-owned -0.106∗∗∗ -0.00990 -0.0943∗∗ -0.0725∗
(0.0370) (0.0385) (0.0371) (0.0370)
Policy -0.934∗∗∗ -1.236∗∗∗ -0.135 -0.189∗∗∗
(0.0999) (0.0665) (0.106) (0.0579)
Rural -0.00535 0.00564 -0.0929 0.109
(0.0897) (0.0958) (0.125) (0.122)
Size 0.00304 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ 0.00181
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0123)
Index 0.409∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.0107 -0.0703 0.245∗∗
(0.129) (0.151) (0.141) (0.0482) (0.0443) (0.111)
Index x Post -0.501∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.158) (0.158) (0.0583) (0.0559) (0.0636)
Observations 806 806 661 603 603 494
R2 0.880 0.507 0.885 0.841 0.332 0.849
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 73 73 65 61 61 56
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of the log interest rate. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates
are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.10 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Initial Year)














State-owned -0.0748∗∗ 0.0574 -0.0949∗∗∗ -0.0633∗
(0.0361) (0.0373) (0.0364) (0.0363)
Policy -0.957∗∗∗ -1.287∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.206∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.0666) (0.106) (0.0579)
Rural 0.00317 0.0214 -0.0643 0.121
(0.0906) (0.0968) (0.125) (0.122)
Size 0.00311 0.0619∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗ -0.00883
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0124)
Index 0.249 -0.102 -0.0748 0.0806∗
(0.222) (0.206) (0.0485) (0.0473)
Index x Post -0.176∗ -0.0825 -0.165 -0.104∗∗ -0.0463 -0.101∗∗
(0.104) (0.112) (0.181) (0.0436) (0.0433) (0.0511)
Observations 806 806 661 603 603 494
R2 0.877 0.496 0.877 0.842 0.332 0.846
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 73 73 65 61 61 56
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of the log interest
rate. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate
is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below
coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.11 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Average of the pre-shock Years)














State-owned -0.0700∗ 0.0525 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.0767∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0371)
Policy -0.958∗∗∗ -1.283∗∗∗ -0.134 -0.193∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.0662) (0.106) (0.0576)
Rural -0.000397 0.0231 -0.0804 0.119
(0.0910) (0.0971) (0.125) (0.122)
Size 0.00157 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ -0.000492
(0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0120)
Index 0.118 0.0686 -0.0424 0.0967∗∗
(0.176) (0.171) (0.0499) (0.0480)
Index x Post -0.221∗∗ -0.1733 -0.316∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.109) (0.117) (0.161) (0.0492) (0.0499) (0.0511)
Observations 806 806 661 603 603 494
R2 0.877 0.496 0.877 0.841 0.333 0.846
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 73 73 65 61 61 56
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of the log interest rate.
All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is signif-
icant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient
estimates are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.12 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect)














State-owned 0.116∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.200∗ 0.0959
(0.0430) (0.0467) (0.108) (0.102)
Policy 1.849∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ 2.112∗∗∗
(0.0960) (0.259) (0.125) (0.257)
Rural 0.366∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.586∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.0948) (0.334) (0.203)
Size 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0152) (0.0344) (0.0318)
Index 0.829∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗ -0.292∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ 0.487
(0.268) (0.329) (0.274) (0.113) (0.0824) (0.324)
Index x Post -0.824∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗
(0.280) (0.333) (0.286) (0.210) (0.152) (0.180)
Observations 12379 12379 12410 4869 4869 4733
R2 0.478 0.077 0.566 0.536 0.098 0.589
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 141 141 142 125 125 122
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log maturity. All regres-
sions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are
clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.13 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect)














State-owned 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0667∗∗∗
(0.00688) (0.00989) (0.00967) (0.0135)
Policy 0.00790 -0.0264 -0.00305 0.0164
(0.0137) (0.0215) (0.00669) (0.0205)
Rural 0.0167 -0.000975 -0.0253 -0.0266
(0.0215) (0.0249) (0.0304) (0.0370)
Size -0.000713 -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.00508 -0.0263∗∗∗
(0.00357) (0.00325) (0.00479) (0.00477)
Index 0.0651∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.0343∗∗ 0.0431∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0445) (0.0490) (0.0151) (0.0178) (0.0530)
Index x Post -0.0877∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.0240 -0.0324∗ -0.0408∗∗ -0.0375∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0492) (0.0527) (0.0170) (0.0201) (0.0190)
Observations 23630 23630 23296 13485 13485 12999
R2 0.572 0.123 0.622 0.582 0.157 0.629
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equals one
if the loan is a collateral loan. All regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that
the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.14 Bank Lending Channel (Level Effect) (Credit Allocation across Firms)














State-owned (Bank) 0.161∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.00936
(0.0298) (0.0331) (0.0472) (0.0302)
Policy 0.508∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0556) (0.132) (0.112)
Rural 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0303 0.146∗∗∗ -0.00804
(0.0310) (0.0588) (0.0443) (0.115)
Size 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.00570) (0.00844) (0.0125) (0.00903)
Index -0.224∗ -0.190 -0.154 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.122) (0.156) (0.0365) (0.0386) (0.101)
Index x Post 0.367∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.0631∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.197∗
(0.142) (0.127) (0.0928) (0.0380) (0.0492) (0.118)
Index x Post x State (Firm) -0.0614 -1.291∗∗∗ -0.0585 -0.0215 -0.428∗∗∗ -0.0390
(0.0880) (0.168) (0.0868) (0.0307) (0.0399) (0.0407)
Observations 23175 23175 22845 13027 13027 12556
R2 0.579 0.117 0.582 0.582 0.129 0.584
Bank Fixed Effect NO NO YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year Fixed Effect NO YES NO NO YES NO
Firm-Year Fixed Effect YES NO YES YES NO YES
Clusters at Bank Level 162 162 160 144 144 141
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit
of observation is a bank-firm-year. The dependent variable is the level of log loan volume. All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates
are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.15 Bank Share (Top 3 Banks in the Specific Prefecture)













State-owned 0.135∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0182 0.000422
(0.0420) (0.0150) (0.0310) (0.0171)
Policy -0.146∗∗∗ -0.0851∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0163) (0.0216) (0.00509)
Rural -0.220∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0207) (0.00807) (0.0164)
Index 0.101∗ 0.0883∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.0519) (0.0756) (0.0696)
Index x Post -0.139∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.0548∗ -0.143∗∗
(0.0703) (0.0596) (0.0318) (0.0548)
Constant 0.282∗∗∗ 0.0802 0.292∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.0964) (0.0518) (0.0128) (0.0134)
Observations 2019 2358 1431 1695
R2 0.633 0.612 0.669 0.646
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Prefecture Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Prefecture Level 113 123 109 123
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-year. The dependent variable is the bank share. All regressions include fixed
effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are clustered at the prefecture
level.
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Table 2.16 Bank Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)













Index 0.0813∗ 0.0881∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.0441) (0.0405) (0.0306) (0.0336)
Index x Post -0.0979∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.0342∗ -0.0411∗∗
(0.0561) (0.0517) (0.0186) (0.0169)
Constant 0.535∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗
(0.0598) (0.0537) (0.0152) (0.0150)
Observations 724 841 529 616
R2 0.555 0.533 0.599 0.577
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Prefecture Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Prefecture Level 129 137 124 137
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-year. The dependent variable is the (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index/10000). All
regressions include fixed effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors given below coefficient estimates are
clustered at the prefecture level.
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Table 2.17 Bank Health











State-owned 1.697∗∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗ 3.507∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.707) (0.545) (0.834)
Policy -1.428∗∗ -4.301∗∗∗ -1.557∗∗ -4.548∗∗∗
(0.669) (0.900) (0.706) (0.953)
Rural 1.164∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 2.081∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.147) (0.185) (0.230)
Index 0.218 0.359 0.346∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.372) (0.110) (0.174)
Index x Post -0.212∗∗ -0.827∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.413) (0.108) (0.169)
Constant 4.956∗∗∗ 11.42∗∗∗ 5.029∗∗∗ 11.26∗∗∗
(1.324) (2.314) (1.319) (2.287)
Observations 1273 1530 1099 1327
R2 0.454 0.510 0.466 0.524
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Prefecture Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Clusters at Prefecture Level 95 100 84 89
Notes. This table presents the results of a Chinese bank lending channel regression. The unit of
observation is a bank-year. The dependent variable is the bad loan rate. All regressions include fixed
effects. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level,




Figure 2.1 Cleanup Costs
Source: “China’s Corruption Paradox", The Wall Street Journal.
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Figure 2.2 Bank Assets (RMB Trillion) and ROA (%)
Source: Jiang Wang (MIT), “China’s Financial System: Developments and Challenges", MIT
Golub Center for Finance and Policy 4th Annual Conference.
Figure 2.3 Corruption Perception Index in China
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Figure 2.4 Corruption Index over Time
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Figure 2.5 Corruption Index (Coefficient of Variation) over Time
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Figure 2.6 Corruption Index over Time
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Figure 2.7 Corruption Index (DM) Map (2001-2016)
Figure 2.8 Evolution of Corruption Index (DM) (2001-2016)
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Figure 2.9 Parallel Trend (The Log Amount of the Loan)
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Cash Flow Forecasting: Dealing with
Serial Correlation and Idiosyncratic
Heterogeneity
with Hongtao Guo and Zhijie Xiao.
3.1 Introduction
Cash flow from operations (CFO) measures the amount of cash generated by a company’s
normal business operations. Prediction of CFO impacts a variety of economic decisions
including valuation methodologies employing discounted cash flows, distress prediction,
risk assessment, the accuracy of credit-rating predictions, and the provision of value- rele-
vant information to security markets, among others (see, for example, Bowen et al., 1986,
DeFond and Hung (2003)). Kim and Kross (2005) indicate that while practitioners use
net earnings in security valuation and performance evaluations more widely, theoretical
valuation models generally favor CFO as an input. Moreover, we observe that CFO pre-
diction has been central to the deliberations of both the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). For example, the
Statement of Financial Concepts No. 1 states: “. . . financial reporting should provide
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information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amount, timing, and un-
certainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise.” (FASB 1978, par. 37).
Statements issued jointly by IASB and FASB underscore the primacy of CFO prediction
to investors and creditors. (IASB, FASB 2006, p. 18). Therefore, research similar to that
contained herein is particularly relevant given the importance of the predictive ability of
CFO data to the aforementioned topics.
Extant literature on statistically-based cash-flow prediction (e.g. Beaver (1970), Bernard
and Stober (1989), Dechow et al. (1998), Barth et al. (2001), Dechow and Dichev (2002),
Hribar and Collins (2002), Givoly et al. (2009), and Kim and Kross (2005), among others)
has pursued cross-sectional versus time-series estimation procedures in a mutually ex-
clusive fashion. Doing so has not allowed statistical models to realize their potential in
terms of predictive performance. Specifically, the cross-section regression based approach
has the advantage of minimal data requirements that serves to maximize sample size (n
is usually large in practice). However, predictive models based on a cross-sectional re-
gression restricts that the beta parameters to be the same for different firms. Cumulated
empirical evidence indicates that the beta value varies across firms of different sizes, and
the cross-sectional regression can not capture an idiosyncratic beta. The beta variability
across firms suggests that it might be useful to consider estimating the coefficients based
on a time series regression for each firm. Such a time series based predictive model has
the advantage of allowing for firm-specific variability in beta, but requires a long enough
time series data. With the passage of SFAS No. 95 requiring firms to present a statement
of cash flow for fiscal year ending after July 15, 1988 (FASB, 1987), such time series of
reported quarterly CFO can be obtained to conduct our analysis.
In this paper, we contribute to the CFO prediction literature by proposing a new pre-
diction model that takes into account of both time series and cross sectional issues. In
particular, our device uses firm specific time series quarterly CFO information, but also
allows the coefficient estimators (beta parameters) to be varying with firm size. The pro-
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posed approach uses the idea of machine learning in making predictions. It allows the in-
formation about coefficients to be represented by a subset of local observations, thus the
beta coefficients vary with these local observations. We are also interested in quarterly
CFO predictions for the following reasons: 1) Both Dechow et al. (1998) and Barth et al.
(2001) suggest that structural modeling of annual cash-flow prediction models ignore the
complex seasonal patterns of CFO and also rely on less timely data. 2) Quarterly CFO se-
ries have the potential to exhibit both quarter-to-quarter (adjacent) as well as quarter-by-
quarter (seasonal) autocorrelation, which is not present in annual CFO series. Time-series
models have the capability to track such complex autocorrelation patterns in quarterly
CFO series very efficiently. 3) The time-series literature in accounting provides empirical
evidence that predictive ability of earnings numbers was dramatically enhanced when
researchers employed quarterly time-series models versus annual models (Brown and
Rozeff (1979)).
We provide empirical evidence that the prediction of cash flows from operations (CFO)
is enhanced by jointly adopting features specific to both cross-sectional and time-series
modeling simultaneously. In doing so, we extend the literature on statistically-based, an-
nual cash-flow prediction models by introducing estimation procedures that combine the
favorable attributes of both cross-sectional estimation via the use of “local” cross-sectional
data for firms of similar size and time-series estimation via the capturing of firm-specific
variability in the beta parameters for the independent variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we discuss the relevant
accounting research to provide the background of our research. We introduce the re-
search question and summarize existing forecasting models used in the CFO forecasting
literature in Section 3.3. We also present preliminary empirical results that motivate our
"learning" approach. Section 3.4 introduces our proposed model. Section 3.5 presents
some Monte Carlo results. Empirical investigation on the proposed method and an ex-
tensive comparison with existing model are discussed in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 we
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discuss the results from several robustness checks. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background
Research on annual CFO prediction models has been championed by Dechow et al. (1998)
and Barth et al. (2001). These studies develop analytical linkages between aggregate and
disaggregate earnings components and CFO and specify the functional forms of CFO
prediction models derived from their analytical work. Two widely cited annual CFO
prediction models are presented below:




β′EARNi,t−τ + ui,t+1 (3.1)
CFOi,t+1 = c0 + c1CFOit + c2∆ARit + c3∆INVit + c4∆APit + c5DEPRit + c6AMORTit + c7OTHERit +uit
(3.2)
where i and t denote firm and year, τ ranges between 0 and 2, EARN is net earnings
before extraordinary items, ∆AR is a change in accounts receivable, ∆INV is a change in
inventory, ∆AP is a change in accounts payable, DEPR is depreciation expense, AMORT
is amortization expense, and OTHER is the aggregate of remaining accruals not specifi-
cally detailed above. Barth et al. (2001) compared the predictive ability of the aggregate
earnings prediction model in equation 3.1 versus the disaggregated earnings prediction
model in equation 3.2 and determined that use of disaggregated accruals enhances predic-
tive performance relative to the aggregate earnings model. Barth et al. (2001)’s prediction
models were estimated cross-sectionally and the sole criterion used to assess predictive
performance was in-sample descriptive fit (i.e., adjusted R2). Unfortunately, exclusive
reliance on cross- sectional estimation procedures precludes capturing the information
content in potentially idiosyncratic beta coefficients in the aforementioned models. Lorek
and Willinger (2011) provide descriptive evidence that the beta parameter in equation
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3.1 exhibits considerable firm-specific variability thus casting doubt upon the propriety
of cross-sectional estimation procedures that suppress such variability. Moreover, sell-
side analysts and users interested in firm valuations require accurate out-of-sample CFO
predictions rather than simply relying upon descriptive goodness of fit measures.
3.3 The Research Question and Existing Methods
Given observation on CFO {CFOi,s}, s = 1, 2, · · ··, T; i = 1, · · ·, n, and related information
denoted by {xi,s}, s = 1, 2, · · ··, T; i = 1, · · ·, n, , we want to predict the cash flow for the
next period CFOr,T+1 for each firm r = 1, 2, · · ·, n. The predictive regression models in
the previous literature can be written in the following form:
CFOi,t+1 = α + β′xi,t + ui,t+1 (3.3)
where i signifies the i− th firm, and xi,t is a vector of informative variables that are avail-
able at time t. Popular models of CFO prediction includes:
1. Predictive model using past CFO information: xi,t = CFOi,t,
CFOi,t+1 = α + βCFOi,t + ui,t+1 (3.4)
2. Predictive model using past values of net earnings: xi,t = Ei,t,
CFOi,t+1 = α + βEi,t + ui,t+1 (3.5)
3. Multiple regression model: xi,t contains past CFO and other important information,
such as operating income.
We first discuss the two leading predictive regressions in the CFO forecasting litera-
ture, based on cross-sectional or time-series estimation procedures respectively.
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3.3.1 Prediction Based on the Cross-sectional Regression
Given the large number of firms at each time period, much of the traditional literature
estimate the parameters α and β based on a cross sectional regression at time t over i:























The one-step ahead forecast of CFO can be obtained by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̂ + β̂′xr,t. (3.10)
The above cross-section regression-based approach has the advantage of minimal data
requirements that serve to maximize sample size (n is usually large in practice). However,
predictive models based on a cross-sectional regression restricts that the beta parameters
to be the same for different firms. Cumulated empirical evidence indicates that the beta
value varies across firms of various sizes, and the cross-sectional regression can not cap-
ture the idiosyncratic beta.
3.3.2 Prediction Based on the Time-series Regression
The beta variability across firms suggests that it might be useful to consider estimating
the coefficients based on a time series regression for each given r














θ̌ = (α̌, β̌′)′. (3.13)
Then obtain one-step ahead forecast of CFO by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̌ + β̌′xr,t. (3.14)
Such a time series based predictive model has the advantage of allowing for the firm-
specific variability in beta, but requires a long enough time series data. This imposes
strong data requirements since FASB standard N0. 95 didn’t require firms to present a
statement of cash flow until fiscal year ending after July 15, 1988.
3.3.3 Empirical Results Based on The Existing Methods: A Motivation
In this section, we present some preliminary empirical analysis revealing important fea-
tures of CFO, which motivates the local learning methods we propose in later sections.
We obtained data from the quarterly Compustat from the first quarter, 2010, to the
fourth quarter, 2018. Sample firms had calendar year-ends that met two sampling criteria:
(i) They had a complete time series of quarterly CFO reported in accordance with SFAS
No. 95 across the aforementioned interval, and (2) they had a complete time series of
quarterly financial statement subcomponents necessary to operationalized multivariate
time-series regression model (MULT). Lorek and Willinger (1996) developed a multivari-
ate time-series regression model (MULT) that employs lagged values of CFO, operating
income, receivables, payables, and inventory in a time series regression, which allows
for firm-specific parameter estimation. The variables we used are Operating Activities -
Net Cash Flow, Account Payable/Creditors, Inventories, Receivables, Operating Income
Before Depreciation, Current Assets, Deferred Taxes, Income Taxes, Income Taxes, Cash,
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Current Liabilities, Assets, Standard Industry Classification Code, Debt in Current Liabil-
ities, Long-Term Debt - Total as well as Interest and Related Expense.
For each firm i, we consider time series regression
CFOi,s = α̌i + β̌i,1CFOi,s−1 + β̌i,2PAYi,s−1 + β̌i,3 INVi,s−1 + β̌i,4OIBDi,s−1 + β̌i,5RECi,s−1 + ǔis, s = 2, · · ·, t.
(3.15)
where CFO is the cash flow from operations, PAY is the accounts payable, INV is the
inventories, OIBD is the operating income before depreciation, and REC is the receivables,
and obtain estimators (α̌i, β̌i,1, · · ·, β̌i,5)′.
In order to get some insights of the idiosyncratic behavior of beta, we next consider
regressions of β̌i,j on the size of firm i : sizei, (measured by assets):
β̌i,j = â + b̂ · sizei + êi, (3.16)
Table 3.1 reports the regression results. These results shows that the beta values are closely
related to the firm size.
Figure 3.1 depicts the coefficient heterogeneity in firm size for β̌i,1, · · ·, β̌i,5. The result
of figure 3.1 further confirms the close relationship between β̌i,j and the size of firm i In
addition, figure 3.1 also suggest a nonlinear relationship between β̌i,j and the size. For
this reason, we next consider a "nonlinear" regression by introducing the quadratic term
of size:
β̌i,j = â + b̂1 · sizei + b̂2 · size2i + êi, (3.17)
Table 3.2 reports the regression results. Table 3.2 re-confirms the close relationship be-
tween beta and size. In addition, after introducing the nonlinear term, the goodness of fit
substantially increases, suggesting a nonlinear connection between beta and size.
As a robustness check, we also perform a regression of CFO on the interaction terms
constructed as products of the previous regressors and assets.
Table 3.3 shows the coefficients of interaction terms of accounts payable/creditors,
inventories, operating income before depreciation, receivables and cash flow from opera-
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Figure 3.1 Coefficient Heterogeneity in Firm Size
Notes: This figure presents the relationship between the estimated coefficient of lag cash flow
from operations, accounts payable, inventories, operating income before depreciation, receivable
and firm size z.
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Table 3.1 Regression of β to Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
coeff of lag CFO coeff of PAY coeff of INV coeff of OIBD coeff of REC
Assets 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.00429∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗ 0.00361∗∗∗
(0.000946) (0.000416) (0.000351) (0.00109) (0.000230)
Constant 0.206∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0698∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗
(0.00708) (0.00311) (0.00263) (0.00815) (0.00172)
Observations 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029
R2 0.475 0.094 0.172 0.548 0.193
Notes. This table presents the results of a beta to assets regression. The unit of observation is a firm-year. The
dependent variable is the coefficient of lag cash flow from operations, account payable/creditors, inventories,
operating income before depreciation and receivables. The independent variable is the assets. ***, **, or *
indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors are given below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 3.2 Regression of β to Assets and Assets-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
coeff of lag CFO coeff of PAY coeff of INV coeff of OIBD coeff of REC
Assets -0.0543∗∗∗ -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.00261∗ 0.0824∗∗∗ -0.00679∗∗∗
(0.00327) (0.00178) (0.00154) (0.00293) (0.000970)
(Assets)2 0.00593∗∗∗ 0.00113∗∗∗ 0.000551∗∗∗ -0.00862∗∗∗ 0.000741∗∗∗
(0.000227) (0.000124) (0.000107) (0.000204) (0.0000674)
Constant 0.468∗∗∗ -0.0680∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.00625) (0.00541) (0.0103) (0.00340)
Observations 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029
R2 0.685 0.162 0.192 0.835 0.278
Notes. This table presents the results of a beta to assets regression. The unit of observation is a firm-year. The
dependent variable is the coefficient of lag cash flow from operations, account payable/creditors, inventories,
operating income before depreciation and receivables. The independent variable is the assets and assets-
squared. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given below the coefficient estimates.
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Table 3.3 Assumption Check
(1) (2)
CFOt+1 CFOt+1
Account Payable/Creditors × Assets 0.00244∗∗∗ 0.00168∗∗∗
(0.000132) (0.000115)
Inventories × Assets -0.00181∗∗∗ -0.00117∗∗∗
(0.0000835) (0.0000724)
Operating Income Before Depreciation × Assets 0.166∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.000852) (0.00101)
Receivables × Assets -0.00208∗∗∗ -0.00162∗∗∗
(0.000150) (0.000131)





Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Overall R2 0.5836 0.6430
Notes. This table presents the results of an assumption check regression. The unit of observation is a
firm-year. The dependent variable is the cash flow from operations at the period t+1. The independent
variable is the interaction between account payable/creditors, inventories, operating income before
depreciation, receivables, cash flow from operations and the assets. ***, **, or * indicates that the coeff-
icient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given
below the coefficient estimates.
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tions with the firm sizes are statistically significant. Thus we could assume that the betas
are varying with firm size.
3.4 The Proposed Method
The extensive empirical literature on CFO forecasting documented cross-sectional het-
erogeneity of beta, indicating the limitation of cross-sectional or panel data regression-
based models, which assume the existence of a constant beta across all firms. Time series
regression-based predictive models capture the heterogeneity across firms but require a
long time series data which may not be available. A short time series will affect the effi-
ciency of the prediction.
The preliminary empirical analysis in the previous section provides strong evidence
that the idiosyncratic beta for each firm is closely related to the firm size. This finding
provides important information to use local learning to find "local" cross-sectional infor-
mation to improve upon the predictive power of single predictive time-series regressions.
There is an extensive literature on machine learning and nonparametric functional-
coefficient estimation, see, among other things, Bontempi et al. (2012), Hastie et al. (2009),
Zhang et al. (2002), Cai and Xiao (2012). The local learning approach assumes no a priori
knowledge on the constancy of the beta coefficient. It allows that the information about
coefficients is represented by only a subset of observations. This feature is particularly
relevant in the CFO model, where the beta values are only related to cross-sectional data
information that is "local" to its size.
In this paper, we propose a new predictive model that takes into account both local
information and time-series information. In particular, we look through the data set for
the "neighbor" of the size of the current firm and predicting that this firm will evolve in
the same manner as the neighbor did.
According to the empirical evidence, the betas vary with firm size. We consider the
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following model:
CFOi,t+1 = α + β(zi)′xi,t + ui,t+1 (3.18)
where zi is the size of firm i. In this model, we allow β to be dependent on the firm size,
in particular, we assume that beta is a smooth function of the firm size zi.
We next consider how to estimate the model (3.18) using panel data. Suppose that we
want to forecast, CFOr,t+1, the Cash Flow of a particular firm, say firm r, at time t + 1,
using all available information at time t. The basic procedure could be stated as follows:





s=1. We use both time series information upto t and also "local"
cross-sectional information for all firms that are similar to the specified firm. Such a device
allows the beta to be varying with firm size. However, by utilizing the "local" cross-
sectional information, the sample sizes in the above regression are many times than the
simple time series regression model. Denote the estimators by α̂ and β̂(·).
Then we move to the prediction of CFO for Firm r at time t + 1. To predict the cash
flow of firm r at time t + 1, i.e. CFOr,t+1. Notice that
CFOr,t+1 = α + β(zr)′xr,t + ur,t+1 (3.19)
our predictor for CFOr,t+1 is given by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̂ + β̂(zr)′xr,t. (3.20)
We need to obtain estimates α̂ and β̂(zr) first. For convenience, in our discussion
below, we denote z = zr, thus we need to estimate α and β(z).





















where ρ (·) is an appropriate criterion function (we consider the widely used ρ (·) = |·| or
ρ (·) = (·)2 in this paper), K(·) is a kernel function, and h = h(n) is a sequence of positive
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numbers tending to zero and it controls the amount of smoothing used in estimation. We


































Let the corresponding estimator from the above regression to be θ̃j(z) , then
β̃(z) = θ̃0(z) (3.24)
Step 3. Finally we predict the cash flow of firm r at time t + 1, i.e. CFOr,t+1, by
C̃FOr,t+1 = α̃ + β̃(zr)′xr,t (3.25)
In practice, a popular and useful choice of m and ρ (·) is "m = 1, and ρ (·) = (·)2".
Consider a semivarying coefficient model, which is an extension of the varying coef-
ficient model, which is an extension of the varying coefficient model, which is called the
semivarying-coefficient model. Procedures for estimation of the linear part and the non-
parametric part are developed, and their associated statistical properties are studied. The
proposed methods are illustrated by some simulation studies and a real example.
Suggest that a partially varying coefficient model allows appreciable flexibility on the
structure of fitted models. The proposed model allows for linearity in coefficients in some
variables and nonlinearity in other variables. In such a way, the model has the ability to
capture the individual variations and easing the so-called “curse of dimensionality".
3.5 Monte Carlo Simulations
We conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to examine the finite sample performance of the






t=1 according to the following description where n =
100. i = 1, · · ·, 100 and T = 200. t = 1, · · ·, 200.
Where we use both ui,t = iid N(0, 1) and ui,t = iid t(5), zi ∼ U[0, 1], xi,t = iid N(0, 1).
Then, we generate CFOi,t based on
CFOi,t = α + (1 + β1zi) xi,t−1 + ui,t (3.26)
using α = 1. We consider several values of β1 as β1 = 0, β1 = 0.5, β1 = 1, β1 = 2, and
β1 = 5. After generating the data, we start from T0 = 100, predict CFOi,t at time periods





using the three prediction methods (cross-sectional regression, time-series regression, and


































The advantages, as well as disadvantages of the forecast accuracy measures, are: 1)
RMSE measures the mean of the deviations, and MAPE measures the median of the de-
viations. 2) MAPE gives the same weight to all errors, the RMSE penalizes variance as
it gives errors with larger absolute values more weight than errors with smaller absolute
values. 3) MAPE has the disadvantage of being infinite or undefined if CFOi,t = 0, and it
also puts a heavier penalty on negative errors than on positive errors.
We choose the optimal bandwidth h by minimizing estimated AMISE over the band-
width h. We did two out-of-sample groups of simulations: The first group is that n = 100,
T = 200, starting from T0 = 100, predict CFOi,t at time periods t = 101, ..., 200, using
information up to time t − 1. And the second group is that n = 100, T = 100, starting
from T0 = 3, predict CFOi,t at time periods t = 4, ..., 100, using information up to time
t− 1.
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Table 3.4 Monte Carlo Comparison (MAPE) of Three Methods, n = 100 and T =
200
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Efficency 1/3 Efficiency 2/3
Parameters MAPE
ui,t = iid N(0, 1)
β1 = 0 2.4701 3.1865 2.4618 1.0034 1.2944
β1 = 0.5 2.6400 3.7770 2.6299 1.0038 1.4362
β1 = 1 2.5869 4.0587 2.3223 1.1139 1.7477
β1 = 2 2.8912 3.5767 2.7008 1.0705 1.3243
β1 = 5 3.6477 3.1097 2.3934 1.5241 1.2993
ui,t = iid t(5)
β1 = 0 2.9523 3.8040 2.9402 1.0041 1.2938
β1 = 0.5 5.3324 9.6390 5.3322 1.0000 1.8077
β1 = 1 3.1553 3.8691 3.0533 1.0334 1.2672
β1 = 2 3.0172 3.5155 2.7451 1.0991 1.2806
β1 = 5 3.7159 2.7651 2.1466 1.7311 1.2881
Notes. This table presents the MAPE results of a Monte Carlo simulations. The unit of
observation is a firm-year. Method 1 is the cross-sectional method. Method 2 is the time-
series method. Method 3 is the proposed method. Efficiency 1/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 1 on method 3. Similarly, Efficiency 2/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 2 on method 3. The number of firms and time periods is designed
as 100 and 200 respectively.
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Table 3.5 Monte Carlo Comparison (RMSE) of Three Methods, n = 100 and T =
200
Method1 Method 2 Method 3 Efficiency 1/3 Efficiency 2/3
Parameters RMSE
ui,t = iid N(0, 1)
β1 = 0 1.0261 1.4252 1.0264 0.9997 1.3885
β1 = 0.5 1.0374 1.6067 1.0301 1.0071 1.5598
β1 = 1 1.0671 1.8122 1.0347 1.0313 1.7514
β1 = 2 1.1754 2.2685 1.0464 1.1233 2.1679
β1 = 5 1.7469 3.7932 1.1003 1.5877 3.4474
ui,t = iid t(5)
β1 = 0 1.3075 1.6457 1.3077 0.9998 1.2585
β1 = 0.5 1.3214 1.8136 1.3101 1.0086 1.3843
β1 = 1 1.3521 2.0083 1.3132 1.0296 1.5293
β1 = 2 1.4590 2.4519 1.3215 1.1040 1.8554
β1 = 5 2.0307 3.9838 1.3621 1.4909 2.9247
Notes. This table presents the RMSE results of a Monte Carlo simulations. The unit of
observation is a firm-year. Method 1 is the cross-sectional method. Method 2 is the time-
series method. Method 3 is the proposed method. Efficiency 1/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 1 on method 3. Similarly, Efficiency 2/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 2 on method 3. The number of firms and time periods is designed
as 100 and 200 respectively.
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Table 3.6 Monte Carlo Comparison (MAPE) of Three Methods, n = 100 and T =
100
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Efficiency 1/3 Efficiency 2/3
Parameters MAPE
ui,t = iid N(0, 1)
β1 = 0 3.5214 5.9915 3.5312 0.9972 1.6967
β1 = 0.5 3.6324 4.7366 3.6119 1.0057 1.3114
β1 = 1 2.7979 3.8689 2.6514 1.0553 1.4592
β1 = 2 8.5294 8.8414 3.1696 2.6910 2.7894
β1 = 5 2.5774 3.0436 1.9812 1.3009 1.5362
ui,t = iid t(5)
β1 = 0 2.9507 4.1142 2.9079 1.0147 1.4148
β1 = 0.5 12.1027 18.0153 11.8537 1.0210 1.5198
β1 = 1 8.9982 13.4050 8.7984 1.0227 1.5236
β1 = 2 2.0346 2.9388 1.7395 1.1696 1.6895
β1 = 5 2.2551 2.9586 1.7798 1.2671 1.6623
Notes. This table presents the MAPE results of a Monte Carlo simulations. The unit of
observation is a firm-year. Method 1 is the cross-sectional method. Method 2 is the time-
series method. Method 3 is the proposed method. Efficiency 1/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 1 on method 3. Similarly, Efficiency 2/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 2 on method 3. The number of firms and time periods is designed
as 100 and 100 respectively.
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Table 3.7 Monte Carlo Comparison (RMSE) of Three Methods, n = 100 and T =
100
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Efficiency 1/3 Efficiency 2/3
Parameters RMSE
ui,t = iid N(0, 1)
β1 = 0 0.9975 1.4074 0.9994 0.9981 1.4082
β1 = 0.5 1.0127 1.6135 1.0031 1.0096 1.6085
β1 = 1 1.0515 1.8478 1.0077 1.0435 1.8337
β1 = 2 1.1890 2.3666 1.0201 1.1656 2.3200
β1 = 5 1.8772 4.0834 1.0795 1.7390 3.7827
ui,t = iid t(5)
β1 = 0 1.3173 1.6707 1.3211 0.9971 1.2646
β1 = 0.5 1.3308 1.8585 1.3236 1.0054 1.4041
β1 = 1 1.3629 2.0770 1.3266 1.0274 1.5657
β1 = 2 1.4780 2.5736 1.3343 1.1077 1.9288
β1 = 5 2.0957 4.2752 1.3693 1.5305 3.1222
Notes. This table presents the RMSE results of a Monte Carlo simulations. The unit of
observation is a firm-year. Method 1 is the cross-sectional method. Method 2 is the time-
series method. Method 3 is the proposed method. Efficiency 1/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 1 on method 3. Similarly, Efficiency 2/3 represents for the relative
effeciencies of method 2 on method 3. The number of firms and time periods is designed
as 100 and 100 respectively.
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The values of both MAPE and RMSE for method 1, method 2 and method 3 are sum-
marized in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 when T = 200 and Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 when
T = 100. To gauge the efficiency gain for the proposed method, we compute the ratios
of both MAPE and RMSE of method 1 and 2 over the MAPE and RMSE of the proposed
method, and the ratios are given in the right part of Table 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. From Table
3.4 and Table 3.5, we find that when true β1 = 0, there is no heterogeneity in the model.
The cross-sectional prediction method approximately equals the proposed method. Our
method is significantly better than other methods (the efficiency gain for the proposed
method is huge) when the heterogeneity is significant (or true β1 is large).
From Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, we could also find that when true β1 = 0, there is no
heterogeneity in the model, cross-sectional prediction method approximately equals the
proposed method. Our method is significantly better than other methods (the efficiency
gain for the proposed method is huge) when the heterogeneity is significant (or true β1 is
large).
Compare Table 3.4, 3.5 and Table 3.6, 3.7, the proposed method is significantly better
than other methods when the time periods T is small. It is evident that the semiparametric
predictor provides a much better estimator for the operating cash flow prediction than the
fully parametric models in the presence of heterogeneity. Therefore, one can conclude that
the proposed method performs very well compared to the misspecified linear model.
3.6 Empirical Applications
3.6.1 Data
We obtained data from the Compustat (North American). We constructed a time series of
quarterly observations for each cash flow series beginning in the first quarter of 2010 and
ending in the fourth quarter of 2018. Sample firms had calendar year-ends that met two
sampling criteria: (i) They had a complete time series of quarterly CFO reported in accor-
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dance with SFAS No. 95 across the aforementioned interval, and (2) they had a complete
time series of quarterly financial statement subcomponents necessary to operationalized
multivariate time-series regression model (MULT).
3.6.2 Key Variables
The dependent variable is the net cash flow from operating activities.
The first set of independent variables consisted of lagged values of the dependent
variable cash flow from operations. Intuitively, the selection of lagged cash flow variables
is consistent with the modeling procedures that rely on past values of the dependent
variable to predict future values.
The second set of independent variables included lagged values of accrual-based earn-
ings. We selected operating income before depreciation (OIBD) as the proxy for accrual-
based earnings since Wilson (1986) and Rayburn (1986) have determined that long-term
accruals possess little information content in a capital market setting.
The employment of the final set of independent variables (accounts receivable (REC,
accounts payable (PAY), and inventory (INV)) is consistent with Wilson’s use of current
accruals in his regression model. We disaggregate the current accruals variable into REC,
PAY, and INV to allow firm-specific parameter estimation for each subcomponent. We
stress that the selection of independent variables is based on our intuition regarding pos-
sible ways to improve existing cash flow prediction models.
3.6.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.8 shows the summary statistics of all the variables we used. Table 3.9 shows the
correlations between these variables. There are 38124 observations and 36 quarters in our
sample.
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Table 3.8 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Account Payable/Creditors 3175.735 37748.814 0.008 999486
Assets 13454.349 83796.051 0.560 2002213
Inventories 1559.013 14503.343 0.004 415293
Cash Flow From Operations 563.5 2883.891 -52280.758 102896.148
Operating Income Before Depreciation 307.171 1070.59 -5431.191 29019
Receivables 2915.15 32727.155 0.003 831427
N 38124
Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of firm-year dependent and independent variables. The
sample consists of all firms in the North American.
Table 3.9 Correlations
Assets PAY INV CFO OIBD REC
Assets 1.0000
PAY 0.9239 1.0000
INV 0.8317 0.7777 1.0000
CFO 0.4461 0.3136 0.2453 1.0000
OIBD 0.5365 0.3288 0.3391 0.7430 1.0000
REC 0.9317 0.9870 0.7700 0.3168 0.3407 1.0000
Notes. Assets represent the average of the assets across the periods. PAY is the
accounts payable, INV is the inventories, CFO is the cash flow from operations,
OIBD is the operating income before depreciation, and REC is the receivables.
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3.6.4 Quarterly CFO Prediction Models
We compare the proposed model with a wide range of predictive models that have been
used in the CFO forecasting literature. We also examine the performance of these models
for different choices of covariates and error structures. For the convenience of compari-
son, we discuss below each of the models used in our empirical investigation.
Method 1 (Cross-section) and 2 (Panel):
The first model that we consider is a widely used prediction based on the following
cross-sectional regression.
CFOi,t = a+ b1OIBDi,t−1 + b2RECi,t−1 + b3 INVi,t−1 + b4PAYi,t−1 + ei,t, i = 1, ..., n. (3.29)
where CFOit is firm i’s cash flow from operations at time t, OIBDi,t−1 is firm i’s operating
income before depreciation at time t − 1, RECi,t−1 is firm i’s receivables at time t − 1,
INVi,t−1 is firm i’s inventories at time t− 1, PAYi,t−1 is firm i’s accounts payable at time
t− 1, and ei,t is the error term.
The traditional approach run this regression for over firms i = 1, ..., n, at time period
t. Let â, b̂1, b̂2, b̂3, b̂4 be the estimators, then, for any firm r, CFOr,t+1 is predicted by
ĈFOr,t+1 = â + b̂1OIBDr,t + b̂2RECr,t + b̂3 INVr,t + b̂4PAYr,t. (3.30)
In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 1".
We also consider a similar predictor using panel data regression estimator of the above
model. i.e. the model (3.29) is estimated based on a panel regression over observations
(s = 2, · · ·, t, i = 1, ..., n), and then the prediction for CFOr,t+1 is constructed based on
these panel regression estimators of (a, b1, b2, b3, b4). In our paper, we refer this predic-
tor to "Predictor 2".
Method 3 (Time-series) and 4 (Panel):
The second model is the traditional time series predictor based on the time-series re-
gression
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CFOr,s = α + ΦCFOr,s−1 + er,s, s = 2, ..., t. (3.31)
for each firm. Since the estimator of Φ is based on firm r information only, it captures
the idiosyncratic firm-specific effect. Let Φ̂ be the time series regression estimator, then,
CFOr,t+1 is predicted by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̂ + Φ̂CFOr,t. (3.32)
In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 3".
Similar to our treatment on model 1, we also consider a similar predictor using panel
data regression estimator of the above model. i.e., the model (3.31) is estimated based on
a panel regression over observations (s = 2, · · ·, t, i = 1, ..., n), and then the prediction for
CFOr,t+1 is constructed based on these panel regression estimators of Φ. Notice that such
an estimator is no longer firm-specific. In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor
4".
Method 5 (Times-series) and 6 (Panel):
Lorek and Willinger (1996) developed a multivariate time-series regression model
(MULT) that employs lagged values of CFO, operating income, receivables, payables, and
inventory in a time series regression, which allows for firm-specific parameter estimation.
The time series regression model can be written as
CFOit = a + b1CFOi,t−1 + b2CFOi,t−4 + b3OIBDi,t−1 + b4OIBDi,t−4 (3.33)
+b5RECi,t−1 + b6 INVi,t−1 + b7PAYi,t−1 + eit,
Where CFOit is operating cash flows for firm i at time t, OIBDi,t−j is operating income
before depreciation for firm i at time t− j, RECi,t−1 is accounts receivable for firm i at time
t− 1, INVi,t−1 is inventory for firm i at time t− 1, PAYi,t−1 is accounts payable for firm i
at time t− 1, and eit is a current disturbance term.
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For each firm, they run a time series regression over observations s = 2, · · ·, t. Since
the estimators are based on specified firm information only, they capture the idiosyncratic
firm-specific effect. CFOi,t+1 is predicted using the parameter estimators based on the
above time series regression. In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 5".
Again, as our treatment on models 1 and 2, we consider the predictor using panel
data regression estimator of the above model. i.e. the model (3.33) is estimated based on
a panel regression over observations (s = 2, · · ·, t, i = 1, ..., n), and then the prediction for
CFOr,t+1 is constructed based on these panel regression estimators of (a, b1, · · ·, b7). In
our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 6".
Method 7:
This is the simple version of our proposed method that uses local learning. However,
compared to the more advanced versions of our model (Models 7 and 8), we only consider
a simple error structure. In particular, we estimate the coefficients based on
CFOr,s+1 = α+ β1(zr)CFOr,s + β2(zr)OIBDr,s + β3(zr)RECr,s + β4(zr)INVr,s + β5(zr)PAYr,s +ur,t+1
(3.34)
where zi is the average assets for the firm i.
Our predictor for CFOr,t+1 is given by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̂+ β̂1(zr)CFOr,t + β̂2(zr)OIBDr,t + β̂3(zr)RECr,t + β̂4(zr)INVr,t + β̂5(zr)PAYr,t.
(3.35)
In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 7".
The next few models consider more complicate error structures. For the convenience
of explanation, the next 4 models employ the Box-Jenkins notation ((pdq)×(PDQ) no-
tation) where: p(P) is the number of regular (seasonal) autoregressive parameters, d(D)
is the number of consecutive (seasonal) differences, and q(Q) is the number of regular
(seasonal) moving-average parameters.
Method 8 (Time-series) and 9 (Panel):
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The SAR ARMA Model (000)×(100) 1. Lorek et al. (1993) developed a univariate
seasonal autoregressive (SAR) ARMA model, (000)×(100).
CFOit = a + ΦCFOi,t−4 + eit −Θei,t−4 (3.36)
where CFOit is operating cash flows for firm i at time t, Φ is an autoregressive parameter,
Θ1 is a seasonal moving-average parameter, eit is a current disturbance term.
For each firm, Lorek et al. (1993) run a time series regression over observations over
s = 2, · · ·, t. The estimators are based on specified firm information only, thus capture
the idiosyncratic firm-specific effect. CFOi,t+1 is predicted using the parameter estima-
tors based on the above time series regression. In our paper, we refer this predictor to
"Predictor 8".
Again, we consider the predictor using panel data regression estimator of the above
model. i.e. the model (3.36) is estimated based on a panel regression over observations
(s = 2, · · ·, t, i = 1, ..., n), and then the prediction for CFOr,t+1 is constructed based on
these panel regression estimators. In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 9
".
Method 10 (Time-series) and 11 (Panel):
The BROWN-ROZEFF ARIMA Model (100)×(011). This model was originally pro-
posed by Brown and Rozeff (1979) several decades ago as a premier, a statistically-based
predictive model for quarterly EPS (earnings per share). Then, Lorek and Willinger (2011)
first document the descriptive fit of the (100) × (011) ARIMA model on quarterly CFO
data. The regression model is:
1Using customary (pdq)× (PDQ) notation, quarterly earnings time-series models popularized by Brown
and Rozeff (1979) and Griffin (1977). The (p, P) variables represent the number of autoregressive or seasonal
autoregressive parameters; (d, D) represent the levels of consecutive or seasonal differencing and (q, Q)
represents the number of moving-average or seasonal moving-average parameters.
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CFOit = a + CFOi,t−4 + Φ1(CFOi,t−1 − CFOi,t−5) + eit −Θ1ei,t−4 (3.37)
where CFOit is operating cash flows for firm i at time t, Φ1 is an autoregressive parameter,
Θ1 is a seasonal moving-average parameter, eit is a current disturbance term.
For each firm, Lorek and Willinger (2011) run a time series regression over observa-
tions over s = 2, · · ·, t. CFOi,t+1 is predicted using the parameter estimators based on the
above time series regression. In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 10".
Again, we consider the predictor using panel data regression estimator of the above
model. i.e. the model (3.37) is estimated based on a panel regression over observations
(s = 2, · · ·, t, i = 1, ..., n), and then the prediction for CFOr,t+1 is constructed based on
these panel regression estimators. In our paper, we refer this predictor to "Predictor 11 ".
Method 12:
This is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). We con-
sider the following model:
CFOr,t+1 = α + β(zr)CFOr,t + γ(zr)Xr,t + ur,t+1 − λ(zr)ur,t−3 (3.38)
which can be estimated using information in a neighborhood of zr. Here Xi,t repre-
sents all the other explanatory variables including CFOi,t (cash flow from operations),
OIBDi,t (operating income before depreciation), RECi,t (receivables), INVi,t (inventories)
and PAYi,t (accounts payable) for firm i at time t.
Given zr, we can select an appropriate neighborhood of zr, denote it by I(zr), then we
estimate a MULT-ARMA model
CFOi,s = α + βCFOi,s−1 + γXi,s + ui,s − λui,s−4 (3.39)
using observations over i ∈ I(zr), and s = 2, ..., t.
Thus, our predictor for CFOr,t+1 can then be obtained as
C̃FOr,t+1 = α̃ + β̃(zr)CFOr,t + γ̃(zr)Xr,t − λ̃(zr)ur,t−3 (3.40)
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We denote this predictor by "Predictor 12".
Method 13:
The Proposed Method with Quarterly Seasonal Adjustment (ARIMA). We consider
CFOr,t+1 = CFOr,t−3 + α + β(zr)[CFOr,t − CFOr,t−4] + γ(zr)Xr,t + ur,t+1 − λ(zr)ur,t−3
(3.41)
which can be estimated using information in a neighborhood of zr. Here Xi,t represents
the same group of explanatory variables as Model 7.
Parallel to the approach in Predictor 12, given zr, we can select an appropriate neigh-
borhood of zr, denote it by I(zr), the we estimate a MULT-ARIMA model
CFOi,t = CFOi,t−4 + α + β[CFOi,t−1 − CFOi,t−5] + γXi,t + ui,t − λui,t−4, (3.42)
using observations over i ∈ I(zr), and s = 2, ..., t.
Our predictor for CFOr,t+1 can then be obtained as
C̃FOr,t+1 = CFOr,t−3 + α̃ + β̃(zr)[CFOr,t − CFOr,t−4] + γ̃(zr)Xr,t − λ̃(zr)ur,t−3. (3.43)
We denote this predictor by "Predictor 13".
Table 3.10 summarizes all of the methods.
3.6.5 Dealing with the Latent Variables
Model
Predicting quarterly cash flow for operations.
CFOi,t = α + β(zi)CFOi,t−1 + γ(zi)Xi,t + ui,t + λ(zi)ui,t−4 (3.44)
Given data {CFOi,t, Xi,t, zi,t, i = 1, · · ·, n; t = 1, · · ·, T}, we want to predict CFOi0,T+1.
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Table 3.10 Method Summarization
Method Dimension Dependent Independent Note
1 Cross-sectional Y X previous one period
2 Panel Y X all previous periods
3 Time-series Y lag Y firm-by-firm
4 Panel Y lag Y homogeneous β
5 Time-series Y lag Y + X firm-by-firm
6 Panel Y lag Y + X homogeneous β
7 Panel Y lag Y + X 2 + 4 (heterogeneous β)
8 Time-series Y lag Y + lag U firm-by-firm
9 Panel Y lag Y + lag U homogeneous beta
10 Time-series ∆Y ∆lag Y + lag U firm-by-firm
11 Panel ∆Y ∆lag Y + lag U homogeneous beta
12 Panel Y lag Y + lag U 7 + 9 (heterogeneous β)
13 Panel ∆Y ∆lag Y + lag U 7 + 11 (heterogeneous β)
Notes. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2 is the cross-sectional method with
panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method. Method 4 is the time-series method
with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries regression model (MULT). Method 6
is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version of our proposed method that uses
local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model. Method 9 is the seasonal
autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model.
Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estimation. Method 12 is our proposed
method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13 is our proposed method with
quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA). lag U represents for moving average term.
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Two-step Estimation




(CFOi,t − α− β(zi)CFOi,t−1 − γ(zi)Xi,t) = ui,t (3.45)

















θj(zi)Xi,t−l = ui,t (3.47)
We consider the following Two-Step Estimation
1. Step 1. For each individual i, We conduct a preliminary long autoregression

















[CFOl,t− ρ01− ρ02(zlt− zi)−∑Kj=1 ρj1CFOl,t−j−∑Kj=1 ρj2(zlt−
zi)CFOl,t−j −∑Kj=0 θj1Xl,t−j −∑Kj=0 θj2(zlt − zi)Xl,t−j]2
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Obtain estimate ûi,t for i = 1, · · ·, n.








[CFOl,t − α− β0CFOl,t−1 − β1(zlt − zi)CFOl,t−1 − γ0Xl,t−1 −




Under smoothness condition of coefficient functions β(z), for any given firm size z = zr,
β(zi)) can be approximated by a polynomial function as
β(zi) ≈ β(z) +
dβ(z)
dz
(zi − z) + · · · (3.51)
Taking first order expansion:
CFOi,t ≈ α+ β0CFOi,t−1 + β1(zi,t− z)CFOi,t−1 +γ0Xi,t +γ1(zi,t− z)Xi,t +ui,t +λ0ui,t−4 +λ1(zi,t− z)ui,t−4
(3.52)
Thus,
ui,t = CFOi,t− α− β0CFOi,t−1− β1(zi,t− z)CFOi,t−1−γ0Xi,t−γ1(zi,t− z)Xi,t−λ0ui,t−4−λ1(zi,t− z)ui,t−4
(3.53)








Conditional on {ui,0, ui,−1, · · ··, ui,−4} and CFOi,0, then, given θ = (α, β0, β1, γ0, γ1, λ0, λ1),
ui,1 = CFOi,1 − α− β0CFOi,0 − β1(zi,1 − z)CFOi,0 − γ0Xi,1 − γ1(zi,1 − z)Xi,1,
ui,2 = CFOi,2 − α− β0CFOi,1 − β1(zi,2 − z)CFOi,1 − γ0Xi,2 − γ1(zi,2 − z)Xi,2,
ui,3 = CFOi,3 − α− β0CFOi,2 − β1(zi,3 − z)CFOi,2 − γ0Xi,3 − γ1(zi,3 − z)Xi,3,
ui,4 = CFOi,4 − α− β0CFOi,3 − β1(zi,4 − z)CFOi,3 − γ0Xi,4 − γ1(zi,4 − z)Xi,4,
ui,5 = CFOi,5 − α− β0CFOi,4 − β1(zi,5 − z)CFOi,4 − γ0Xi,5 − γ1(zi,5 − z)Xi,5 − λ0ui,1 − λ1(zi,5 − z)ui,1
· · · · · ·
ui,t = CFOi,t − α− β0CFOi,t−1 − β1(zi,t − z)CFOi,t−1 − γ0Xi,t − γ1(zi,t − z)Xi,t − λ0ui,t−4 − λ1(zi,t − z)ui,t−4
, for any t ≥ 5
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Figure 3.2 Empirical Application: Forecasting
Notes: This figure represents the forecasting results of a specific firm in the sample. Method 7
is the proposed method. Method 12 is the proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment
(ARMA). Method 13 is the proposed method with quarterly seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
Notice that the above ui,t are depdent on (α, β0, β1, γ0, γ1, λ0, λ1), ui,t = ui,t (α, β0, β1, γ0, γ1, λ0, λ1),
we estimate the parameters by












ui,t (α, β0, β1, γ0, γ1, λ0, λ1)
2 (3.55)
3.6.6 Empirical Results
Figure 3.2 compares the forecasting results of the operating cash flow using the proposed
method 7, 12 and 13 and the real value for a specific firm in our sample. Figure 3.2 shows
that our proposed model could be regarded as a good predictor for the trend and fluctu-
ations of the operating cash flow.
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Table 3.11 Empirical Application (MAPE and RE Based on MAPE), n = 1029 and
T = 36
Method MAPE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 6.9999 2.9903
2 (Panel) 3.8100 1.6276
3 (Time-series) 3.7885 1.6184
4 (Panel) 3.9468 1.6860
5 (Time-series) 4.1638 1.7788
6 (Panel) 2.7964 1.1946
7 (The proposed) 3.8072 1.6264
8 (Time-series) 3.6660 1.5661
9 (Panel) 2.3666 1.0110
10 (Time-series) 6.5354 2.7919
11 (Panel) 2.5984 1.1100
12 (ARMA) 2.4965 1.0665
13 (ARIMA) 2.3409 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13
is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
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Table 3.12 Empirical Application (RMSE and RE Based on RMSE), n = 1029 and
T = 36
Method RMSE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 0.1434 1.6377
2 (Panel) 0.1100 1.2565
3 (Time-series) 0.1149 1.3123
4 (Panel) 0.1105 1.2621
5 (Time-series) 0.1419 1.6203
6 (Panel) 0.0884 1.0102
7 (The proposed) 0.1088 1.2431
8 (Time-series) 0.9033 10.3162
9 (Panel) 0.0971 1.1094
10 (Time-series) 2.9178 33.3242
11 (Panel) 0.0944 1.0784
12 (ARMA) 0.0894 1.0206
13 (ARIMA) 0.0876 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13
is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
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The values of MAPE and RMSE for methods 1-13 are summarized in Table 3.11 and
Table 3.12. To gauge the efficiency gain for the proposed method, we compute the relative
effects of MAPE for methods 1-13 over MAPE of the proposed method 13 in Table 3.11.
Moreover, we also compute the relative effects of RMSE for methods 1-13 over RMSE
of the proposed method 13 in Table 3.12. From Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, we can find
that the pro- posed method could beat all of the existing methods in terms of MAPE and
RMSE in both the baseline framework and the quarterly model with seasonal adjustment
framework.
3.7 Robustness Check
3.7.1 Using Initial Value of Firm Size
Due to the endogeneity concern, we changed the firm size from the mean value across the
periods to the initial value. The results are similar to the baseline results, which means
the proposed method is robust.
The value of MAPE and RMSE for method 1-13 are summarized in Table 3.13 and
Table 3.14. To gauge the efficiency gain for the proposed method, we compute the relative
effects of MAPE for method 1-13 over MAPE of the proposed method 13 in Table 3.13.
Moreover, we also compute the relative effects of RMSE for method 1-13 over RMSE of
the proposed method 13 in Table 3.14. From Table 3.13 and Table 3.14, we could find
that the proposed method could beat all of the existing methods, consider MAPE and
RMSE in both the baseline framework and the quarterly model with seasonal adjustment
framework.
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Table 3.13 Initial Value (MAPE and RE Based on MAPE), n = 1029 and T = 36
Method MAPE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 6.9999 2.9735
2 (Panel) 3.8100 1.6185
3 (Time-series) 3.7885 1.6093
4 (Panel) 3.9468 1.6766
5 (Time-series) 4.1638 1.7688
6 (Panel) 2.7964 1.1879
7 (The proposed) 3.8066 1.6170
8 (Time-series) 3.6660 1.5573
9 (Panel) 2.3666 1.0053
10 (Time-series) 6.5354 2.7762
11 (Panel) 2.5984 1.1038
12 (ARMA) 2.4961 1.0603
13 (ARIMA) 2.3541 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13
is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
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Table 3.14 Initial Value (RMSE and RE Based on RMSE), n = 1029 and T = 36
Method RMSE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 0.1434 1.6948
2 (Panel) 0.1100 1.3003
3 (Time-series) 0.1149 1.3581
4 (Panel) 0.1105 1.3060
5 (Time-series) 0.1419 1.6767
6 (Panel) 0.0884 1.0454
7 (The proposed) 0.1094 1.2932
8 (Time-series) 0.9033 10.6757
9 (Panel) 0.0971 1.1481
10 (Time-series) 2.9178 34.4854
11 (Panel) 0.0944 1.1160
12 (ARMA) 0.0887 1.0489
13 (ARIMA) 0.0846 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13
is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
174
3.7.2 Including Firm Size in Each Prediction Method
Due to the number of variables concern, we add the additional variable firm size in ev-
ery method. The results are also very similar to the baseline results, which means the
proposed method is robust.
The value of MAPE and RMSE for method 1-13 are summarized in Table 3.15 and
Table 3.16. To gauge the efficiency gain for the proposed method, we compute the relative
effects of MAPE for method 1-13 over MAPE of the proposed method 13 in Table 3.15.
Moreover, we also compute the relative effects of RMSE for method 1-13 over RMSE of
the proposed method 13 in Table 3.16. From Table 3.15 and Table 3.16, we could find
that the proposed method could beat all of the existing methods, consider MAPE and
RMSE in both the baseline framework and the quarterly model with seasonal adjustment
framework.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
We provide empirical results supportive of a quarterly CFO prediction model that uses
firm specific time series quarterly CFO information, but also allows the coefficient estima-
tors (beta parameters) to be varying with firm size. Specifically, our estimation method
utilizes "local" cross-sectional information to improve upon the predictive power of single
predictive time series regressions. We compare our proposed method with the prediction
models in existing accounting literature and find our method provides better quarterly
CFO predictions in terms of both MAPE and RMSE. This methodological improvement
in quarterly CFO prediction should be of interests to investors and creditors in their firm
valuation methodology, and to accounting and finance researchers who are developing
statistical proxies for market expectation on future quarterly CFOs. The proposed fore-
casting model can also be easily applied to a number of settings that involve making pre-
dictions, for example, the prediction of stock price, future revenues and future earnings.
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Table 3.15 Including Firm Size (MAPE and RE Based on MAPE), n = 1029 and T
= 36
Method MAPE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 6.9453 2.9670
2 (Panel) 3.8208 1.6322
3 (Time-series) 3.9583 1.6909
4 (Panel) 3.9471 1.6862
5 (Time-series) 3.7002 1.5807
6 (Panel) 2.8017 1.1969
7 (The proposed) 3.8072 1.6264
8 (Time-series) 4.4947 1.9201
9 (Panel) 2.3684 1.0118
10 (Time-series) 4.2232 1.8041
11 (Panel) 2.5981 1.1099
12 (ARMA) 2.5065 1.0707
13 (ARIMA) 2.3409 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13
is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARIMA).
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Table 3.16 Including Firm Size (RMSE and RE Based on RMSE), n = 1029 and T =
36
Method RMSE Relative Efficiencies on Method 13
1 (Cross-sectional) 0.1415 1.6158
2 (Panel) 0.1100 1.2563
3 (Time-series) 0.1224 1.3982
4 (Panel) 0.1105 1.2621
5 (Time-series) 0.1501 1.7144
6 (Panel) 0.0884 1.0100
7 (The proposed) 0.1088 1.2431
8 (Time-series) 0.4170 4.7622
9 (Panel) 0.0971 1.1094
10 (Time-series) 0.1517 1.7323
11 (Panel) 0.0944 1.0784
12 (ARMA) 0.0897 1.0246
13 (ARIMA) 0.0876 1.0000
Notes. The observations begining in the first quarter of 2010 and ending in the fourth quarter of
2018. There are 1029 firms in our sample. Method 1 is the simple cross-sectional method. Method 2
is the cross-sectional method with panel estimation. Method 3 is the simple time-series method.
Method 4 is the time-series method with panel estimation. Method 5 is the multivariate time-sries
regression model (MULT). Method 6 is MULT with panel estimation. Method 7 is the simple version
of our proposed method that uses local learning. Method 8 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA
model. Method 9 is the seasonal autoregressive ARMA model with panel estimation. Method 10 is
the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model. Method 11 is the Brown-Rozeff ARIMA model with panel estim-
ation. Method 12 is our proposed method with quarterly-seasonal adjustment (ARMA). Method 13




Under smoothness condition of coefficient functions β(z), for any given firm size z, β(zi))
can be approximated by a polynomial function as
β(zi) ≈ β(z) +
dβ(z)
dz
(zi − z) + · · ·+
dmβ(z)
dzm
(zi − z)m/m !,






θTj xi,t (zi − z)j,
where θj =
djβ(z)
dzj /j! for 0 ≤ j ≤ m. Based on this motivation, we estimate α and β(z)




















where ρ (·) is an appropriate criterion function (we may use either ρ (·) = |·| or ρ (·) =
(·)2 in this paper), K(·) is a kernel function, and h = h(n) is a sequence of positive num-
bers tending to zero and it controls the amount of smoothing used in estimation.
The we move to the prediction of CFO for Firm r at time t + 1. To predict the cash flow
of firm r at time t + 1, i.e. CFOr,t+1. Notice that
CFOr,t+1 = α + β(zr)′xr,t + ur,t+1
our predictor is given by
ĈFOr,t+1 = α̂ + β̂(zr)′xr,t.
When we choose m = 1, and ρ (·) = (·)2, we have
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CFOis − α− βT0 xi,s−1 − βT1 xi,s−1 (zis − z)
= CFOis −
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xi,s−1 (zis − z)
 .
Let Kis = K((zi,s − z) /h), then

































Thus, the first order condition corresponding to the local optimization with a quadratic
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